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Introduction 
 
 
Recent changes in agrifood supply chains, such is the need for quality improvement and 
control, enhanced information exchange, and increased customer responsiveness, have made 
the introduction of Supply Chain Practices (SCPs) essential for effective and efficient 
transactions. Adopting practices such as product standardization, supplier partnership and 
information exchange have resulted on better efficiency and economic performance (Fearne et 
al., 2006; Van der Vorst et al., 2007). Producers, traders and processors are able to obtain 
better control over production and distribution, to improve quality, to obtain more reliable 
supply, and rationalize logistic processes in the supply chain (Van der Vorst et al., 2007). 
 
Most research on SCPs has focused on the potential benefits; however, under what conditions 
these benefits will be obtained has hardly been subject of study. Humphrey (2006) has 
mentioned the complexity associated to adoption of SCPs; Raynaud et al. (2005) have called 
the attention on the specificity of the assets involved and the uncertainty of the context in 
which the transaction is given; and Van der Vorst et al. (2007) have emphasized the 
importance of trust among the supply chain organizations when SCPs are adopted. These 
studies only begin to inform us on the institutional and organizational conditions that favour 
the application of new SCPs. To further the scientific knowledge on the adoption of SCPs in 
agrifood supply chains, particularly in fresh produce chains, we have studied the introduction 
of SCPs in the avocado industry in Mexico. 
 
The main objective in this thesis is to explain the relationship between particular supply chain 
practices and inter-organizational arrangements, and to explain how particular combinations 
of supply chain practices and inter-organizational arrangements result in higher performance 
in the Mexican avocado industry. 
 
This introductory chapter starts with the research background by providing a description of 
the Mexican avocado industry. Section 1.2 addresses the problem statement and research 
questions. Section 1.3 discusses the theoretical perspective and research design. Section 1.4 
describes the research design. Section 1.5 summarizes each of the four main chapters in the 
thesis. Finally, Section 1.6 presents the overall conclusion and discussion. 
 
1.1 Research background  
 
Mexico is the word leader in production, consumption and exports of fresh avocado (Evans 
and Nalampang, 2006). More than 95% of all production (more than one million of tons 
annually) is consumed fresh; the other 5% is processed into avocado pulp and frozen 
guacamole paste, avocado oil, and frozen sliced avocado (Sanchez, 2007). 70% of total 
avocado production is consumed domestically, while the other 30% is exported. Over the last 
decade, export to the USA has grown substantially (see Figure 1.1), now representing 
approximately 20% of total production. Other foreign destinations for the Mexican avocado 
are Japan, Central America, Canada, and Europe, together accounting for almost 10% of 
production.
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Under this growth of Mexican avocado export, a new configuration of the Mexican avocado 
industry has developed since the non-tariff barriers that prohibited Mexican fresh avocado 
exports to the US market were eliminated in 1997 and phytosanitary regulations were 
introduced (Ortiz, 2007; Sanchez, 2007: 67).1 Nowadays, two supply chains can be identified: 
an international chain for high quality avocado and a domestic chain for low quality product. 
Products in the international supply chain must not only comply with phytosanitary 
regulations, but should also score high on other quality attributes such as size, colour, ripeness 
and product appearance. Products in the domestic supply chain do not have to meet export 
quality standards. Figure 1.2 shows the structure of the two main supply chains.  
 
In the international supply chain, producers with phytosanitary certification sell their product 
to export packers who have followed two forward supply chain coordination strategies. One 
group of export packers has forwardly integrated with export trading companies. Another 
group has established strategic alliances with export traders. In the first group, the product is 
directly sent to foreign supermarkets. In the second group, the close relationship between 
packer and trader facilitates a continue flow of information about the demand for particular 
quality and quantity, prices, and customer specific logistic requirements. In this group, traders 
send the product to foreign wholesalers, who sell the avocado mainly to supermarkets 
                                                 
1 In 1914, the US government established phytosanitary measures that prohibited Mexican avocado exports to 
the US market. On February 5, 1997, the ban on Mexican avocado imports into the USA was lifted. To allow 
export of Mexican avocado to the USA, the US Department of Agriculture requires verification of compliance to 
the phytosanitary regulations, which are inspected by the US Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services 
(APHIS). In addition, a continuous program of pest control must be followed by Mexican producers (Sanchez, 
2007: 49). 
-
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Figure 1.1 Development of Mexican avocado export to the USA (1998-2008)
Source: Sanchez (2007), SAGARPA (2009) 
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(Sanchez, 2007). Avocado commercialised in the international supply chain has a higher and 
more uniform quality compared to product sold through the domestic supply chain. The 
international supply chain is characterized by consistency in timing and quality of deliveries, 
long distance transporting, a closed cold chain, and often specialized packaging. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The domestic supply chain consists of two subchains. The first handles avocado coming from 
producers that comply with phytosanitary requirements but do not meet export quality 
standards. This product is shipped from the export packaging houses to distribution centres of 
national supermarkets. This subchain accounts for about 26% of total avocado production. In 
the second subchain, the product does not comply with phytosanitary requirements. Producers 
sell to non-export packaging houses, who resell the product to different wholesalers, which 
ship to small and medium-sized retailers. This second subchain accounts for about 44% of 
total avocado production (Sanchez, 2007). 
 
1.2 Problem statement and objectives of the study 
 
Producers and packers of fruits and vegetables in developing countries are facing a number of 
supply chain challenges (Humphrey, 2006; Jaffee and Henson, 2004; Reardon and Berdegue, 
2002; Shepherd, 2005). These challenges are (1) increased stringency of food safety and 
phytosanitary standards; (2) a shift from product standards to process standards; (3) a trend to 
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complement public, mandatory standards with private standards such as BRC, Global-GAP 
and Safe Quality Food; and (4) the rise of supermarkets, which use more centralized 
purchasing systems and require large volumes of uniform quality. 
 
Mexican avocado producers have the opportunity to enhance exports to the USA. This new 
export opportunity and the concomitant introduction of strict phytosanitary requirements have 
led to a number of specific supply chain challenges for the Mexican avocado industry, such as 
the need to enhance product quality, create reliable supply, and improve coordination between 
supply chain actors (Ramos, 2007; Sanchez, 2007). In addition, as avocado is a seasonal 
product, the industry is faced with specific supply chain challenges such as large variation in 
the demand for transportation, storage and packaging facilities, making logistic planning more 
complicated (Sanchez, 2007). 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyse the impact of the introduction of particular 
supply chain practices on organization and performance in the Mexican avocado industry. To 
obtain this objective we have collected data from producers and buyers in the Mexican 
avocado industry on the three key constructs: inter-organizational relationships, supply chain 
practices, and performance. By analysing the interaction among these constructs we seek to 
contribute to both a theoretical and practical understanding of the technical and organizational 
tools to enhance quality performance in a supply chain context.  
 
In obtaining the main objective, four specific objectives have been elaborated: 
 
1. To describe the technical and organizational solutions that packers in the Mexican 
avocado industry have introduced in dealing with the main supply chain challenges.  
2. To analyse what types of contractual arrangements avocado producers have been used in 
adopting particular quality standards in the Mexican avocado industry. 
3. To analyse the conditions that affect the level of inter-firm coordination between packers 
and buyers. 
4. To analyse how characteristics of the producer-packer relationship affect producer 
performance. 
 
1.3 Theoretical framework 
 
The present thesis uses three theoretical approaches to conduct the analyses on supply chain 
practices and inter-organizational relationships: Supply Chain Management, Transaction Cost 
Economics, and Organization Theory. 
 
Supply Chain Management (SCM) is a rapidly evolving area of interest that has usually been 
applied in studying the interface between processors and its suppliers or retailers and its 
suppliers (Van der Vorst et al., 2007). Supply Chain Practices (SCPs) such as standardization, 
supplier relationship and information exchange has been referred to the SCM literature as 
organizational and technical tools to increase efficiency and competitiveness (Van der Vorst 
et al., 2007; Taylor and Fearne, 2009). These practices not only stand for integration of 
various processes running across functions and organizations, they also imply that 
transactions are grouped and managed as chains. 
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Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) has become the predominant theoretical framework for 
explaining inter-organizational relationships (Geyskens et al., 2006). TCE focuses on the 
efficiency of the transaction. Transaction costs will be reduced when there is a good match 
between the attributes of a transaction and the governance structure in which the transaction is 
embedded. Failures to align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance 
structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, result in competitive disadvantage 
(Williamson, 1991). Thus, parties in a dyadic relationship are motivated to craft efficient 
organizational forms to achieve lower transaction costs and thus better performance 
(Williamson, 1985). While TCE can inform which (formal) governance mechanisms may 
reduce the transaction costs that result from uncertainty and asset specificity, this approach 
has at least two limitations. First, it ignores the impact of an ongoing relationship on the 
building of cooperative behaviour, which can reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour that 
is so central to the TCE (Nooteboom, 2004). Second, because of its assumption of conflicting 
interests between transaction partners, it ignores the possibility of transactions costs even 
when interests are fully aligned (Gulati et al., 2005). Such transaction costs (or better: 
coordination costs) are related to the cognitive limitations of human beings in gathering and 
processing all relevant information concerning the transaction. Recently, several authors have 
emphasized that particular relationship characteristics allow more efficient coordination 
between buyer and seller activities and thereby enhance performance (Dyer and Chu, 2003; 
Mesquita and Brush, 2008; Paulraj et al., 2008). 
 
In addition to SCM and TCE, studies in the field organization theory have emphasized the 
importance of particular relational characteristics in dyadic relationships in reducing the 
propensity of opportunistic behaviour as well as in improving coordination. Organisational 
theory posits that forms of organizational interactions are based on the gradual development 
of relationship features such as trust (Barney and Hansen, 1994), reputation (Kreps and 
Wilson, 1982), expectation of continuity (Dwyer et al., 1987), and commitment (Noordewier 
et al., 1990). These characteristics of the inter-organizational relationship have the effect of 
reducing the chance of behavioural opportunism (Artz and Brush, 2000; Brouthers et al., 
2007; Dyer, 1996 and 1997; Heide and John, 1992). In addition, these characteristics improve 
information exchange and thereby lead to more efficient coordination among the transaction 
partners (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Mesquita and Brush, 2008; Paulraj et al., 2008). 
 
The objectives presented above will be achieved using a theoretical framework that integrates 
the three theoretical approaches. Each of these theoretical approaches offers its own focus, 
assumptions and framework for studying supplier-buyer relationships. Together they provide 
complementary explanations for the efficiency and effectiveness of particular supplier-buyer 
relationships. SCPs will allow us to determine what strategy is implemented and what the 
impact on performance is present. Insofar as the practices are organizational solutions, they fit 
in the TCE model, which predicts that a different organizational structure will be chosen 
when transaction costs change. Including relationship characteristics in the analysis will allow 
explaining performance not only on the basis of transaction attributes but also on the basis of 
the characteristics of the relationship. 
 
1.4 Research Design 
 
Two steps have been followed in developing the measures and conducting empirical studies. 
The first step involves a case study of the Mexican avocado industry. Interviews have been 
conducted with different companies engaged in the avocado industry as well as with 
representatives of the federal government and research institutions. The gathered information 
Chapter 1 
16   Supply chain practices, performance and organizational configuration in the 
       Mexican avocado supply chain 
allowed us to explore and define the relevant supply chain practices, detect the main problems 
faced by the actors in the chain, and determine technical and organizational solutions. The 
results of this case study are reported in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
 
In the second step, a survey has been carried out among avocado producers and avocado 
packer. The questionnaire for the producers included items on household characteristics, 
supply chain practices, types of contractual arrangements, transaction attributes, relationship 
characteristics, and performance indicators. This questionnaire was conducted in the most 
important avocado region in Mexico, the state of Michoacan. Data was collected in the five 
most important avocado production municipalities: Periban, San Juan Nuevo, Tancitaro, 
Uruapan and Ziracuaretiro. A total of 122 producers and 44 packers were interviewed. 
Analysis of the survey data is presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis.  
 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of six chapters (see Figure 1.3). After this introductory chapter, four 
chapters deal with the four objectives listed above. The final chapter presents overall 
conclusions and discussion. Below we will briefly introduce the content of the five chapters. 
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Figure 1.3 Outline of the thesis 
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1.5.1 Supply chain challenges and supply chain practices 
 
Analysis of agrifood supply chains originating from developing countries has focused on 
aspects such as quality and safety of products and reliability of supply (Humphrey, 2006; 
Ruben et al., 2007). Consistent product quality and compliance with complex food safety and 
phytosanitary standards are required when exporting to the high demanding markets. 
Particular supply chain practices, such as product standardization, supplier partnership and 
information exchange can be used to enhance quality, guarantee safety, and improve 
coordination between supply and demand (Van der Vorst et al., 2007).  
 
Chapter 2 aims to describe the technical and organizational solutions that packers in the 
Mexican avocado industry have introduced in dealing with the main supply chain challenges. 
The focus in this chapter is on the role that the packer plays in introducing supply chain 
practices. Although the packer performs a central role in the supply chain, few academic 
studies have focused on this particular chain actor. The main research strategy used for this 
chapter has been the case study. By studying document and interviewing 13 representatives of 
the Mexican avocado industry as well as of state agencies dealing with the avocado industry, 
a rich picture has appeared on the supply chain challenges and the supply chain practices 
introduced to deal with those challenges.  
 
1.5.2 Contractual arrangements and food quality standards 
 
Quality is now a key variable in marketing strategies in food chains. Quality improvement 
often requires transaction-specific investments and tight coordination among transactors 
(Ménard and Valceschini, 2005). Difficult-to-measure quality attributes lead to higher 
asymmetric information between buyers and suppliers of food products, while consumer and 
governments request more information on all processes in the supply chain. A key 
development in food chains is the shift from market governance towards more contractual and 
hierarchical governance. Despite the high relevance of the interaction between food quality 
standards and particular governance structures, few studies have sought to analyses the 
causality between these two variables (Ménard and Valceschini, 2005; Raynaud et al., 2005). 
 
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the types of contractual arrangements avocado producers 
have been using in adopting particular quality standards in the Mexican avocado industry. To 
get detailed information on quality standards and contractual arrangements, we set up a 
survey among 122 avocado producers of the state of Michoacan in the period February-April 
2008. A bivariate probit model was used for the analysis, i.e., two separate binary dependent 
variables were introduced in the model. First, the type of arrangement is explained by 
transaction characteristics, institutional environment, and relationship characteristics. Second, 
the model estimates the relationship between type of arrangement and household 
characteristics as independent variables and type of quality standard as dependent variable. 
 
1.5.3 Relationship characteristics and performance 
 
In the literature on inter-organizational relationships, relationship characteristics are found to 
be important governance mechanisms for reducing the propensity of opportunistic behaviour 
(Barney and Hansen, 1994; Dwyer et al., 1987; Noordewier et al., 1990). Recently, Mesquita 
and Brush (2008) have brought further depth into the discussion by disentangling which 
relationship characteristics function as safeguards for specific investments and which can be 
considered coordination devices. They found that the function of relationship characteristics 
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varies with the moderating effects of complexity and asset specificity. Untangling safeguard 
and coordination effects of inter-firm relationship characteristics in the context of unstable 
buyer-supplier relationships allows a more detailed explanation of the efficiency impact of 
particular inter-organizational relationship characteristics (Mesquita and Brush, 2008). 
 
Chapter 4 seeks to analyse how characteristics of the producer-packer relationship affect 
producer performance. The analysis is based on the same survey among 122 avocado 
producers mentioned above.  
 
1.5.4 Inter-firm coordination between packers and buyers 
 
Inter-firm coordination has become a subject of considerable managerial interest. Typically 
viewed as a universally desirable win-win mechanism (Porter, 1980), inter-firm coordination 
has gained relevance in the analysis of hybrid forms of organization (Gulati et al., 2005; 
Noordewier et al., 1990; Palay, 1984). Several studies have found that vertical coordination is 
an effective response to uncertainties of changing marketing environments (Gulati and Singh, 
1998; Noordewier et al., 1990; Palay, 1984). Other, however, have argued that higher level of 
inter-firm coordination increases the hazard posed to the sellers’ specific investment (Buvik 
and John, 2000). Suppliers with substantial transaction-specific investments face safeguarding 
problems, which, under environmental uncertainty, may conflict with the introduction of 
stronger ties with buyers. Recently, Gulati et al. (2005) have suggested that the analysis of 
inter-firm coordination requires evaluation of aligning actions as well as aligning interests 
between parties. 
 
While Chapters 3 and 4 focussed on the transactions between producers and packers, chapter 
5 studies the interaction between packers and their customers. The chapter aims to present an 
analysis of the conditions that affect the level of inter-firm coordination between packers and 
buyers. The analysis is based a survey among 44 packers in the Mexican avocado industry. 
The data was collected in the period February – April 2008. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 highlights the main results, presents general conclusions and provides a 
discussion on a number of theoretical and methodological issues, as well as on the practical 
relevance of the findings. 
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The role of packers in fresh produce supply 
chains: A case study of the Mexican avocado 
industry 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Analysis of agrifood supply chains originating from developing countries has focused on 
aspects such as quality and safety of products and reliability of supply (Reardon and Barrett, 
2000; Ruben et al., 2007). Consistent product quality and compliance with complex food 
safety and phytosanitary standards are required when exporting to the high demanding 
markets in North America and Europe. Particular supply chain management practices, such as 
product standardization, supplier partnership and information can be used to enhance quality, 
guarantee safety, and improve coordination between supply and demand conditions (Van der 
Vorst et al., 2007). 
 
For Mexican avocado producers the US has become the major foreign market, but also a 
market with high requirements in terms of product quality and phytosanitary conditions. Since 
1997, the US market has been opened for avocado from Mexico, but only under strict quality 
control. In order to raise product quality to comply with US quality standards, the actors in the 
avocado supply chain have introduced new technical and organisational solutions. Packers, as 
the main interface between producers and customers, have played a dominant role in the 
design of safety norms as well as reliable and sustainable sanitary supervision systems 
(Stanford, 1998). In addition, packers have implemented supplier partnerships to obtain 
reliable supply. Finally, systems of information exchange have been implemented, firstly to 
obtain better information on consumer demand so as to improve the planning of packaging 
and distribution processes, and secondly to be able to communicate with the producer about 
quality requirements. Thus, the strengthening of the packer-producer relationship has enabled 
an enhancement the coordination of both quality and quantity in the Mexican avocado supply 
chain. Under the relevance of these practices, we pose the following question, how the supply 
chain practices implemented by the packers have facilitated to enhance product quality, create 
reliable supply and improve the planning of packaging and distribution processes? 
 
To address this question, we purpose to present a preliminary analysis of the technical and 
organisational solutions packers in the Mexican avocado industry have introduced to deal 
with the main supply chain challenges. More specifically, the chapter has the following 
objectives: first, to describe the Mexican avocado industry with special attention for the role 
of packers; second, to indicate the main challenges in the Mexican avocado industry from a 
supply chain management perspective; and third, to explain the supply chain practices 
(technical and organisational solutions) packers have introduced, using a transaction costs and 
supply chain management theoretical framework. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical framework consisting 
of transaction cost analysis and supply chain management. Section 2.3 describes the 
methodology that has been used. Section 2.4 describes the Mexican avocado industry, and 
after that, we continue with a more detailed look at the packers. Then, in section 2.5, the main 
supply chain challenges are introduced. In section 2.6 the technical and organizational 
solutions are identified. Section 2.7 presents the conclusions. 
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2.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
The current research makes use of two theoretical approaches for explaining technical and 
organisational solutions in the Mexican avocado chain, viz. Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) 
and Supply Chain Management (SCM). TCT, as developed by Williamson (1979; 1985) and 
others, can be considered as the study of alternative institutions of governance. TCT holds 
that ‘transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, 
which differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost 
economizing) way’ (Williamson, 1991: 277). Put more simply, TCT tries to explain how 
economic actors choose, from a set of feasible alternative institutions, the arrangements that 
mostly reduce (or prevent) transaction costs. SCM is a management approach that seeks to 
coordinate strategic and operational activities of different supply chain partners in order to 
provide high customer value (Cooper et al., 1997). This section introduces the main concepts 
and key relationship of both TCT and SCM, and discusses some literature that has integrated 
TCT and SCM. 
 
2.2.1 Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) 
 
TCT can be considered as one approach within the broader field of New Institutional 
Economics. It takes the individual transaction as unit of analysis. Three sources of transaction 
costs have been distinguished (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997): safeguarding specific asset, 
adaptation of the transaction to changing conditions, and performance evaluation. Based on 
two main assumptions of human behaviour (i.e., bounded rationality and opportunism) and 
two key dimensions of transactions (i.e., asset specificity and uncertainty), the sources of 
transaction costs are defined. The first source of transaction cost is safeguarding when a firm 
deploys specific assets and may be opportunistically exploited by the partner. The second 
source is the adaptation or coordination problem when a firm has difficulty modifying 
contractual agreements to changes in the external environment.2 This problem relates to 
environmental uncertainty. The third source of transaction cost is difficult performance 
evaluation. It arises when a firm has difficulty assessing the contractual compliance of its 
exchange partners, in other words, where there is behavioural uncertainty.  
 
TCT assumes that when transaction cost caused by adaptation, performance evaluation, and 
safeguarding are absent or low, economic actors will favour market governance. However, if 
these costs are high firms will favour internal organization. Internal organization (or 
hierarchy) has superior ability to minimize particular transaction costs (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997): first, organizations have more powerful control and monitoring mechanisms; 
second, organizations are able to provide rewards that are long term in nature, such as 
promotion opportunities; and third, organizations can develop organizational culture and 
socialization processes that may create convergent goals between parties and reduce 
opportunism ex ante. Between the extremes of market and internal organization, the hybrid 
can be found as a third category of governance structures (Ménard, 2004; Williamson, 1991). 
The hybrid may achieve the benefits of internal organization without complete vertical 
integration. As Stinchcombe argued, the ability to govern by means of authority is not limited 
to intrafirm settings, but can also be achieved between firms by means of contractual 
provisions, which essentially ‘produce the effects of hierarchies’ (Stinchcombe, 1985: 165). 
                                                 
2 Adaptation problem has two dimensions: autonomous adaptation, where transaction partners respond 
independently to variables like price; and coordinated adaptation to disturbances which require a coordinated 
response (Williamson, 1991). 
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2.2.2 Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
 
SCM is usually applied in studying the interface between manufacturers and its suppliers or 
retailers and its suppliers. The objective of SCM is to harmonize the supply of raw materials 
with the production of final products in such a way as to minimize stocks, maintain quality, 
and maximize responsiveness to changing market conditions (Van der Vorst et al., 2007). In 
this chapter we will focus on three SC practices: product standardization, supplier partnership, 
and information exchange.  
 
The practice of product standardization has mostly been used to implement a strategy of cost 
reduction or increased flexibility (Van der Vorst et al., 2001). In the agrifood sector the 
practice of product standardization consists of a number of activities aimed at increasing 
product quality and homogeneity, enhancing food safety, complying with private quality 
standards. Product standardization includes the activities of inspection and certification. 
 
The second practice, supplier partnership, deals with the relationship between two 
independent entities in the supply chain to achieve objectives such as increased financial and 
operational performance through reductions in total costs, reductions in inventories 
throughout the supply chain, and increased levels of coordination. In the agrifood sector, 
supplier partnership, developed by processors and packers with their suppliers, has been 
presented as an instrument to improve and maintain product quality and reliable supply 
(Kannan and Tan, 2005; Van Plaggenhoef, 2007). Important elements of supplier partnership 
are commitment and trust (Duffy and Fearne, 2004; Pyke and Johnson, 2003). Commitment is 
the willingness of each partner to exert effort on behalf of the relationship (Pyke and Johnson, 
2003). Trust is the willingness to rely on a trading partner in whom one has confidence 
(Kumar et al., 1995).  
 
The third practice, information exchange, consists of generating and sharing information 
among the supply chain partners. Information exchange consists of two activities (Barrat and 
Oliveira, 2001; Kulp et al., 2003): the generation of information to forecast demand and plan 
activities, and sharing this information to upstream supply chain members. Spriggs et al. 
(2000) distinguish two levels of information exchange. First, simple information such as 
product specifications, prices, and delivery schedules. Second, more complex information 
may be exchanged such as on product quality and safety standards and market preferences, 
particularly in situations where processors require specific product quality. 
 
2.2.3 Combining Supply Chain Management and Transaction Cost Theory 
 
Supply chain practices can be considered as technical and organisational solutions to the 
problem of high transaction cost. Insofar as the practices are organisational solutions, such as 
the establishment of a supplier-buyer partnership, they fit in the TCT model, which predicts 
that a different organisational structure will be chosen when transaction costs increase. 
 
The issue of standardization is ambiguous. One would expect that standardization leads to a 
reduction of transaction costs because products become more homogeneous and buyers 
therefore need to put in less effort in screening and selecting. However, when the initial 
introduction of standards require a substantial effort on the part of the buyers to inform all 
(potential) suppliers about the new product requirements, short-term transaction costs go up. 
In addition, buyers may incur cost in helping suppliers to adjust their business processes. This
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problem of coordination (or coordinated adaptation) may be solved by public intervention, 
that is by having the government develop, introduce and enforce new standards. 
 
Whether transaction costs in the buyer-seller relationship actually go up with the introduction 
of new standards depend on the complexity of the standards and the organisation of 
enforcement (bilateral or multilateral). When private standards are set at a higher level than 
prevailing public standards, transactions that have to comply with these private standards are 
more likely to be carried out in hybrid governance structures (as opposed to pure market 
governance). However, when standards are introduced and monitored by the state, market 
governance is more prevalent (Raynaud et al., 2005). 
 
Enhanced information exchange is a typical solution for the uncertainty problem. Uncertainty 
on consumer demand, as a form of environmental uncertainty, can be reduced by collecting 
and processing market information (Noordewier et al., 1990). Having this information can 
reduce the cost of stocks, the cost of misalignment between quality supplied and quality 
demanded, and the cost of finding the proper market. Improved information exchange 
between two partners can also reduce behavioural uncertainty. Being able to measure the 
exact quality of the product, for instance through improved measurement techniques, reduces 
the change of opportunistic behaviour by the partner. Finally, exchanging more and better 
information is also a solution to the adaptation or coordination problem. When changes in the 
market environment require rapid response of all supply chain partners, a good information 
exchange system can support a timely and coordinated adjustment. 
 
A supplier partnership can be considered as a hybrid governance structure, chosen in 
situations where product quality and reliability of supply is important. A supplier partnership 
provides opportunities for lower cost information exchange, which is needed for coordinated 
response to higher quality requirements. Also, supplier partnerships reduce the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour, because of social mechanisms like commitment, trust, and social 
control (Das and Teng, 1998). By sharing information, joint goal setting, joint problem 
solving, and joint decision making, partners can increase commitment to and common interest 
in the outcome of the relationship (Uzzi, 1997). Entering a supplier partnership can also be 
seen as an investment in a bilateral or multilateral relationship, creating a credible 
commitment to continue the relationship. Finally, supplier partnerships reduce the transaction 
costs related to asset specificity (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
 
2.3 Methodology 
 
This case study is based on two sources of information: interviews and reviews of documents. 
Interviews were carried out with different actors in the Mexican avocado industry as well as 
with representatives of research institutions and the state. These interviews were conducted 
between July and September 2007, in the state of Michoacan, Mexico. To get a good 
overview of the industry and its developments, different stakeholders were interviewed: three 
producers, four packers, one trader, two packers’ associations, and three representatives of the 
Mexican government. The representatives of the companies were chosen from the three main 
avocado producing municipalities: Uruapan, Periban and Tancitaro. Finally, differences in 
company size were included by interviewing managers from small, middle and large 
enterprises. 
 
A list of interview topics was used for all interviews (see page 117, Appendix A). It 
considered broad information with respect to the structure and performance of the Mexican 
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avocado industry, market characteristics, transactional problems, supply chain practices, and 
organisations. The questionnaire was written in English, and then translated into Spanish. In 
addition to interviews, documents containing information about natural conditions, marketing 
channels, organizations, and technologies used were gathered from state institutions related to 
the avocado sector (e.g., Dorantes et al., 2004; Evans and Nalampang, 2006; Ramos, 2007; 
Sanchez, 2007). 
 
2.4 Description of the Mexican avocado industry 
 
2.4.1 Physical conditions in Michoacan, Mexico 
 
Michoacan is the principal avocado region in Mexico (Sanchez, 2007). While it has good 
natural and geographical conditions to produce avocado almost all year-round (Ramos, 2007), 
the main harvesting period is between October and March. The majority of avocado orchards 
are located on elevations between 1,600 and 2,200 m, where there is a humid climate with 
abundant rain in summer and winter and temperatures ranging from 16 to 18˚C during the 
coldest months and from 21 to 25˚C during the warmest ones. Soils are rich in organic 
materials and the length of time from bloom to harvest is 8 to 14 months (Ramos, 2007). The 
main variety grown is the Hass (Persea Americana Mill) that is the most popular variety in the 
world. When the fruit is ripe, it can be maintained on the tree for several months without any 
harmful effects, and when it is harvested the shelf life is approximately 7 weeks under good 
conditions (Dorantes et al., 2004). 
 
2.4.2 Production and producers 
 
The Mexican avocado sector annually generates a harvested product value of more than US$ 
700 millions, provides 42,000 permanent and 31,000 temporal jobs (Ramos, 2007). Most of 
the Mexican avocado production is concentrated in Michoacan, annually producing more than 
800,000 tons, on approximately 75,800 hectares, by around 11,700 producers (Sanchez, 
2007). Five municipalities host 72% of cultivated area and 66% of avocado producers: 
Tancitaro, Uruapan, Tacambaro, San Juan Nuevo and Periban. Producers in these 
municipalities have between 5.2 and 10 hectares of orchard, yielding 10.5 tons/hectare. 
However, more than 71% of the orchards are considered as small property with a size smaller 
than 10 hectares, and most of them are characterized by lack of compliance with the 
phytosanitary requirements, no investments in fertilization, and no irrigation systems. Studies 
done in the avocado sector in Michoacan indicate that small size producers have no business 
orientation and have a strong limitation to capitalize the orchard (Sanchez, 2007).  
 
2.4.3 National and International Markets 
 
Mexico is the word leader in production, consumption and export of avocado (Evans and 
Nalampang, 2006). More than 95% of all production is consumed fresh; the other 5% is 
processed into avocado pulp and frozen guacamole paste, avocado oil, and frozen sliced 
avocado (Sanchez, 2007). The main export market for fresh avocado is the USA (importing 
16% of total production). Exports to the US have grown substantially over the last decade (see 
Figure 2.1). Other export markets are Japan, Central America, Canada, and Europe, together 
accounting for almost 10% of production. In the US market, Mexican avocados compete with 
fruit from California and from Chile. Californian avocado has a 60% share of the US market, 
Mexico 25% and Chile 15%. 
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A new configuration of the Mexican avocado industry has developed since the non-tariff 
barriers that prohibited Mexican fresh avocado exports to the US market3 were eliminated4 
and phytosanitary regulations were introduced (Ortiz, 2007; Sanchez, 2007: 67). Nowadays, 
two markets can be identified: a national market for low quality avocado, and an international 
market for high quality avocado. Some 70% of total production is consumed domestically, 
and 30% is exported. International markets demand fulfilment of food safety conditions, 
phytosanitary conditions, and product with larger size than domestic markets. Fruits not 
meeting the minimum export quality standards are sold at the national market or go into the 
processing industry. As of 2005, more than half of all avocado producers comply with the 
phytosanitary requirements. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the two main marketing channels and the packers supplying the channels. 
National packers target the domestic market, commercializing 44% of the all Mexican 
avocados. The other 56% is commercialized by export-oriented national packers and by 
export transnational packers. The latter are foreign (mainly US) owned packer companies. 
These transnational companies as well as some of the export national packer are integrated 
 
                                                 
3 In 1914, the US government established phytosanitary measure that prohibited Mexican avocado exports to the 
US market (Sanchez, 2007: 48). 
4 On February 5, 1997, the ban on Mexican avocado imports into the USA was lifted. To allow exports of 
Mexican avocado to the USA, the USDA requires verification of compliance to the phytosanitary conditions, 
which is inspected by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS). In addition, a continuous 
program of pest control must be followed by Mexican producers (Sanchez, 2007: 49). 
-
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Figure 2.1 Development of Mexican avocado export to the USA (1998-2008)
Source: Sanchez (2007), SAGARPA (2009) 
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packing and trading companies (as indicated by the dark box in Figure 2.2), selling directly to 
foreign supermarkets.5 
 
Producers selling in these different marketing channels have different characteristics, such as 
choice of quality standard, and linkages to particular packaging companies (see Table 2.1).  
 
 
Table 2.1 Michoacan avocado producer characteristics in each marketing channel 
Type of 
producer 
Number of 
producers 
Share of 
total 
production 
Type of 
quality 
standard 
adopted 
Compliance and 
investment 
Market 
destination 
Certified 
producers 
for the US 
market 
 
2,290 
 
28% 
Complex 
quality 
standards such 
as US-GAP, 
Global-GAP, 
Organic 
standards 
Compliance with 
phytosanitary 
conditions and 
investment in 
fertilizers and 
irrigation systems 
USA and other 
foreign markets 
such as Japan, 
Canada and 
Europe 
Certified 
producers 
for non-US 
markets 
 
3,545 
 
28% 
One of each 
three 
producers 
adopts 
complex 
quality 
standard 
One of each three 
producers 
compliance with 
phytosanitary 
conditions and 
investment in 
fertilizers and 
irrigation systems 
Mainly supplying 
domestic 
supermarkets; 
limited export to 
Central America 
Non-
certified 
producers 
 
5,892 
 
44% No quality standards 
No compliance with 
phytosanitary 
conditions and  no 
investment in 
fertilizers and 
irrigation systems 
Small and 
medium-sized 
retailers in the 
domestic market 
Total 11,727 100%    
Source: Ramos (2007); Sanchez, (2007), and interviews. 
 
 
The international channel is dominated by producers which hold a certificate indicating that 
they comply with phytosanitary requirements and collaborate with transnational packing 
companies. These producers are responsible for 28% of the total Mexican avocado 
production. Many of these producers have adopted a complex quality standard such as US-
GAP, Global-GAP or Organic. In order to supply uniform and high quality products, these 
producers have invested in fertilization and irrigations systems. The second channel consists 
of producers that also have a phytosanitary certificate, but sell to domestic large supermarkets 
or export to Central America. These producers also produce about 28% of domestic 
production. Only one out of three of the producers in this channel has adopted a complex 
quality standard and has invested in fertilization and irrigations systems. As a result, not all of 
the product complies with the minimum export quality requirements in terms of size, colour 
and ripeness. The third channel, taking care of 44% of total domestic avocado production, 
                                                 
5 The following firms are integrated packer/traders: Calavo, West Pak, Empacadora de Aguacates San Lorenzo, 
Frozavo, Procesadora de Aguacate y Frutas. 
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consists of producers that do not have phytosanitary certification. These producers have not 
invested in fertilization and irrigations systems. The main destination for the avocado’s of 
these producers is the small and medium-sized retailers in the domestic market. In Section 6 
we will elaborate on the explanation of complex quality standards by some but not by other 
producers. 
 
2.4.4 The packers 
 
Traditionally the function of the avocado packers has been to collect, pack and distribute the 
fruits. This function included activities like purchasing, transporting from orchard to packing 
station, sorting, and transporting from packing station to wholesale or retail customers. While 
in the domestic marketing channels, the packer also carries out the sales process, in the 
international marketing channels the actual trading of the fruits is performed by specialized 
trading companies (or trade departments of integrated trading/packing companies). 
Traditionally, the packer accepted the quality that producers offered, and no further quality 
control was carried out. Given the perishability of the product (shelf life varies from one to 
two weeks), one of the main goals of the packer was to get the product from producer to 
consumer in the least time (Dorantes et al., 2004).  
 
In the Mexican avocado industry, there are approximately 382 packaging houses (Table 2.2). 
Only 60 of these firms participate in the export channel, and only 26 export to the USA 
(Sanchez, 2007). Table 3 presents some of the main characteristics of the packaging houses. 
The 26 large size packaging houses sell more than 8,000 tons of avocados per year, and are 
supplied by an average of 50 producers. They are characterized by a high technology level 
and use of quality systems such as good manufacturing practices. The middle packers sell 
between 1,500 and 8,000 tons of avocados a year, and are supplied by a range of 20 to 50 
producers. These packers have different technological level for conducting the different 
activities in the packaging station. Finally, 320 packers with small packaging stations sell less 
than 1,500 tons a year and are supplied by less than 20 producers. They use obsolete 
technology sorting the product manually. 
 
Given the high quality requirements in international markets, there has been an increasing 
differentiation between packers that participate in international channels and those that only 
service domestic channels. The internationally oriented packers not only use high-tech 
equipment for sorting and grading avocado’s, as well as refrigerated storage of the fruits, they 
are also often vertically integrated with international trading companies. Three integrated 
packing/trading firms manage 40% of all exports to the USA: Calavo, Mission and West Pak. 
All three are subsidiaries of US companies. 
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Table 2.2 Grouping of packaging houses 
Number 
of 
packers 
Volume 
(tons/year) Technology Market destination 
Suppliers 
per packer
26 
> 8,000 
(large 
packers) 
 
- Implementation of Good 
Manufacturing Practices 
- Automatic equipment for 
cleaning, sorting, packaging, 
refrigeration 
- Specialized personnel to 
make harvesting activity and 
plan production needs and 
distribution  
- Cold chain with control 
atmosphere containers  
The main market is 
USA.  
Also exporting to 
Japan, Europe, 
Canada 
 
More than 
50 
36 
1,500 - 
8,000 
(middle 
packers) 
- Different technological 
level for conducting the 
packaging activities. 
- Some packaging houses 
use automatic equipment 
whereas others use mechanic 
equipment or develop the 
activities manually 
- Some packaging houses 
have specialized personnel, 
but most cases employ 
unskilled personnel 
- Cold chain transport  
The main markets are 
Central America and 
domestic 
supermarkets 
20-50 
320 
< 1,500 
(small 
packers) 
- Obsolete technological 
level 
- Sorting is done manually 
- No skilled personnel 
- No cold chain 
The main markets are 
domestic small and 
medium-sized 
retailers, and street 
markets 
Less than 
20 
Total 382   
Source: Elaborated from Ramos, (2007) and interviews. 
 
 
2.4.5  Organizations of packers 
 
Packers have been organized in a number of different associations, depending on their main 
destination markets. Three associations can be distinguished: APEAM, UDECAM and 
UEAP.6 As said above, APEAM is the association of more than 2,290 producers and 26 
packers that send their products to the US market. UDECAM is the association of 61 
packaging houses, some of them are also member of APEAM. UDECAM members export 
avocado to Japan, Canada, Europe Union and Central America. In addition, they sell avocado 
to different supermarkets in Mexico. UEAP is an association of 31 packers, all from the 
Periban municipality, mainly serving the domestic market (Sanchez, 2007). 
                                                 
6 APEAM = Avocado Producers and Export Packers Association; UDECAM = Union of Michoacan Avocado 
Packers and Traders; UEAP = Union of Periban Avocado Packers. 
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APEAM plays a major role in the Mexican avocado industry because it is the only 
organization that includes both packers and producers. Only members of APEAM are 
authorized to export avocado to the USA. As said, APEAM represents the Mexican avocado 
interest vis-à-vis US authorities. APEAM also covers the cost of inspections by USDA and 
APHIS, inspecting both packaging stations and orchards. In addition, APEAM is collecting 
market information (prices, stocks, consumer preferences), promoting Mexican avocado in 
the US market, and has introduced a quota system to avoid saturation of the US markets 
(Sanchez, 2007).  
 
The producers and packers that are members of APEAM have been working closely with 
government officials to develop the current legislation on phytosanitary requirements. While 
only 16% of total Mexican fresh avocado production is exported to the USA, the 
phytosanitary conditions for products exported to the US have also become mandatory for 
producers and packers that only sell at the domestic market (Stanford, 2002).7 
 
2.4.6 The role of the state  
 
After the economic crisis of 1982, the Mexico government has changed its economic strategy, 
from a protectionist model which exacerbated the inefficiency, corruption and obsolescence 
of agriculture to a liberal economic model (Basave, 2001). This new strategy involved 
promotion of foreign investment and privatization of public corporations. In order to integrate 
the Mexican agriculture into international markets, the new strategy consisted of reducing 
price support for basic food crops, abolishing marketing boards, and eliminating credit 
subsidies (Warnock, 1995). These changes were meant to prepare Mexico for entering into a 
free trade agreement with its most important export countries. In 1994, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed by Canada, USA, and Mexico. Under this 
agreement, Mexican producers were expected to respond to market signals to redirect their 
activities towards more profitable, labour-intensive exports such as vegetables, fruits and nuts 
(De Janvry et al., 1997). 
 
To facilitate producers’ adjustment to a market economy, the federal government 
implemented a subsidy program to increase investment and productivity in the agricultural 
sector (Cord and Wodon, 2001). Particularly in the Mexican Avocado Industry, subsidies 
have been given to cover part of the extra production costs resulting from phytosanitary 
standards (Sanchez, 2007). In August 1996, the Mexican government established the legal 
phytosanitary requirements for commercializing avocado.8 Although the legislation was based 
on US phytosanitary regulations for importing avocado, the Mexican government has now 
ruled that producers for the domestic market should also meet these standards (Stanford, 
2002). 
 
This August 1996 law also established the legal base for a system of regional phytosanitary 
control, requiring every avocado producer to enter the state pest control program and obtain 
certification for its orchards if he intends to market their fruit at regional packinghouses 
(Dorantes et al., 2004). To implement this norm SAGARPA promoted the creation of two 
entities: the Plant Safety Municipal Boards (JLSVs) and the Avocado Producers and Export 
                                                 
7 This is not to say that all producers comply with the legislation. Packers targeting the national market do not 
require their suppliers to be certified. 
8 The law is called NOM-066-FITO-1995, and the authority responsible for implementation is the Secretariat 
for Agriculture, Ranching, Rural Development, Fishing and Food (SAGARPA). 
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Packers Association (APEAM). The JLSVs are supported by producers’ associations, and are 
responsible of verifying and certification of phytosanitary conditions in the orchards. APEAM 
is an association with both producers and packers as members, and is the formal 
representative of Mexican producers and packers with regard to the US authorities. APEAM 
is paying the supervision carried out by US personnel, and has its own certification system.  
 
2.5 Analysis: The main supply chain challenges 
 
Producers and packers of fruits and vegetables in developing countries are facing a number of 
supply chain challenges (Jaffee and Henson, 2004; Reardon and Berdegue, 2002; Shepherd, 
2005). The main challenges are (1) increased stringency of food safety and phytosanitary 
standards; (2) a shift from product standards, largely enforced through testing at national 
borders, towards standards that target processes in the entire chain; (3) a trend to complement 
statutory standards with private standards such as BRC, Global-GAP and Safe Quality Food; 
and (4) the rise of supermarkets in developing countries, which use more centralized 
purchasing systems and require large volumes of uniform quality. 
 
Introduction of strict phytosanitary requirements and exporting to the US market has lead to 
specific supply chain challenges for the Mexican avocado industry. From the perspective of 
the packers, three challenges stand out (Ramos, 2007; Sanchez, 2007): enhancing product 
quality; creating reliable avocado supply; and improving coordination between supply and 
demand. In terms of our theoretical framework, these challenges may lead to higher 
transaction costs. This section will discuss these challenges, while the next section will 
present the technical and organisational solutions the producers and packers have applied. 
 
2.5.1 Enhancing product quality 
 
In their ambition to market avocado in the US, producers and packers were faced with a 
number of uncertainties. As US consumers are more demanding on product quality than 
Mexican consumers, exporting to the US implies a different quality strategy. For the packer 
the initial information problem is in finding the right product and right producers (those 
complying with phytosanitary requirements). At the same time, for the producers the problem 
is how to obtain the knowledge and skills to produce high quality avocado, and to signal to 
packers that their product meets the export quality requirements (Sanchez, 2007). 
 
As to the investments needed to enhance product quality, the packer has to invest in more 
sophisticated sorting and selecting equipment, in refrigerated storage capacity, and in high 
hygiene packaging facilities. When there are only a small number of producers that can 
supply the demanded quality, the investments by the packer are specific to the relationship 
with those producers. In addition, when the number of buyers is limited, the investments by 
the producers are also specific to the sales relations with those buyers. 
 
2.5.2 Creating reliable supply 
 
When supplying supermarkets in developed countries, deliveries have to be reliable both in 
quantity (right volume delivered at the right time) and in quality (uniform quality, all 
complying to a certain standard). In general, supermarkets demand year-round supply of 
uniform quality and apply rather strict delivery conditions (Reardon et al., 2001). Given the 
tradition of low quality demand in the domestic market, creating a continuous supply of high 
quality products for the US markets is a real challenge for export-oriented packers. As more 
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than 70% of the Mexican avocado producers fall in the small size category (producing less 
than 50 tons per year), variation in quantity delivered and in product quality has been quite 
large (Sanchez, 2007). Thus, packers participating in the export channel have a horizontal 
coordination problem in dealing with many different suppliers. How to obtain avocado in 
sufficient quantity and with sufficient quality?  
 
2.5.3 Improving coordination in the supply chain 
 
Coordination among supply chain actors is more critical when targeting the international 
market compared to the domestic market (Sanchez, 2007). Avocado commercialized in the 
international market requires higher quality, more uniform quality, consistency in timing and 
quality of deliveries, long distance transporting, a closed cool chain, and often specialized 
packaging. As export as share of total production is growing rapidly, coordination issues have 
also gained importance. The information needed to improve coordination in the supply chain 
refers to consumer demand, retail firm preferences, promotions, market structure (for instance 
information on competitors), logistics, availability of supply, and quality of supply. Packers 
play a major role in collecting, processing, distributing and using this information. As packers 
are only one stage of the supply chain, they have to share information with other participants, 
and make individual as well as joint decisions. 
 
2.6 Technical and organizational solutions 
 
Enhancing product and process quality entails adaptation of business processes, additional 
investments, improved information exchange, and more coordination between supply chain 
participants. Introduction of higher quality is associated with more investments in non-
redeployable assets. Therefore, one should expect that market governance will be replaced by 
hybrid forms or vertical integration. In fact, raising quality is not only associated with higher 
asset specificity, but also more uncertainty and higher coordination needs. 
 
Packers and producers have implemented a number of technical and organizational solutions 
to meet the above described supply chain challenges, particularly for meeting the demands of 
international markets. Here we focus on three supply chain practices as solution for the above 
described challenges: product standardization as the main solution for enhancing quality, 
supplier partnership as the main solution for obtaining reliable supply, and information 
exchange as a solution for the coordination needs in the supply chain. These solutions have 
had a transaction cost reduction effect. 
 
2.6.1 Quality  
 
The issue of product quality has been strongly related to phytosanitary quality, which is the 
absence of pests and diseases (Stanford, 2002). Packers targeting the international markets 
have to comply with a number of phytosanitary requirements: the product must come from 
certified orchards; the packing house should have a registration; and all shipments of avocado 
must carry verification of originating from registered orchards or packing houses. The law 
establishing the phytosanitary specifications for packers also established the regional system 
of phytosanitary control that requires all avocado growers to enter the state pest control 
program and obtain certification for their orchards if they intend to market their fruit at 
regional packing houses. For the producers, entering a state phytosanitary program requires 
compliance with technical recommendations issued by visiting inspectors. These inspections 
are carried out by the Local Plant Health Boards (JLSVs), a public-private partnership of local 
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producers and federal authorities. Packers recognize the phytosanitary certification issued by 
the JLSVs. By this system of certification, the transaction costs for the packer of verifying 
whether a producer complies with the phytosanitary requirements are substantially reduced. 
Both the public phytosanitary control program (at state and federal level) and the 
establishment of the JLSV at the municipal level have reduced uncertainty on the 
phytosanitary quality and therefore have reduced transaction costs in the producer-packer 
transaction. In addition, shipments of avocados from orchard to packing house and from 
packing house to domestic or foreign customers must have verification that they originate 
from registered orchards or registered packing houses (Ramos, 2007; Sanchez, 2007). 
 
The system of certification of orchards and packing houses has reduced the problem of 
uncertainty for the packer about where to source products for the US market. Since the 
legislation on phytosanitary norms was introduced in 1996, an increasing number of 
producers have been certified. In 2005, 50% of all avocado producers were certified.9 While 
originally only meant for those producers and packers targeting the US market, the legal 
requirements on phytosanitary conditions now also apply to producers and packers selling in 
the domestic market. An increase in the number of producers with certification implies a 
broadening of the sourcing base for the packers. Two of the interviewed packers have 
indicated that the supply of avocados from certified producers is large enough to rely on the 
spot market. 
 
2.6.2 Reliable supply 
 
Export producers have indicated, in our interviews, the higher production costs but also the 
higher prices received for export quality avocado. Non-export producers indicated the high 
costs of shifting to the international marketing channel, due to higher pesticide and fertilizer 
costs, as well as the high cost of certification and verification.10 Federal agencies have 
indicated, in our interviews, that implementing phytosanitary practices and related cultivation 
methods (including the use of pesticides, fertilizers, and irrigation) increase the production 
cost by more than 50%. In order to motivate producers to adopt phytosanitary practices the 
Mexican federal government has developed a subsidy programme which represents 45% of 
additional production cost. 
 
Three types of partnership between producers and packers can be found in the avocado 
industry. The first type of partnership is APEAM, the organisation of export packers and 
producers. Producer and packer members of APEAM have coinciding interests in maintaining 
a reliable supply for the US market. But they also have a joint interest in supporting the public 
certification program; in gathering and exchanging market information; in regulating supply 
to prevent saturation of the US market; and in promoting Mexican avocado in the US and 
other countries. Thus, APEAM fits the Ménard (2004) definition of the hybrid governance 
structure: pooling resources; maintaining competition among participants; and relying on 
relational governance for obtaining mutual gains, establishing order, and resolving conflicts. 
 
The second type of partnership consists of packers and producers of specialty products 
complying with US and European standards on food safety, good agricultural practice, and 
organic produce standards. Given the higher uncertainty (or higher information requirements) 
and the asset specificity in these specialty product supply chains, a contractual relationship 
                                                 
9 Information obtained from the Michoacan State Office of Plant Safety (CESV). 
10 For the inspection services of USDA/APHIS, Mexican avocado producers and packers pay a fixed fee of USD 
0.08 per pound of product. APEAM is responsible for collecting and paying out these fees. 
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will be chosen. A particular case we found through our interviews concerns the partnership 
with a transnational packing house with a very large producer (360 ha) to produce and market 
organic avocado. As producing organic avocado is approximately 50% more expensive than 
producing regular avocados, shifting to organic produce poses a transactional risk due to the 
specific investments the producer has to make. The packer has reduced this risk by making 
credible commitments in the form of providing credit as well as technical advice. The packer 
has indicated that this partnership with the large producer has important benefits because of 
lower coordination costs in sourcing sufficient supplies.  
 
The third type of partnership consists of producers financially participating in a packaging 
house. Our interviews revealed one particular case of an export packaging house owned by 11 
producers. These owner-suppliers provide 27% of the avocado packed by the company. The 
quality of produce supplied by the owners is higher than that of the other 90 suppliers. The 
owners have agreed that they all obtain US-GAP and Global-GAP certification. The packing 
house is putting much effort in providing technical assistance to its owner-suppliers in order 
for them to comply with current and future product and process requirements. In addition, the 
packing company continuously invests in keeping its installations as well as its workers’ skills 
up to meeting the requirements of foreign quality certification programs. 
 
In sum, to obtain a reliable supply of high quality products, packers selling in the international 
market have followed different organisational strategies. Both bilateral and multilateral 
partnerships between producers and packers can be found in the high quality segments of the 
Mexican avocado industry. In addition, the Mexican government is financially supporting 
producers to adopt the cultivation practices needed to meet phytosanitary specifications. 
 
2.6.3 Coordination in the supply chain 
 
To improve coordination, packers have followed two strategies: vertical integration into 
trading, and forming partnerships with trading companies. As export avocados are sold 
mainly through supermarkets, it is the policies of those foreign supermarkets that put high 
pressure on supply chain management. Supermarkets in general have high demands in terms 
of delivery conditions, logistics, promotions, and product quality. Information about these 
requirements is crucial for efficient planning and equipment use by the packers. In order to 
get this information, most packers supplying international markets have integrated with 
trading companies (see Figure 2.2). These trading companies have direct contact with foreign 
customers for obtaining information on retail demand, product quality and required quantity, 
available stocks, etc. Some the export transnational packing houses are subsidiaries of major 
US fresh produce trading companies.11 While some export national packers have also 
integrated the trading activity, most of them just sell to the foreign-owned integrated packing-
trading companies. By selling to the foreign-owned packers, the domestically owned packing 
houses do not have to bear the market risk present in the international markets, and do not 
bear the risk of delayed payment by the retail customers. The foreign-owned packers/traders 
have a reputation of paying immediately (Sanchez, 2007). 
 
The other option for packers is to form partnerships with particular buyers in order to get 
information about retail demand and promotions. This information can greatly support joint 
planning activities. 
 
                                                 
11 These are Calavo, Mission, West Pak, and Fresh Direction. 
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To sum up, information exchange has not only played a relevant role in communicating 
product requirements to producers (thus coordinating the quality produced with the quality 
demanded) but also in reducing the environmental uncertainty of demand quantities. To get 
access to crucial customer information, export packers have integrated into trading activities. 
 
2.6.4 Harvesting practices 
 
One of the differences in supply chain practices applied by packers targeting the national 
market and those focussing on the international market concerns the harvesting practice. The 
national packers apply a harvesting system that is called al parar. This practice consists of 
cutting all products in the orchard at the same time, regardless of their size and ripeness. 
However, packers in the international channel use a practice that is called al corte, which 
implies that only products that meet certain minimum quality requirements (in terms of size, 
weight and maturity) are cut. While under al parar all products are harvested at once, under al 
corte, harvesting workers visit the orchard several times during the growing season. 
 
Al parar is traditionally the most common harvesting method. Packers visit the orchard during 
the growing season and assess the quality and quantity of the final product. The packer and 
producer agree on one price for the full harvest. Producer and packer can agree on a one-time 
cut or on letting the packer harvest at different moments during the season. The packer 
decides when the fruits are cut, and organises the actual harvesting, usually carried out by 
unskilled workers. The packer pays 50% at the moment of the transaction, and 50% one or 
two months later when he has sold the product. About this second instalment, the producer is 
always in uncertainty as packers have a reputation of delaying or unfulfilling payment. 
 
The harvesting method al corte is commonly used in certified orchards and has the following 
features. Skilled purchasing staff of the packer visits the orchard and negotiate with the 
producer about the price. A unique price is established for all harvested product regardless of 
size and weight. Skilled workers, employed either by the packer of by a specialized harvesting 
company, enter the orchard and only cut fruits with the proper ripeness (measured by colour 
and firmness). Negotiation and harvesting ripe fruit can be repeated several times during the 
harvesting season. As the packer has a great interest in the quality of the product, harvesting is 
done carefully, under close supervision of the packer. The payment is punctual, which means 
that within two weeks after harvesting, the producer receives his payment. If not, the producer 
will not enter another agreement with this packer and will sell the rest of the fruit still on the 
tree to another packer. Packers have indicated (in the interviews) that they value a good 
relationship with the producer. While the price is always determined by current market 
conditions, a good relationship between producer and packer means that the packer prefers to 
purchase from this producer in time of abundant supply and that the producer prefers to sell to 
this packer in times of limited supply (such as at the end of the growing season). 
 
2.6.5  Supply Chain Management by packers 
 
In recent decades, packers have taken up new functions, particularly when they became 
participants in international marketing channels. The role of the packer has broadened, to 
include harvesting, selecting and sorting, cleaning, refrigerated storage, quality control, 
labelling and cooled transport. Table 2.3 lists the activities of the packer working on the 
national market, and those of the packers selling on the international market. Given the high 
product quality and phytosanitary requirements of the export markets, packers working in the 
international marketing channel have enhanced their activities for product quality control, for 
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guaranteeing reliable supply, and for improving coordination between several actors in the 
supply chain.  
 
 
Table 2.3 Activities of the packer 
Main activities Activities of packer selling mainly in domestic market 
Activities of packer selling in 
foreing 
market 
Harvesting 
- Unskilled harvest workers 
not employed by packer 
- Main practice: ‘al parar’ 
- Skilled harvest workers employed 
by packer or specialized companies  
- Main practice: ‘al corte’ 
Transport from 
orchard to 
packing station  
Transport by packer  Transport by packer 
Inside the 
packing station 
- No cleaning of fruit 
- Limited sorting and 
selection 
- Sorting by hand 
- No packaging 
- No labelling  
- No refrigeration  
- No tracing and tracking 
- Cleaning of fruit 
- Elaborate sorting and selection (by 
size, weight, ripeness) 
- Automated sorting  
- Specialized packaging (special 
cardboard box to regulate 
temperature) 
- Labelling 
- Refrigeration 
- Tracking and tracing 
Trading/selling By specialized traders Mainly by integrated packer/trader  
Source: Dorantes et al., 2004; Sanchez, 2007; and interviews.  
 
 
To summarize, packers selling mainly in the domestic market do not put much effort in 
quality improvements and quality control. For the packers for the international markets, 
however, the issue of enhancing product quality and maintaining the quality level throughout 
the supply chain is a major objective. All harvesting, sorting and selection, cleaning, storing, 
and transport activities are geared towards the quality ambition. These activities also require 
specialized knowledge and equipment at the packaging station, as well as harvesting by 
skilled teams. By careful selection, cleaning and refrigeration (including cold chain transport), 
the shelf life of the export avocado is about extended to 40 days. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
One of the key questions in supply chain management is about coordination between quality 
demanded and quality required. Packers of fresh produce can play a major role in enhancing 
product quality by exchanging information between producers and customers, by setting 
particular quality standards, and by upgrading their own sorting and packaging facilities. 
 
We have presented a qualitative analysis of the technical and organisational solutions that 
packers in the Mexican avocado industry have introduced to deal with new supply chain 
challenges. As a result of changes in (international) market opportunities, a number of supply 
chain challenges have appeared for avocado producers and packers. The main challenges are 
low quality, unreliable supply, and a lack of supply chain coordination. In order to meet these 
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challenges, a restructuring of the avocado supply chain has taken place, including the entrance 
of US capital into the Mexican packing industry, introducing phytosanitary requirements, 
establishing new types of producer-packer partnerships, and facilitating information 
exchange. These technical and organisational changes can be considered as a response to the 
rising transaction costs that resulted from higher quality demands. 
 
The coordination problem due to uncertainty about market conditions in the international 
market has been solved by the packers by forward integration into trading companies. By 
integrating, they are now able to obtain detailed information on retail customer demand, and 
are better able to coordinate their purchasing activities with their marketing activities. This 
vertical integration has also solved the problem of asset specificity in the transaction between 
packer and traders for the US market. 
 
The problem of low avocado quality and the related uncertainty problem for the packer about 
how to measure producer compliance to quality requirements have been solved by several 
strategies. First, packers and producers have lobbied with the government to develop and 
implement a certification programme for all avocado producers, thus reducing diversity 
among producers and products. The actual inspection and certification is done by the Local 
Plant Health Boards, a public-private partnership. Second, some packers have entered into 
partnership with producers, either bilaterally or multilaterally (within organisations). These 
partnerships are a form of relational governance that reduce transaction costs related to 
difficult performance measurement. Third, packers shifted to a different type of harvesting 
method, maintaining direct control over the quality of the product. 
 
The problem of obtaining reliable supply has also been solved by introducing product 
standards, by entering into multilateral partnerships, and by entering into bilateral contractual 
relationships (particularly for organic produce). 
 
In meeting the new international market opportunities for Mexican avocado, the packers have 
played a dominant role in obtaining the supply chain management goals of efficiency and 
market responsiveness. Individually the packing houses have upgraded their equipment, have 
integrated with traders to obtain critical market information, and have entered into 
partnerships with producers to improve their sourcing. In addition, organisations of packer 
and producers have established transaction cost reducing procedures for producer-packer 
transactions, and have lobbied the government for an enabling institutional environment. 
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Contractual arrangements and food quality 
standards in the Mexican avocado industry12 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The introduction of quality standards and quality assurance systems is an important part of the 
restructuring process taking place in the agrifood sectors of transition and developing 
countries (Reardon and Barrett, 2000). The organisation and impact of different quality 
assurance programs have become major issues in both development economics and supply 
chain management literature (Fafchamps, 2008; Mainville et al., 2005; Mergenthaler et al., 
2009; Roy and Thorat, 2008). Introducing quality standards in the agrifood value chain can be 
beneficial both for producers who gain access to higher value markets and thereby increase 
their income, and for buyers who gain access to a larger quantity of products with consistent 
quality. In addition, quality standards can reduce the information asymmetry between buyers 
and suppliers, thereby increasing the efficiency of the value chain (Trienekens and Zuurbier, 
2009). 
 
However, introducing quality standards may lead to increasing complexity in the value chain 
(Humphrey, 2006; Reardon and Farina, 2002). Holleran et al. (1999) have argued that the 
degree to which arrangements can be enforced influences the decision to adopt a particular 
quality system. Ménard and Valceschini (2005), applying transaction cost economics, have 
argued that the type of quality standard adopted is associated with the level of transaction 
costs. Private quality standards require a more complex governance structure than public 
quality standards because of their higher asset specificity and higher transaction cost resulting 
from monitoring and certifying. Despite some valuable publications, the issue of the 
interaction between type of quality standards and type of contractual arrangement has only 
received limited attention. 
 
Increasing organizational complexity as a result of adopting quality standards has been 
observed in the Mexican avocado industry where the possibility to export to the US market 
has provided an incentive to enhance product quality. Until 1997, private quality standards 
were only adopted by a select group of export producers (Stanford, 1998). In that year, the US 
import ban on Mexican avocados was lifted and the Mexican government established the 
legal requirement to comply with phytosanitary standards when commercializing avocado in 
the USA. An increasing number of producers have been adopting public quality standard 
since 1997 (Sanchez, 2007).  
 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate how governance structure choice relates to the 
adoption of different quality standards in agrifood supply chains. Two decisions are modelled, 
using a bivariate probit model. First, the type of arrangement will be explained by the 
transaction costs, the institutional environment and the relationship characteristics (viz. buyer 
commitment, expectation of continuity, and information exchange). Second, adoption of a 
particular quality standard is modelled by the type of arrangement, the price obtained for the 
product, and a number of household characteristics. By including variables about the
                                                 
12 This chapter is in the second round of review with the journal Agricultural Economics 
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 institutional environment and the characteristics of the seller-buyer relationship, we are able 
to extend the predictive power of the classical transaction cost model in explaining 
governance structure choice. To obtain detailed information on quality standards and 
contractual arrangements, we set up a survey among avocado producers of the state of 
Michoacan, the most important avocado production area in Mexico. 
 
We find that the type of arrangement influences adoption of particular quality standard. 
Furthermore, producers adopting private standards not only use contractual arrangements 
based on relational governance, but also under a supporting institutional environment make 
use of market arrangements. The support from the institutional environment contributes to 
safeguarding specific investments. Finally, producers applying only public quality standards, 
entailing a low level of asset specificity, utilize market governance arrangements. 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the Mexican 
avocado industry and its quality standards. This is followed by a description of the conceptual 
framework in section 3.3 and the data and estimation procedure in section 3.4. Results are 
presented in Section 3.5 and discussed in section 3.6. Concluding comments are made in 
section 3.7. 
 
3.2 Research domain: Avocado industry in Mexico and quality standards 
 
Mexico is the word leader in production, consumption and exports of fresh avocado (Sanchez, 
2007), and a new configuration of the Mexican avocado industry has been developed since 
the non-tariff barriers that prohibited Mexican fresh avocado exports to the US market were 
eliminated13 and phytosanitary regulations were introduced (Ortiz, 2007; Sanchez, 2007: 67). 
In 2005, Mexican avocado producers exported 30% of their domestic avocado production, 
with the main export market for fresh avocado being the USA (importing more than half of 
Mexican avocado export). 
 
Michoacan is the principal avocado region in Mexico generating annually a harvested product 
value of more than US$ 700 million, and providing 42,000 permanent and 31,000 temporal 
jobs (Ramos, 2007). In terms of production, Michoacan produces more than 800,000 tons 
annually, on more than 75,800 hectares, by approximately 11,700 avocado producers 
(Sanchez, 2007). Five municipalities host 72% of cultivated area and 66% of avocado 
producers: Tancitaro, Uruapan, Tacambaro, San Juan Nuevo and Periban. Producers in these 
municipalities have between 5.2 and 10 hectares of orchard, yielding 10 tons/hectare. 
However, more than 71% of the orchards in Michoacan are considered as small properties 
that do not comply with the phytosanitary conditions, and their owners do not apply fertilizers 
and use irrigation systems. Studies done in the avocado industry in Michoacan indicate that 
small size producers have no business orientation and have a strong limitation to capitalize the 
orchard (Sanchez, 2007).  
 
The packaging sector is following stage in the Mexican avocado industry. The packaging is 
more concentrated as it consists of approximately 382 packaging houses. Only 60 of these 
firms export avocados and only 26 of them export to the USA (Sanchez, 2007). The 26 large 
                                                 
13 On February 5, 1997, the ban on Mexican avocado imports into the USA was lifted. To allow exports of 
Mexican avocado to the USA, the USDA requires verification of compliance to the phytosanitary conditions, 
which is inspected by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) in the Mexican production 
avocado areas.. In addition, a continuous program of pest control must be followed by Mexican producers 
(Sanchez, 2007: 49). 
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size packaging houses are characterized by a high technology level and use of quality systems 
such as good manufacturing practices. These large firms are selling more than 8,000 tons of 
avocados per year, and are supplied by, on average 50 producers. In total, these packaging 
houses process about one fourth of the Mexican avocado production. 
 
3.2.1 Quality standards and contractual arrangements 
 
Mexican avocado producers have adopted public quality standards and private quality 
standards (Sanchez, 2007). Public quality standards entail a number of phytosanitary 
requirements: the product must come from certified orchards; the packing houses should have 
a registration; and each shipments of avocado must carry a document stating that it originates 
from a registered orchard or packing house. Producers entering a state phytosanitary program 
require compliance with technical recommendations issued by visiting inspectors for at least 
one year in advance to export in order to get certification. Although relative complex 
implementation, technical assistance, monitoring and certification activities are carried out by 
personnel of the Local Plant Health Boards (JLSVs), a public-private partnership of local 
producers and federal authorities (SAGARPA). Costs for technical assistance and monitoring 
are supported by the state through JLSVs whereas costs for certification are paid by the 
producer. 
 
Producers adopting private quality standards are frequently complying with US and European 
standards on food safety and good agricultural practices (US-GAP and Global-GAP 
certification), and organic produce standards. Private quality standards are more complex than 
public quality standards. Producers must first purchase certification services, then incur 
compliance costs and undergo regular and repeated testing and certification. In total, the 
producer must implement eleven practices related to soil and substrata management; fertilizer 
use; irrigation system; crop protection; harvesting; produce handling; waste and pollution 
management; worker health, safety and welfare; environmental issues; and complaint form. In 
addition, information from the packer such as size, weight, ripeness and colour must be 
registered. High costs are faced by producer, and a constant interaction between producer and 
packer is required to deal with technical issues. The packing house puts much effort in 
providing technical advice to its partner-suppliers in order to help them to comply with 
current and future product and process quality requirements. 
 
Producers are subject to the harvesting and payment conditions determined by the packer. In 
contrast to other agrifood products, harvesting in the Mexican avocado industry is done by the 
packer. Damage to avocado’s trees caused by incorrect harvesting practice has been indicated 
as a potential problem by producers (Sanchez, 2007). Payment is another relevant issue for 
avocado producers. The producer and packer establish the payment conditions (price, ripeness 
and amount, payment date) one day before harvesting and payment is done approximately two 
weeks after harvesting. 
 
Two types of arrangements are used by producers (Sanchez, 2007; Stanford, 1998). Simple 
contractual arrangements are efficiently used by producers who have adopted public quality 
standards, and in which amount, price, and date are specified. Under this type the arrangement 
approximately 4,500 producers commercialize their products (Ramos, 2007). Thus, when 
producers or buyers do not comply with agreed delivery or purchase condition, both parties 
can easily find another trading partner on similar terms. Relational (verbal) arrangements 
based on mutual communication, expectation of continuity, and verification of product quality 
in the orchards and packing houses is apparently an efficient option used by producers who 
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have adopted private quality standards. In this case, parties have the expectation of a 
continued relationship which influences the fulfilment of arrangement. Non-fulfilment may be 
present by the two parties; however, buyers, in the Mexican avocado sector, have more 
frequently failed fulfilment of payment conditions when they require products under public 
quality standards. Under private quality standards, the buyers unfulfilling payment conditions 
would reduce their supplying sources because the availability of alternative producers is low, 
thereby affecting their contracts with customers further down the supply chain. 
 
In the Mexican avocado industry, prices are evaluated and negotiated with packers on a daily 
basis. However, some producers and packers have long-term relationships, in which both 
parties try to get benefits. Without influencing prices greatly, the packer prefers to purchase 
from this producer in time of abundant supply and that the producer prefers to sell to this 
packer in times of limited supply.  
 
In the present study, we show that avocado producers who adopt quality standards prefer to 
use specific type of arrangements to reduce transaction costs. In addition, participation of the 
state supporting public quality standards influences the contractual arrangement selected by 
the producers. 
 
3.3 Conceptual framework  
 
This section defines the sources of transaction costs in order to identify the different 
contractual problems faced by producers that adopt quality standards. In addition, the 
influence of the institutional environment on transaction costs is discussed. Eventually, it is 
the level of transaction costs related to the production and marketing of quality products that 
determines the choice of governance structure. 
 
3.3.1 Transaction costs 
 
Transaction costs are the costs of undertaking an exchange between customer and supplier, 
and encompass all aspects of the contractual relationship between buyers and suppliers 
(Hobbs, 1996). Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) identified three sources of transaction costs: 
safeguarding specific asset, adaptation of the transaction to changing conditions, and 
performance evaluation. The first source of transaction cost is the crafting safeguards when a 
firm deploys specific assets and may be opportunistically exploited by the partner (hold up 
problem). The second source is the adaptation or coordination problem when a firm has 
difficulty modifying contractual agreements to changes in the external environment14. It is a 
problem caused by environmental uncertainty. The third source of transaction cost is 
difficulty in performance evaluation in selecting new partners and monitoring current partners 
(behavioural uncertainty). 
 
Williamson (1985) argues that uncertainty is only problematic in the presence of specific 
assets. Thus, when transaction costs caused by adaptation challenges or difficulties in 
performance evaluation but asset specificity is absent or low, economic actors will favour 
market governance. However, if specific investments are high firms will favours internal 
organization (Geyskens et al., 2006). Internal organization (or hierarchy) has a superior 
ability to minimize opportunistic behaviour and reduce asymmetric information. Between the 
                                                 
14 Adaptation problem has two dimensions: autonomous adaptation, where transaction partners respond 
independently to variables like price; and coordinated adaptation to disturbances that require a coordinated 
response (Williamson, 1991). 
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extremes of market and internal organization, the hybrid can be found as a third category of 
governance structures (Ménard, 2004; Williamson, 1991). The hybrid may achieve the 
benefits of internal organization without complete vertical integration avoiding the burdens of 
bureaucracy to which internal organization is subject (Williamson, 2008). 
 
3.3.2 Transaction costs and quality standards in the agrifood sector 
 
As food safety and quality assurance affect the cost of carrying out transactions, private 
companies have an incentive to adopt voluntary quality assurance systems (Holleran et al, 
1999). Transaction costs are directly affected by, and may often be increased by, food safety 
regulations, product liability law and customer requirements. Quality standards can mitigate 
the transaction costs, depending on the attributes of the transaction such as asset specificity, 
behavioural uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. 
 
Perishable products such as fresh fruits and vegetables are subject to climatic uncertainty that 
influences both the quality and the quantity of products available. To reduce strong 
perishability constraints and achieve homogeneity of product quality, producers invest in or 
fine tune the production process to meet the quality standard determined by the buyers 
(Raynaud et al., 2005). The solution is adoption of quality standards that consider aspects 
such as specification of products and/or related production processes, environmental 
concerns, human rights and social and ethical values. Investments in specific knowledge and 
physical assets are required. The hold-up problem is present because adoption of a particular 
standard reduces the number of potential buyers who require a specific product for a specific 
market (Holmes et al., 2006), which could cause quasi-rent expropriation and mal-adaptation 
hazards.  
 
To mitigate the contractual hazards a particular governance structure can be adopted. 
Geyskens et al. (2006) and Noorderhaven (1994) have found that high asset specificity leads 
to a preference for relational governance over market governance. In reducing contractual 
hazards engaging in collaborative exchanges (i.e., relational governance) is a viable 
alternative to hierarchy. Relational governance modes are sustained by such relationship 
characteristics as expectation of continuity, commitment, and information exchange (Lusch 
and Brown, 1996). The following hypothesis is proposed:  
 
H1: As asset specificity increases, relational governance becomes preferred over market 
governance. 
 
The problem of behavioural uncertainty is related to performance evaluation, and two 
different problems are identified: monitoring costs and enforcement costs (Leiblein, 2003). 
Monitoring costs refer to the costs associated with monitoring whether the partner is 
complying with the agreement (Dyer, 1997). Enforcement and verification costs refer to the 
costs associated with ex post bargaining and with sanctioning a trading partner that does not 
perform according to the contract. Williamson (1991) has argued that relational governance 
addresses behavioural uncertainty less effectively than market governance when asset 
specificity is absent. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
H2: As behavioural uncertainty increases, market governance becomes preferred over 
relational governance. 
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Environmental uncertainty refers to unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an 
exchange which influence coordination costs (Noordewier et al., 1990) and negotiation costs 
(Hobbs, 1997). Environmental uncertainty has been measured in terms of demand uncertainty, 
volume uncertainty, and price uncertainty. Demand uncertainty is the supplier’s inability to 
predict variations in the quantity and timing of demand. Without this information, the supplier 
will be hesitant to invest in production capacity for fear that it will be stuck with costly excess 
capacity if sales expectations do not materialize (Anderson, 1985). Volume uncertainty is 
defined as uncertainty in production or distribution of the product (Noordewier et al., 1990), 
and this can occur as result of quality and production process problems, unreliable lead time, 
and inflexibility (Davis, 1993). Suppliers cannot access accurate information on the quality 
attributes of the product and buyers must deal with heterogeneous inputs of variable qualities 
and, at the same time, being able to deliver a uniform and stable final product to consumer 
markets (Raynaud et al., 2005). Price uncertainty occurs when producers and buyers cannot 
access accurate information on the quality attributes of the product; thus, rather than reflecting 
the opportunity cost of production the final price may simply reflect the relative strength of 
bargaining (Fafchamps et al., 2008; Kyeyamwa et al., 2008). 
 
Williamson (1991) has argued that in the case of environmental uncertainty and absent asset 
specificity, market governance is preferred because of its low cost and strong performance 
incentives. The following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H3: As environmental uncertainty increases, market governance becomes preferred over 
relational governance. 
 
3.3.3 Institutional environment 
 
The institutional environment influences the choice of governance structure. According to 
Williamson (1991), institutional environment is a locus of shifting parameters that induces 
modifications in the comparative costs of governance. Influence of the institutional 
environment has been analyzed in terms of intellectual property rights protection (Oxley, 
1999), regulatory processes and economic conditions in the telecommunication sector (Levy 
and Spiller, 1994), and choice of quality standards in the agrifood sector (Raynaud et al., 
2005). Lou (2005) has defined institutional environment as a government interference that 
may vary not only across national markets, but also vary within one market, affecting firms 
differently. Raynaud et al. (2005) explain, under a situation of private and public quality 
standards, how the institutional environment affects the choice of private governance 
structures. The institutional environment is seen as the system designed by the state, 
providing rules, public monitoring and certification. As a result of the institutional 
environment support, buyers need to invest less to meter and monitor quality and they do not 
need to rely on the same amount of explicit contractual arrangement. In the present research, 
we compare the producer decision adopting public and private quality standards. Based on 
this decision, the producers require additional information about the specific quality 
requirements, inputs, technical assistance, and credit that may be supplied by a tailored buyer, 
government, or other supporter. We expect that a higher support of the government for 
adopting quality standards will reduce the need for safeguarding specific assets, and a less 
tight relationship between producer and buyer is required. The following hypothesis is 
proposed:  
 
H4: The lower the support of the institutional environment for adopting quality standards, the 
more prevalent relational governance. 
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3.3.4 Relationship characteristics 
 
Under relational governance, different characteristics of the supplier-buyer relationship are 
identified to mitigate exchange hazards. Lusch and Brown (1996) distinguishing between 
relational and market governance have concluded that a significant and positive relation exists 
between relational governance and each one of the variables expectation of continuity and 
buyer commitment. Geyskens et al. (2006) and Gulati et al. (2005) have explained that 
expectation of continuity has an important role aligning interests in relational governance, and 
therefore, safeguarding the level of transaction specific investments incurred by the supplier 
with the main buyer. Noordewier et al. (1990) have indicated that information provided to 
suppliers clearly contributes to buyer adaptability, and Dyer (1996; 1997) has added that 
information is shared only when parties are under relational governance. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses are proposed:  
 
H5: A high level of expectation of continuity is more prevalent under relational governance 
than under market governance. 
 
H6: A high level of buyer commitment is more prevalent under relational governance than 
under market governance. 
 
H7: A high level of information exchange is more prevalent under relational governance than 
under market governance. 
 
3.3.5 Quality standards and governance structure  
 
Quality standard is understood as a list of product specifications that translates in constrains 
on the production/transformation process and on the final quality. Suppliers may need to 
invest or finely design their production process in order to meet this quality standard. These 
requirements may require increasing the specific assets (Raynaud et al., 2005) and 
information (Humphrey, 2006) to meet these constraints. Distinguishing between public and 
private quality standards, Raynaud et al. (2005) have mentioned that these two forms of 
quality standards rest on different enforcement mechanisms, and therefore, are required 
different governance structure. Public quality standards are market oriented because of low 
level of asset specificity and low costs of monitoring, information and negotiation compared 
with private quality standards (Ménard and Valceschini, 2005; Raynaud et al., 2005). 
Particularly, Raynaud et al. (2005) has pointed suppliers need to invest or re-design their 
production process in order to meet private quality standards, increasing the physical 
specificity of assets invested. This condition gives rise to relational governance to reduce 
observability and traceability problems (Foss, 1996), have more ability to exercise decision 
control (Heide, 1994) and safeguard the asset specificity (Williamson, 1991). Holleran et al. 
(1999) have indicated that between parties, contractual arrangements define ex ante 
expectations and the quality standard assures ex post that agreed-upon characteristics and 
attributes are produced. In addition, they affirm that a higher degree to which arrangements 
are enforced increases the likelihood of adopting a private quality system. 
 
In the Mexican avocado sector, producers adopting public quality standards require less 
specific investment than producers adopting private quality standards. As mentioned in 
section 2, whereas private quality standards are more complex than public quality standards, 
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implementation of this latter quality standard is also supported by a public-private 
partnership.  
 
The following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H8: Relational governance is positively related to adoption of private quality standards. 
 
3.4 Data and estimation procedure  
 
3.4.1 Survey 
 
The information required for testing the hypotheses was collected through a survey among 
122 Mexican avocado producers (see page 119, Appendix B). The avocado producers were 
randomly selected based on multistage cluster sampling from the most important avocado 
municipalities in Michoacan State: Uruapan, Periban, Tancitaro, Ziracuaretiro and San Juan 
Nuevo. Two sources were used to select the producers. The first source comes from JLSVs. In 
each municipality, the boards register producers that have obtained or are following the rules 
to get the phytosanitary certification, i.e., the public quality standard. The second source 
comes from avocado producers association registered for municipality. In this latter list we 
can find avocado producers that have adopted US-Gap, Global-Gap or Organic standard. As 
previously referred in section 3.2, these five municipalities host 66% of avocado producers 
(Sanchez, 2007). The survey was applied in the period February-April 2008 and information 
was collected about household characteristics (age, experience, property size, production 
volume and location), price, adoption of quality standards, type of arrangement, transaction 
characteristics (asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty and environmental uncertainty), and 
relationship characteristics (buyer commitment, expectation of continuity and information 
exchange). 
 
Questions included in the survey were either newly developed or based on previous studies. A 
pilot was applied to 5 avocado producers (with different property size) in the area of study. 
The pretested participants were asked to identify ambiguous or other problematic scale 
measures. Based on the response received, some measures were eliminated, others modified, 
and new measures were added.  
 
3.4.2 Estimation procedure 
 
Because the producer takes two decisions, type of arrangement15 (Arrangement) and type of 
quality standard (Quality), a bivariate probit model is used, i.e., two separate binary 
dependent variables are modelled. 
 
The type of arrangement (Arrangement) is explained by following independent variables16: 
transaction characteristics, institutional environment and relationship characteristics. The type 
of quality standard (Quality) is modelled by the type of arrangement and household 
characteristics. The specification for the two equation model is, 
 
                                                 
15 In the present research market governance is operationalised as simple arrangement, and relational governance 
as relational arrangement. 
16 Constructs of independent variables such as asset specificity, buyer commitment, expectation of continuity, 
and information exchange are indicated in the Appendix B.  
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where: *tArrangemen  and *Quality  are latent variables, and Arrangement and Quality are 
dichotomous variables observed following the rules:   
 
1tArrangemen  if 0* tArrangemen , 0 otherwise 
1Quality  if 0* Quality , 0 otherwise 
 
The error terms are assumed to be independently and identically distributed as bivariate 
normal: 
 
0),,/(),,/( 212211  iiii xtArrangemenxuExtArrangemenxuE  
1),,/(),,/( 212211  iiii xtArrangemenxuVarxtArrangemenxuVar  
),,/,( 2121 ii xtArrangemenxuuCov  
 
where  is the correlation between the error terms in the equations. In other words, 
measures the correlation between the outcomes after the influence of the included variables is 
accounted for. Because the type of arrangement affects the quality standard (Quality), the 
correlation coefficient, the model may suffer from endogeneity bias (Greene, 2008), in which 
case  is significantly different from zero. To estimate the model, a robust bivariate probit 
will be used. As noted by Maddala (1983) and Greene (2003), a bivariate probit model 
enables us to simultaneously model the process with a recursive component in which the 
dependent variable in the equation (1) is an independent variable in the equation (2). Under 
this process, we can obtain consistent estimates using standard maximum likelihood.  
 
3.4.3 Data preparation 
 
The estimation model consists of an equation for explaining the type of arrangement and the 
type of the quality standard. The type of arrangement (Arrangement) is explained by a vector 
of independent variables ( ix1 ). A relational arrangement (
RtArrangemen ) will be chosen by 
the producers if it has better ability to minimize transaction costs than simple arrangement (
StArrangemen ). The independent variables ( ix1 ) in equation (1) represent transaction 
characteristics (based on asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty and environmental 
uncertainty), relationship characteristics (buyer commitment, expectation of continuity, and 
information exchange), and the moderating effect of the institutional environment on asset 
specificity. 
 
As follow, we describe each variable of the model, and in addition, we argue whether 
variables related to transaction characteristics (asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty and 
environmental uncertainty) and relationship characteristics (buyer commitment, expectation 
of continuity, and information exchange) that are measured using several items (see page 120, 
Sections D and E, Appendix B) may be retained and used in the model as either individual 
items or a construct composes of several items. Principal factor analysis is used to calculate 
the loadings for each construct, and under this method, the loadings indicate how much of 
variance in each independent item is accounted for by the latent construct (Lattin et al., 2003). 
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Thus, each construct is evaluated in terms of individual item reliability, internal consistency 
and discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
 
Asset specificity is the extent to which specialized investments support an exchange. 
Following Dahlstrom et al. (1996), three items were initially used to measure asset 
specificity; however, the item dedicated asset specificity to the buyer (i.e., producer loses part 
of his investment when he switches to another buyer) was not significant. The final construct 
for asset specificity was based on two items, human asset specificity and dedicated asset 
specificity (see Table 3.4, Appendix 3.1). The items were measured using a seven-point Likert 
scale ranging from ‘not agree at all’ to ‘totally agree’. 
 
Behavioural uncertainty is related to performance evaluation, and in the present research, this 
uncertainty is measured by means of two items: payment uncertainty and damage uncertainty 
(description of these two items are mentioned in Table 3.4, Appendix 3.1). However, because 
individual item reliability (loading) for damage uncertainty was lower than 0.7 (see Table 3.4, 
Appendix 3.1), items were separately included in the model. Again, a seven-point Likert scale 
was used.  
 
Environmental uncertainty refers to unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an 
exchange which influence the coordination and negotiation costs. It was constructed from 
three items: price uncertainty, demand uncertainty, volume uncertainty. The individual 
reliability (loadings) for demand uncertainty and volume uncertainty were lower than 0.7 (see 
Table 3.4, Appendix 3.1), and the composite reliability for environmental uncertainty 
construct was lower than 0.7 (see Table 3.5, Appendix 3.2). Therefore, the three items were 
individually included in the model. A seven-point Likert scale was used.  
 
Institutional environment is a locus of shifting parameters that induces modifications in the 
comparative costs of governance (Williamson, 1991). In the present research, institutional 
environment represents the support provided in terms of information, inputs, and technical 
assistance by a public-private partnership of local producers and federal authorities. 
Institutional environment measure was created based on three equally weighted items. For 
each item, two mutually exclusive choices were considered, 1= supported by the public-
private partnership organization and 0= otherwise. Therefore, the minimum value regarding 
support of institutional environment is 0 when the producer does not choose public-private 
partnership in any item, and the maximum value is 1 when the public-private partnership is 
selected in each of the three items (see page 123, question 63, Appendix B). 
 
Buyer commitment refers to the willingness of the buyer to work together, to create a positive 
exchange relationship and improve alliances performance (Heide and John, 1992). It is a 
measure of the intensity of the relationship of the buyer. Four items measured by means of a 
seven-point Likert scale are considered for its construction (see Table 3.4, Appendix 3.1). 
This construct was included as an individual variable. 
 
Expectation of continuity indicates the degree to which the supplier is dependent on the buyer 
(Lusch and Brown, 1996). Two items were used to measure this construct (see Table 3.4, 
Appendix 3.1), each one using a seven-point Likert scale. This construct was included as an 
individual variable in the model. 
 
Information exchange refers to long-term forecasting, structural planning information, 
including future product design information, and production planning- schedules (Noordewier 
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et al., 1990). In the present research, this measure is constructed from four items (see Table 
3.4, Appendix 3.1). A seven-point Likert scale was used. 
 
The type of arrangement refers to the product sale between producer and buyer. It will be a 
relational arrangement ( RtArrangemen ) if a verbal commitment is made between transactors, 
and in which price, quality and payment date are verbally agreed. In addition, verbal 
arrangement is made if the buyer has established commitments with the producer supplying 
information about the specific quality requirements, inputs or technical assistance, or if the 
buyer has supported the verbal commitment on a continued profitable relationship with the 
producer. A simple arrangement ( StArrangemen ) is given if a written document is 
established between transactors for selling product ready to harvest. Aspects such as the 
product price and quantity are specified in the arrangement. A dummy variable will be used, 
with 1 for relational arrangement and 0 for simple arrangement. 
 
The choice of the adopted quality standard (Quality) is directly asked to the avocado 
producer, and four quality standards are identified in the Mexican avocado industry: Global-
GAP, US-GAP, organic standard and public standard. We assume that the first three quality 
standards result in higher transaction costs compared to public quality standard. Therefore, the 
producer will more likely adopt a private quality standard ( PrQuality ) when he has a 
relational arrangement with the buyer. A public quality standard ( PuQuality ) will be adopted 
when the producer has a simple arrangement with the buyer. The choice of quality standard 
(Quality) is a function of the type of arrangement (Arrangement), and a vector of variables (
ix2 ) containing price (average price), and a number of household characteristics: gender, age, 
education, experience, family size, property size, production volume, location, yield and sales. 
 
A price premium is a necessary condition to cover the extra costs associated with the higher 
quality of the product for a producer who have an incentive to produce an expected high level 
of quality (Fouayzi et al., 2006; Klein and Leffler, 1981). It is a continuous variable 
indicating the average price during the season 2007.  
 
Household characteristics such as age, experience, property size, production volume and 
location are expected to influence adoption of quality standards. Except for the location 
variable, all variables are continuous variables. Wollni and Zeller (2007) found that 
experience and property size are associated to marketing channels that require higher quality 
standards. We expect that these household characteristics present a positive relationship with 
private quality standards. In terms of location, Raynaud et al. (2005) have mentioned that if 
producers have alternative processing companies to deal with within the same distance, the 
bilateral dependency is limited; therefore, we expect a significant positive relationship 
between Uruapan municipality, in which a high number of packaging firms are located, and 
adoption of public quality standard. A summary of the variables included in the two equations 
is given in Table 3.1. The table shows that price uncertainty has a high mean value compared 
to the other environmental uncertainty variables. The avocado producers involved in both 
types of quality standards, have indicated that price is a relevant variable in the transaction 
with the packers. Price is negotiated daily, and large avocado producers are preferred by 
international packaging firms.  
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Table 3.1 Summary of variables 
Independent variable Type of variable Mean Standard 
deviation
Asset specificity Ordinal 4.51 1.90
Payment uncertainty Ordinal 3.02 2.12
Damage uncertainty Ordinal 3.37 2.26
Price uncertainty Ordinal 5.03 2.02
Demand uncertainty Ordinal 2.93 1.72
Volume uncertainty Ordinal 4.22 1.76
Institutional environment Ordinal 0.83 0.24
Buyer commitment Ordinal 1.74 1.72
Expectation of continuity Ordinal 1.45 1.46
Information exchange Ordinal 2.50 2.14
Price 2007 (average price in pesos/kilograms) Interval 11.42 3.64
Age (years) Interval 49.6 14.8
Experience (producer experience in years) Interval 20.27 11.88
Size (Property size in hectares)  Interval 12.70 18.92
Production 2007 (Production volume in tons/year) Interval 132.15 295.31
Location (Location of property, Uruapan=1, 
otherwise=0) 
Nominal 0.52 
 
0.50
Source: authors’ survey 
 
 
Regarding household characteristics, variables such as property size and production volume 
show a higher standard deviation than the mean. Sanchez (2007) and Stanford (1998) have 
emphasized the large heterogeneity in property size in the Mexican avocado industry. In our 
research, this heterogeneity was considered by explicitly interviewing avocado producers with 
small, middle and large property size. We expect a positive impact of property size on the 
adoption of private quality standards. 
 
In terms of correlation between variables, except correlation between asset specificity and 
moderator variable institutional environment interacting with asset specificity that is 0.68, 
none of them exhibit great overlap, the highest correlation among the exogenous variables 
being 0.45. Based on the low correlations among the measures, the possibility of criterion 
contamination can be more or less ruled out. 
 
3.5 Results 
 
Results of the regressions are presented in Table 3.2. The Mc Fadden’s 2R  is 0.44 indicating 
a good model fit. In addition, the Wald test indicates that the null hypothesis  = 0 is not 
rejected at 5%, and therefore, it is possible to estimate separately the two equation s of the 
model. As noted by Maddala (1983) and Greene (2003), the bivariate probit model generates 
consistent estimates using standard maximum likelihood. 
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Table 3.2 Determinants of type of arrangement and adoption of quality standards 
(Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model, robust estimation) 
Variables Coefficients Robust 
Standard 
errors 
dF/dx a
Dep var 
= Arrangement  
 Asset specificity 1.542 ** 0.232 0.097
 Payment uncertainty -0.105 0.100 -0.006
 Damage uncertainty -0.060 0.089 -0.004
 Price uncertainty -0.581 ** 0.153 -0.040
 Demand uncertainty 0.344 ** 0.157 0.022
 Volume uncertainty 0.241 * 0.110 0.015
 Information exchange 0.290 ** 0.142 0.014
 Buyer commitment -0.279 0.200 0.017
 Expectation of continuity 0.579 ** 0.158 0.036
 Institutional environment -0.361 0.472 -0.023
 
Institutional environment *Asset 
specificity -1.866 ** 0.407 -0.117
 Constant 1.438 ** 0.244 
Variables  Coefficients Robust 
Standard 
errors 
dF/dx a
Dep var 
= Quality  
 Arrangement 2.258 ** 0.595 0.264
 Price 0.081 ** 0.030 0.020
 Size 0.010 * 0.005 0.001
 Age -0.025 ** 0.010 -0.005
 Experience 0.001 0.017 0.000
 Location -0.871 ** 0.321 -0.188
 Constant -1.940 ** 0.848 
  
 
Wald test of rho=0: 
 
chi2(1) =  197.889 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
  
 N 122
 Log likehood (only the constant) 
-
128.12
 Log likehood (constant and explanatory variables) -70.41
 Mc Fadden’s 2R  0.45
* significant at p < 0.10; ** significant at p < 0.05 
a Marginal change in probabilities at the sample means 
 
 
In the first decision of the model the dependent variable is the type of arrangement and the 
independent variables are transaction characteristics, relationship characteristics and 
interaction term institutional environment x asset specificity. Asset specificity has a 
significant positive effect on relational governance, thus supporting hypothesis 1. The impact 
of environmental uncertainty is less straightforward. Price uncertainty has a significant 
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negative impact on relational governance, which is consistent with our expectation that as 
environmental uncertainty increases, market governance becomes preferred over relational 
governance (hypothesis 3). However, the other two elements of environmental uncertainty, 
i.e. demand uncertainty and volume uncertainty, have significant positive impacts on 
relational governance. This finding rejects hypothesis 3. 
 
The coefficients for the two items reflecting behavioural uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty whether 
the buyer will stick to payment arrangement (payment uncertainty) and uncertainty whether 
the buyer will damage the orchard when harvesting activity is done (damage uncertainty), 
were not significant in explaining the type of arrangement; and thus, hypothesis 2 was not 
supported. 
 
Institutional environment did not have a significant impact on the adoption of relational 
arrangement, as we expected. However, we also hypothesized that institutional environment 
would influence the type of arrangement indirectly, as a moderator variable. The term 
institutional environment interacting with asset specificity (Institutional environment*Asset 
specificity) had a significant negative relationship with relational arrangement thereby 
supporting hypothesis 4. A high support by the state, in this case channelled through a public-
private partnership that provides information, inputs, and technical assistance, decreases the 
need of producers to safeguard their specific investments. Therefore, state support leads to the 
application of more simple arrangements, even when asset specificity is present. 
 
The expectation regarding the continuity of the relationship (expectation of continuity) and the 
exchange of information (information exchange) both had a significant positive effect on the 
adoption of relational arrangement, which leads us to accept hypotheses 5 and 7. The 
coefficient of the variable ‘buyer commitment’ was not significant indicating that this variable 
does not influence the type of arrangement between the producer and the packer (hypothesis 6 
not supported). 
 
The second decision deals with the determinants for selecting the type of quality standard 
(Quality). Regression results reveal that the type of arrangement (Arrangement) had a 
significant positive effect on the choice of quality standard. When a relational arrangement is 
used, private quality standards are more prevalent (thus supporting hypothesis 8). In addition, 
control variables such as price and size were positive and significant, while age and location 
were negatively related to adoption of the private quality standard. Table 3.3 provides an 
overview of the hypotheses. 
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Table 3.3 Result for each hypothesis 
 Significance 
of 
coefficient 
Expected 
sign of 
coefficient 
Decision 
H1. As asset specificity increases, relational 
governance becomes preferred over market 
governance. 
yes yes Supported
H2. As behavioural uncertainty increases, market 
governance becomes preferred over relational 
governance. 
no - No supported 
H3. As environmental uncertainty increases, market 
governance becomes preferred over relational 
governance. 
partially partially * 
H4. The lower the support of the institutional 
environment for adopting quality standards, the more 
prevalent relational governance.   
yes yes Supported
H5. A high level of expectation of continuity is more 
prevalent under relational governance than market 
governance 
yes yes Supported
H6.A high level of buyer commitment is more 
prevalent under relational governance than market 
governance. 
no no No supported 
H7.A high level of information exchange is more 
prevalent under relational governance than market 
governance. 
yes yes Supported
H8. Relational governance is positively related to the 
adoption of private quality standards. yes yes Supported
Note: * only price uncertainty had a significant negative impact on choosing relational 
governance. 
 
 
3.6 Discussion  
 
3.6.1 Type of arrangement  
 
Empirical results from our study support the main TCE argument that asset specificity 
influences the type of governance structure. When producers make specialized investments, 
they tend to safeguard these investments by relying on relational governance. However, asset 
specificity moderated by the institutional environment presents a significant negative 
relationship with relational governance.  
 
Our analysis shows that producers safeguard their specific investment in two ways. On the 
one hand, they rely on relational governance as shown by the expectation of continuity and 
substantial information exchange. We will refer to this issue later. On the other hand, when 
strong support from a public-private partnership of local producers and public authorities is 
present, producers who have increased their specific investments still have a lower need for 
safeguarding. Producers get information, inputs, and technical assistance from the public-
private organization. Particularly, this public-private organization has facilitated 
dissemination of price information among producers. Data about different product quality and 
markets are collected and distributed on a daily basis, thus reducing information asymmetry 
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between producers and buyers. Similarly, Raynaud et al. (2005) found that institutional 
support mitigates the hazards related to quality by means of public monitoring and provision 
of public resources. 
 
As to uncertainty, we found that volume uncertainty and demand uncertainty have a 
significant positive impact on relational governance, while the impact of price uncertainty on 
relational governance was negative. Results regarding the relationship between environmental 
uncertainty and governance structure have been mixed in prior research (Heide and John, 
1990; Shervani et al., 2007; Walker and Weber, 1984). The positive relationship between 
volume uncertainty and relational governance found in our study was also obtained by Walker 
and Weber (1984) who indicated that a high level of volume uncertainty is associated with 
more complex governance structures than the market. The positive relationship between 
demand uncertainty and relational governance was also obtained by Fynes et al. (2004) who 
showed that a high level of demand uncertainty is associated with a tighter relationship 
between supply chain members. High level of demand uncertainty can lead to either excesses 
or shortages in inventory, both of which will be more easily prevented through relational 
governance structure compared to market governance. 
 
Regarding price uncertainty, our study found a negative impact on the adoption of relational 
governance. Dwyer and Welsh (1985), Heide and John (1990), Shervani et al. (2007) found a 
similar negative relationship. Williamson (1996, p.116) argues that ‘although the efficacy of 
all forms of governance may deteriorate in the face of more frequent disturbances, the hybrid 
mode is arguably the most susceptible [because] adaptations cannot be made unilaterally (as 
with market governance) or by fiat (as with hierarchy) but require mutual consent.’ 
 
Behavioural uncertainty is synonymous with the difficulty of evaluating performance 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). A higher level of behavioural uncertainty increases the costs 
of evaluating the performance of exchange partners. Transaction Cost Economics predicts that 
market governance will be chosen in situations of high behavioural uncertainty and absence 
of specific investments. In the present research, behavioural uncertainty analyzed in terms of 
uncertainty whether the buyer will stick to the payment arrangement and uncertainty whether 
the buyer will damage the orchard was not significant in explaining the type of governance 
structure. Two possible reasons can explain this result. First, observations with higher values 
for measures of behavioural uncertainty were not sufficiently large to contrast with the rest of 
the data and therefore the measures were not statistically significant (Greene, 2008). Second, 
the two measures of behavioural uncertainty were not serious problems for the producers. 
 
In terms of relationship characteristics, the expectation of continuity has a positive and 
significant impact on the adoption of relational governance. A similar result was obtained by 
Lusch and Brown (1996). Avocado producers adopting relational governance have a high 
expectation of sustained benefits; they expect to continue selling their product to the same 
buyer even in a context of abundant supply. 
 
A high level of information exchange was positively associated to relational governance. 
Noordewier et al. (1990), obtaining the same result, have showed that information supplied by 
the buyer is an appropriate adaptation response to heightened environmental uncertainty 
facilitating efficient planning, storing, and scheduling of sales. Avocado producers who have 
adopted relational governance indicated that information about size, colour and ripeness is 
essential in a market with high quality standards. In addition, information supplied in advance 
about preferences and requirements allowed producers to guarantee the correct quality. 
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3.6.2 Quality standard  
 
Relational governance had a significant positive impact on the adoption of private quality 
standards. Raynaud et al. (2005) have explained that private quality standards require a more 
complex governance structure than public quality standards because of higher asset specificity 
and higher transaction cost resulting from monitoring and certifying. 
 
In addition to the contractual arrangement, price and property size are positively related to 
adoption of private quality standards. A negotiated premium has been the main incentive 
covering the extra costs associated with the higher quality of the product. Avocado producers 
adopting private quality standards have received a higher price than avocado producers who 
have only adopted phytosanitary standards, i.e. public quality standards (Sanchez, 2007). 
Regarding the variable property size, it is positively related to adoption of private quality 
standards. Producers with large-scale operations have a greater capacity to bear the risk 
involved in adoption of innovations (Nowak, 1987). In terms of location, producers producing 
in Uruapan prefer to adopt public standards, whereas producers located in Periban, Tancitaro, 
Ziracuaretiro or San Juan Nuevo better adopt private quality standards. As possible 
explanation, Sanchez (2007) refers the number of alternative buyers that producers have to 
market their product. While producers located in Uruapan have a significant number of 
packaging houses and other buyers, producers located in Periban, San Juan Nuevo, Tancitaro, 
and Ziracuaretiro have a reduced number of alternatives. Thus, producers with few 
alternatives prefer to create a higher relationship with the buyer and adopt private quality 
standards than producers with a significant number of buyers. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
Our study has analyzed the impact of transaction costs and relationship characteristics on the 
joint choice of contractual arrangements and quality standards in the Mexican avocado 
industry. The results indicate that the type of arrangement is important for the adoption of a 
specific type of quality standard. Theoretical explanations are found in transaction cost 
economics, which predicts that the need for safeguarding transaction-specific investments is 
an important driver for governance structure choice. Mexican avocado producers follow two 
strategies for safeguarding specific investments. First, relational governance based on 
information exchange and expectation of continuity is used to reduce transaction costs related 
to asset specificity. Whereas information exchange facilitates more coordination between 
parties, expectation of continuity promotes cooperation between parties. Dyer (1997) has 
mentioned that expectation of a continued relationship results in lower bargaining or 
negotiation costs between parties. Second, the institutional environment (in this case the 
public-private partnership of local producers and public authorities) is an important factor in 
reducing safeguarding hazards. This public-private organization provides information, inputs, 
and technical assistance to producers who then use simple contractual arrangements. 
 
This latter point allows us to affirm that under an active participation of a third part in the 
transaction, the classical TCE model of governance structure choice must be augmented with 
other constructs to strengthen its explanatory power. A complete understanding of governance 
structure choice thus requires a combined focus on transaction costs and the institutional 
environment. 
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Finally, implications of this research should be evaluated in light of the following limitations. 
First, although the sample of producers used was large enough to evaluate and get significant 
results in most hypotheses, we faced limitations in terms of the representativeness of the data. 
Although the sample of producers included respondents from different property sizes and 
different municipalities, most respondents came from the central avocado production region 
in Mexico, which has a dense network of supporting institutions, many potential buyers, and 
close proximity to export packaging firms. Therefore, our results are more representative for 
the avocado industry in that region. 
 
Second, the central point in our research was to explain how governance structure choice 
relates to the adoption of particular quality standards. We obtained significant results that 
allowed confirming theoretical issues and offering new insights in terms of practical issues for 
producers in the Mexican avocado sector. However, we did not pay attention to any 
performance impact beyond adoption of quality standard. Thus, we propose that future 
research studies the impact of adopting quality standards on such performance criteria as firm 
profit, firm growth and higher prices. 
 
As the implications of our results for Mexican avocado producers and packers, we have 
shown that the introduction of particular private quality standards goes together with the 
choice of particular contractual arrangements and its specificities in terms of relational 
characteristics. Producers are advised to either establish long term relationships with 
particular packing firms or to join the producer organization that executes the public-private 
program for quality enhancement. 
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APPENDIX 3.1 
 
Table 3.4 Constructs and items used in the first decision of the model 
 Constructs  Loadings
Asset specificity (= 0.74, eigenvalue = 2.94)
Human asset specificity We have made significant investments in 
training of workers and in equipment specific 
for our main buyer 
 0.90 
Dedicated asset specificity 
 
We have made significant investments in 
fulfilment of production requirements for our 
main buyer 
 0.93 
Behavioural Uncertainty (= 0.58, eigenvalue = 1.95) 
Payment uncertainty We are uncertain whether our buyer will stick 
to the payment arrangement 
 0.99 
Damage uncertainty We are uncertain whether our buyer will 
damage the orchard 
 0.52 
Environmental Uncertainty (= 0.34, eigenvalue = 0.50) 
Price uncertainty 
 
The price for my product varies significantly 
over the seasons 
 0.90 
Demand uncertainty 
 
The demand for my product varies 
significantly over the seasons 
 0.62 
Volume uncertainty 
 
The harvested volume per hectare varies 
significantly 
 0.31 
Information exchange (= 0.85, eigenvalue = 2.58) 
Information exchange 
planning 
We receive information to help us plan 
according to his needs 
 0.74 
Information exchange product 
requirements 
We are frequently informed of his product 
requirements 
 0.87 
Information exchange 
forecasting 
We are provided with long-range forecasts of 
supply requirements 
 0.68 
Information exchange 
preferences and requirements 
We are informed in advance of impeding 
changes in preferences and requirements 
 0.80 
Buyer commitment (= 0.85, eigenvalue =1.53)
Buyer commitment helping Our main buyer tries to help us when we incur 
problems 
 0.70 
Buyer commitment sharing Our main buyer shares in the problems that 
arise in the course of dealing 
 0.74 
Buyer commitment improving Our main buyer is committed to improvements 
that benefit our relationship 
 0.68 
Buyer commitment assistance Our main buyer has supported us with 
technical assistance and inputs 
 0.84 
Expectation of continuity (= 0.67, eigenvalue = 2.66)  
Expectation of continuity a 
long time 
We expect our relationship to continue a long 
time 
 0.85 
Expectation of continuity 
renewal 
Renewal of the relationship is virtually 
automatic 
 0.73 
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APPENDIX 3.2 
 
Constructs of variables 
 
To determine whether constructs such as asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty, 
environmental uncertainty, buyer commitment, expectation of continuity and information 
exchange can be used in the model, each construct is evaluated in terms of individual item 
reliability, internal consistency (composite reliability and cronbach’s alpha ‘α’) and 
discriminant validity (average variance extracted and interconstruct correlations) (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981). 
 
Individual item reliability was determined by examining the loadings of measures on their 
corresponding constructs (see Table 3.4, Appendix 3.1). Except for the constructs behavioural 
uncertainty and environmental uncertainty, all constructs present loadings greater than or 
close to 0.7, indicating a high degree of individual item reliability. 
 
Internal consistency was assessed using two measures: composite reliability and 
cronbach’alpha. Regarding composite reliability, an internal consistency of 0.7 or greater is 
reasonable for exploratory research. Except for the construct environmental uncertainty, 
composite reliability for all constructs exceeds 0.70 (see Table 3.5) indicating a good internal 
consistency. In terms of cronbach’alpha, a minimum reliability of 0.7 is required. Except for 
the constructs behavioural uncertainty and environmental uncertainty, the rest of constructs 
present values ‘α’ closer to or higher than 0.7 (see Table 3.4). 
 
The discriminant validity was carried out in two ways. First, the square root of the variance 
extracted (the numbers on the diagonal in Table 3.5) should be greater than all construct 
correlations (the numbers on the off-diagonal in Table 3.5), which is the case. 
 
Table 3.5 Description of the Constructs [Mean (M), Standard Deviation (SD), Composite 
Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extracted and Intercorrelations of the Constructs] 
  
Sample n = 122 
Constructs  M SD CR 1 2 3 
1. Asset Specificity 4.51 1.90 0.92 0.84   
2. Behavioural Uncertainty 3.09 1.92 0.76 -0.06 0.33  
3. Environmental Uncertainty 4.91 1.32 0.67 -0.16 0.30 0.43 
       
  
Sample n = 122 
Constructs  M SD CR 1 2 3 
1. Buyer commitment 1.74 1.72 0.90 0.69   
2. Expectation of continuity 1.45 1.46 0.91 0.47 0.74  
3. Information exchange 2.50 2.14 0.85 0.50 -0.23 0.71 
Note: The boldface numbers on the diagonal are the square root of the variance shared 
between the constructs and their measures (square root of Average Variance 
Extracted). Off-diagonal elements are correlations among constructs.  
 
Second, the test involves assessing how each item is related to the latent constructs. The 
Appendix 3.3 Table 3.6 reports the item loadings and cross-loadings on the constructs. No 
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item loaded more highly on the other constructs than it did on its associated construct. Both 
criteria indicate that the discriminant validity of the constructs used in the model is satisfied. 
Therefore, we can confidently rely on the constructs asset specificity, buyer commitment, 
expectation of continuity, and information exchange. 
 
APPENDIX 3.3 
 
Table 3.6 Construct to Measure Item Loadings and Cross-Loadings 
 
Sample n = 122 
Items Asset 
specificity 
Behavioural 
Uncertainty 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Human asset specificity 0.903 -0.047 -0.112 
Dedicated asset specificity 0.934 -0.056 -0.176 
Payment uncertainty -0.066 0.990 0.314 
Damage uncertainty 0.082 0.517 0.032 
Price uncertainty -0.144 0.293 0.904 
Demand uncertainty -0.031 0.161 0.625 
Volume uncertainty -0.184 0.084 0.312 
Note. The boldface numbers indicate the item loadings, and the others are the cross-loadings. 
 
 
 
Sample n = 122 
Items Information 
exchange 
Buyer 
commitment 
Expectation of 
continuity 
Information exchange planning 0.745 0.222 0.254 
Information exchange product 
requirements 0.873 0.117 0.211 
Information exchange forecasting 0.684 0.326 0.386 
Information exchange preferences 
and requirements 
0.804 
 
0.226 
 
0.149 
 
Buyer commitment helping 0.426 0.700 0.248 
Buyer commitment sharing 0.298 0.736 0.303 
Buyer commitment improving 0.235 0.681 0.563 
Buyer commitment assistance 0.076 0.837 -0.072 
Expectation of continuity a long 
time 0.200 0.079 0.847 
Expectation of continuity renewal 0.358 0.184 0.729 
Note. The boldface numbers indicate the item loadings, and the others are the cross-loadings. 
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Relationship characteristics and performance in 
fresh produce supply chains: the case of the 
Mexican avocado industry17 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Studies on how particular characteristics of seller-buyer relationships affect performance in 
that relationship usually apply Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). Transaction costs will be 
reduced when there is a good match between the attributes of a transaction and the 
governance structure in which the transaction is embedded. Failure to align transactions, 
which differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which differ in their costs and 
competencies, result in competitive disadvantage (Williamson, 1991). Parties in a dyadic 
relationship are motivated to craft efficient organizational forms to achieve better 
performance due to lower transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). While TCE can inform us 
which (formal) governance mechanisms may reduce the transaction costs that result from 
uncertainty and asset specificity, this approach has at least two limitations. First, it ignores the 
impact of an ongoing relationship on the building of cooperative behaviour, which can reduce 
the risk of opportunistic behaviour that is so central to TCE (Nooteboom, 2004). Second, 
because TCE assumes opportunism as a basic feature of human behaviour, it ignores the 
possibility of positive transactions costs when the problem of opportunism is resolved. Gulati 
et al. (2005) have argued that transaction costs can exist even when opportunism is absent, 
because of the cognitive limitations of human beings in gathering and processing all relevant 
information concerning the transaction. Particular relationship characteristics allow more 
efficient coordination and thus a reduction of transaction costs (Dyer and Chu, 2003; 
Mesquita and Brush, 2008; Paulraj et al., 2008). 
 
We seek to answer the following research question: how do relationship characteristics 
influence producer performance in a fresh produce supply chain. We distinguish between 
characteristics, such as information exchange, that have a direct effect on coordination and 
thereby on performance, and those characteristics that affect transaction costs resulting from 
behavioural uncertainty. Our empirically based analysis is relevant for at least two reasons. 
First, the three relationship characteristics we have selected – information exchange, buyer 
commitment, and expectation of continuity – allow a rich analysis in terms of transaction 
risks and coordination costs. Buyer commitment and expectation of continuity is usually 
associated with a reduction of the transaction risks resulting from behavioural uncertainty 
(Geyskens et al., 1996) while information exchange facilitates efficient planning of 
interdependent activities (Noordewier et al., 1990). Although these relationship characteristics 
have been included in previous research on factors that support efficiency in dyadic 
relationships (e.g. by Lusch and Brown, 1996), their separate effect on transaction risks and 
coordination costs has not been studied. Second, empirical research on the impact of 
relationship characteristics on transaction costs is important from a practical managerial 
perspective because it directly link economic organization to firm performance, thus leading 
to managerial heuristics (Noordewier et al., 1990). 
                                                 
17 This chapter has been published as: Jose Jaime Arana Coronado, Jos Bijman, Onno Omta and Alfons Oude 
Lansink (2010). Relationship characteristics and performance in fresh produce supply chains; the case of the 
Mexican avocado industry. Journal on Chain and Network Science, 10(1): 1 – 15. 
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Our study contributes to the literature on inter-organizational relations in two ways. Our 
theoretical contribution lies in providing a richer explanation for the impact of the 
organisation of transactions on performance by explicitly including in the explanatory model 
a number of relationship characteristics. While buyer commitment and expectation of 
continuity may indirectly explain performance through reduced behavioural uncertainty, 
information exchange influences performance directly through enhanced coordination 
between sellers and buyers. Our practical contribution relates to our findings on specific 
relational factors that affect performance in the Mexican avocado industry. We found a 
positive association between the producer’s expectation of continued interaction with its main 
buyer and the producer performance in terms of yield and product quality. This effect was 
mediated by decreased behavioural uncertainty. In addition, we found that information 
exchange was positively associated with yield, product quality and a better price. On the basis 
of our study we are able to provide recommendations to avocado producers and buyers about 
the relationship characteristics that support performance in their transactions. 
 
Our chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe the avocado industry in 
Mexico. Our conceptual framework is outlined in Section 4.3. Data and estimation procedure 
are specified in Section 4.4 Results are presented in Section 4.5. Discussion and conclusions 
are presented in Section 4.6. We finish with limitations and suggestions for further research in 
Section 4.7.  
 
4.2 Research domain: The Mexican avocado industry 
 
Mexico is word leader in production, consumption and export of fresh avocado (Sanchez, 
2007) and Michoacan is the principal avocado region in Mexico generating an annual 
harvested product value of more than US$ 700 million (Ramos, 2007). In 2005, Mexican 
avocado producers exported 30% of their production, with the USA as the main export market 
(16% of the total production). The rest of the avocado harvest was sold domestically, mainly 
through small and medium sized retail stores (44%) and supermarkets (26%) (Sanchez, 2007). 
 
Since 1997, Mexican avocado producers are allowed to market their fruits in the US market 
(Sanchez, 2007; Stanford, 1998). While there is a growing demand in the US for Mexican 
avocados, producers face two challenges. First, how can they enhance and control product 
quality. Second, how can they improve supply chain efficiency by better aligning supply with 
demand. Mexican avocado producers have recognized that a good supplier-buyer relationship 
can help to comply with quality requirements, adopt appropriate business practices, and meet 
the qualitative and quantitative demands of foreign buyer (Sanchez, 2007). 
 
Mexico has about 11,700 avocado producers, together harvesting more than 800,000 tons 
annually (Sanchez, 2007). The average size of the orchard is between 5.2 and 10 hectares, 
yielding 10 tons/hectare (see Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1 Mexican avocado producers grouped by orchard size 
Type of producer Size of orchard 
(hectares) 
Total production area 
(hectares) 
Percentage (%) 
Small size Smaller than 10 40,149 57 
Medium size 10 to 30 18,313 26 
Large size Larger than 30 11,974 17 
Total  70,436 100 
Source: Ramos (2007) 
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The next stage in the supply chain consists of the packaging houses. There are approximately 
380 packaging houses, of which 60 firms are engaged in export. From these export packaging 
houses, the 26 largest packaging firms mainly target the US market (Sanchez, 2007) using 
modern sorting and packaging technology and adopting quality control systems such as good 
manufacturing practices. Each of these 26 large firms sells more than 8,000 tons of avocados 
per year and is supplied by an average of 50 producers. In total, they process 28% of the 
Mexican avocado production. The other 34 packers are medium size firms applying different 
levels of technology in their packaging stations. They sell between 1,500 and 8,000 tons of 
avocados a year and are supplied by a range of 20 to 50 producers. In total, they process 28% 
of the national avocado harvest. Finally, 320 firms with small packaging stations use rather 
old technology by sorting and packaging the product manually. They sell less than 1,500 tons 
a year and are supplied by less than 20 producers. These packers process 44% of the national 
product (Sanchez, 2007). 
 
The Mexican avocado sector is characterized by high price variation, low levels of investment 
in production improvements, and unpredictable variations in the quantity and timing of 
demand. Prices are negotiated on a daily basis between producers and buyers (Sanchez, 
2007). From our sample of 122 producers, 65% agreed that the price they receive for their 
produce varies significantly over the season. As a consequence of high price variation, 
producers face a high risk of buyer reneging on price agreements as well as damages to the 
trees caused by harvesting by opportunistic buyers18 (Sanchez, 2007). 
 
Investments in improving avocado production are rather low. Studies done in Michoacan 
indicate that more than 71% of the orchards do not comply with the phytosanitary 
requirements, do not apply any fertilizer and do not have irrigation systems (Ramos, 2007; 
Sanchez, 2007). In our sample of 122 producers, only 23% have adopted some type of 
complex quality standard (Global-GAP, US-GAP, or organic). 
 
4.3 Conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework is grounded in two approaches in inter-organizational relations 
theory. The first approach is Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985; 1991). TCE 
provides an answer to the question how to reduce transaction costs that result from asset 
specificity and behavioural uncertainty. While the classical Williamson solution to increasing 
transaction costs is choosing a more hierarchical governance structure, thus strengthening 
control over the transaction by one of the transaction partners, other authors have suggested 
non-hierarchical solutions for dealing with the risk of opportunistic behaviour. Behavioural 
uncertainty have effectively been reduced by such governance mechanisms as trust (Barney 
and Hansen, 1994), reputation (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), expectation of continuity (Dwyer et 
al., 1987), and commitment (Noordewier et al., 1990).  
 
Expectations of continuity and commitment can be considered as non-legal mechanisms that 
complement contractual agreements (Macaulay, 1963), allowing the contract to remain 
incomplete without raising the risk of opportunistic behaviour. While expectation of 
continuity is based on expectations of payoffs from future cooperative behaviour (Telser, 
1980), commitment refers to the current level of interdependence between parties for the 
performance of channel functions (Lusch and Brown, 1996). In addition, commitment is seen 
                                                 
18 In the Mexican avocado industry, the buyer carries out the harvesting. Producers face potential future product 
losses when trees are damaged by unskilled workers employed by the buyer.  
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as joint motivational investment that provides an incentive to make the relationship work and 
endure (Heide and John, 1988). Although commitment can play an important role in 
promoting cooperation, there is a limit to it. When commitment to the exchange relationship 
is disproportionate, the propensity for opportunistic behaviour on the part of the less-
committed party is higher (Lusch and Brown, 1996). Our study will focus on producer 
expectation of continued interaction with a specific buyer and producer perception of buyer 
commitment. 
 
The second approach in inter-organizational theory focuses less on transaction costs 
associated to difficult performance measurement, but more on the transaction costs resulting 
from coordination problems between exchange partners (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Paulraj et al., 
2008). A crucial element of coordination is information exchange (Galbraith, 1977), as shared 
and accurate knowledge about the decisions (and decision rules) of the exchange partner is 
likely to lead to proper alignment of individual but interdependent activities and decisions. 
Information exchange takes relevance particularly when complexity increases (Mesquita and 
Brush, 2008). 
 
In our study, we will consider three relationship characteristics separately: buyer 
commitment, expectation of continuity, and information exchange (Figure 4.1). While 
commitment and expectation of continuity are factors that allow aligning of interests (thus 
reducing transaction cost related to behavioural uncertainty), information exchange allows 
aligning of actions between parties (thus reducing coordination costs). Lower behavioural 
uncertainty and lower coordination costs are expected to generate higher performance on 
efficiency and product quality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework 
 
Various indicators can be used to measure performance in a supply chain. Studies about 
performance in agrifood chains often use efficiency, flexibility, responsiveness, and product 
quality (Aramyan et al., 2006). Efficiency aims to maximize value added by the process and 
minimizes the cost absorbed in inventories. The most commonly used indicators are costs, 
profit, return on investment, and inventory. Flexibility is understood as the ability to respond 
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to changes in the environment (Beamon, 1999). It includes customer satisfaction and 
reductions in the number of backorders, lost sales, and late orders. Responsiveness aims at a 
high level of customer service and may include fill rate, product lateness, customer response 
time, lead-time, and shipping errors (Aramyan et al., 2006). Product quality is obtained by 
turning physical properties of a product into the quality attributes demanded by the consumer 
(Jongen, 2000). Indicators of product quality are safety and healthiness, reliability, and 
convenience (Aramyan et al., 2006).  
 
In our analysis we use two categories of performance indicators, efficiency and product 
quality. These indicators were selected because they are crucial in modern supply chains. 
Consumers and retail customer increasingly emphasize the need for high and uniform quality, 
while there is continuous competitive pressure to improve efficiency, both for individual 
firms and for the supply chain as a whole. These two performance indicators were also found 
to be relevant in other empirical research on the effect of relationship characteristics on 
performance in fresh produce supply chains. Fafchamps et al. (2008) found that information 
supplied by producers to packers about adoption of agricultural and post-harvest practices 
resulted in a price premium for the producer. Lu et al. (2008) showed that vegetable 
producers committed to their buyers obtained higher profitability. In addition, continued 
interaction between exchange parties provides an opportunity to reward good behaviour 
through economic benefits (Baker et al., 2002). Finally, a long-term relationship facilitates the 
adoption of complex quality standards (Reardon and Farina, 2002). We will now individually 
elaborate on each of the hypotheses of our conceptual framework. 
 
4.3.1 Behavioural uncertainty and buyer commitment 
 
Commitment to a relationship is defined as a party’s intention to continue the relationship 
with another party and to refrain from taking advantage of the vulnerability of the other party 
(Heide and John, 1992; Mayer et al., 1995). Two types of commitment are identified in the 
literature, affective commitment and calculative commitment. Affective commitment refers to 
a firm’s intention to remain in an inter-organizational relationship based on feelings of 
identification and involvement with the partner (Cullen et al., 1995). Calculative commitment 
refers to a firm’s intention to remain in an inter-organizational relationship based on the 
recognition of the costs and benefits (Parkhe, 1993). The calculative commitment of a buyer 
results from its constant evaluation of the benefits provided by the supplier as well as the 
opportunity costs of remaining in the relationship (Geyskens et al., 1996). Parkhe (1993) 
found that calculative commitment in a dyadic relationship is negatively related to the 
perception of opportunistic behaviour. We expect that higher buyer commitment leads to 
lower uncertainty about buyer behaviour, formulated in the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Buyer commitment is negatively related to behavioural uncertainty. 
 
4.3.2 Behavioural uncertainty and expectation of continuity 
 
Expectation of continuity concerns the extent to which the exchange partners expect the 
relationship to continue for the foreseeable future (Dwyer et al., 1987). The expectation of 
continuity is conditional upon the future benefits from long-term relationships compared to 
the benefits that accrue from short-term self-interested behaviour (Baker et al., 2002). When 
the value of a future relationship is sufficiently large neither party wishes to renege (Telser, 
1980). Dyer (1997) showed that the value of a future relationship allows reducing the 
bargaining costs (i.e., transaction costs) between parties. We expect that a higher (supplier) 
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expectation of continuity leads to lower uncertainty about buyer behaviour, which gives us the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Expectation of continuity is negatively related to behavioural uncertainty 
 
4.3.3 Behavioural uncertainty and environmental uncertainty 
 
We define environmental uncertainty as the inability to predict changes in relevant factors 
surrounding the supplier-buyer exchange (Walker and Weber, 1984). By increasing the 
number of contingencies that may affect an agreement, more environmental uncertainty raises 
the potential for opportunistic behaviour as well as the expected costs of writing and 
enforcing a contingent claims contract (Williamson, 1985). We distinguish between two types 
of environmental uncertainty, price uncertainty and demand uncertainty. Price uncertainty is 
present when a supplier is unable to accurately forecast the price he is going to receive for his 
product, which makes him reluctant to enter into an agreement that locks him into a fixed 
price for an extended period of time. In a situation of price uncertainty, the supplier is likely 
to insist on negotiating agreements that address this uncertainty and allow for periodic 
adjustments (Artz and Brush, 2000). Demand uncertainty is the defined as the supplier’s 
inability to predict variations in the quantity, quality, and timing of demand (Davis, 1993). 
Without this information, the supplier will be hesitant to invest in production capacity for fear 
that he will be stuck with costly excess capacity if sales expectations do not materialize 
(Anderson, 1985). Both types of environmental uncertainty are included in the model, and we 
expect that environment uncertainty is positively related to his uncertainty about buyer 
behaviour: 
 
H3: Environmental uncertainty is positively related to behavioural uncertainty 
 
4.3.4 Behavioural uncertainty and performance 
 
Behaviour uncertainty leads to two types of transaction costs: monitoring costs and 
enforcement costs (Leiblein, 2003). Monitoring costs refers to the costs associated with 
monitoring whether the partner is complying with the agreement (Dyer, 1997). Enforcement 
costs refer to the costs of ex post bargaining and of sanctioning a trading partner that does not 
perform according to the agreement. Ex post bargaining costs and monitoring costs lead to a 
loss in productivity because of wasteful effort for adjustment and bad performance 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). We expect that higher behavioural uncertainty leads to lower 
performance on efficiency. 
 
H4: Behavioural uncertainty is negatively related to efficiency 
 
High behavioural uncertainty may discourage the supplier from making specialized 
investment (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). When the supplier’s investment has a higher return 
when dealing with a specific buyer than in an alternative transaction, the buyer is able to 
exploit the dependency relationship and demand a large portion of the gains from cooperation. 
High uncertainty about buyer behaviour in a situation of asymmetric dependency may prevent 
the supplier to make efficient investments, such as in quality improvement. We expect that 
high uncertainty about buyer behaviour leads to lower performance on product quality. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: Behavioural uncertainty is negatively related to product quality 
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4.3.5 Information exchange and performance  
 
Information exchange is defined as the bilateral expectation that parties will proactively share 
information relevant to the partner (Heide and John, 1992). Exchanging information is 
necessary in inter-organizational relations even when parties are fully devoted to cooperation 
(Gulati et al., 2005). Noordewier et al. (1990) found that information exchange facilitates 
efficient planning and scheduling of sales. When sellers and buyers communicate and share 
information they can save cost through greater operational efficiencies (Kotabe et al., 2003; 
Takeishi, 2001). We expect that when the supplier receives information from the buyer, for 
instance on the quality and quantity of final demand, it has a positive effect on the economic 
performance of the supplier. The following hypothesis is proposed:  
 
H6: Information exchange is positively related to efficiency  
 
Information exchange is also required for coordinating individual activities and decisions, 
particularly in complex transactions inherent in decomposed production and distribution tasks 
(Mesquita and Brush, 2008: 788). For instance, when the number of (sequential) production 
and distribution tasks increases, the quantity and diversity of the exchanged information also 
increase, making the integration of the various production and distribution tasks more 
cognitively challenging. We expect that more information exchange among buyer and seller 
leads to the adoption (by the supplier) of a higher product quality. The following hypothesis is 
posed: 
 
H7: Information exchange is positively related to product quality 
 
4.4 Data and estimation procedure 
 
4.4.1  Data 
 
The unit of analysis in our study is the supplier-buyer relationship. We tested our hypotheses 
on a sample of avocado producers in Mexico. We collected data by personal interviews with 
122 producers, in the period February – April, 2008. These producers were randomly selected 
based on multistage cluster sampling from the five most important avocado production 
municipalities in Michoacan State: 12 producers from Periban, 28 producers from San Juan 
Nuevo, 8 producers from Tancitaro, 64 producers from Uruapan and 10 producers from 
Ziracuaretiro. Because the Mexican avocado production sector is highly heterogeneous in 
terms of property size, we selected producers with small, medium and large property (see 
Table 4.1). 
 
A questionnaire was developed based on previous studies to measure the constructs in our 
model. After some adaptation to the particular situation of the Mexican avocado industry, a 
pre-test was carried out with three avocado producers who sell to domestic and international 
customers and have different property size. The final questionnaire contained items about 
transaction characteristics, relationship characteristics, performance indicators, and farm 
characteristics (see page 119, Appendix B). Except for farm characteristics, which were 
measured using continuous variables, all items were measured using a seven-point Likert 
scale ranging from ‘1 = not agree at all’ to ‘7 = totally agree’ for items of transaction 
characteristics and relationship characteristics and from ‘1 = much lower’ to ‘7 = much 
higher’ for relative performance indicators. 
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4.4.2  Method 
 
To examine whether relationship characteristics influence transaction characteristics as well 
as performance, each hypothesis was tested using Stata statistical software. The estimation 
procedure we followed was multiple robust regression. This type of estimation should be 
considered when there is a strong suspicion of heteroskedasticity19. For instance, in our 
sample, some independent variables do not present homogeneity of variance. Compared to 
Least Square estimation, Robust Regression generates the same coefficients with smaller 
standard errors (Greene, 2005). Consequently, it decreases the probability that the null 
hypothesis is not rejected while it is false (i.e., a type II error). The first three hypotheses in 
our conceptual framework have behavioural uncertainty as dependent variable, and 
respectively buyer commitment, expectation of continuity, and environmental uncertainty as 
independent variables. Behavioural uncertainty is operationalised by means of payment 
uncertainty and damage uncertainty, and environmental uncertainty is operationalised by 
means of price uncertainty and demand uncertainty. In addition, asset specificity is included 
as a control variable in the equation. Controlling for asset specificity is needed because 
transactions with high specific investments are likely to show more buyer commitment and 
expectation of continuity. Thus, for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, the equation is: 
 
Behavioural uncertainty 0 + 1 buyer commitment+ 2 expectation of continuity+ 3 price 
uncertainty+ 4 demand uncertainty+ 5 asset specificity+e 
 
For hypotheses 4, 5, 6, and 7, the dependent variable is producer performance and it is 
explained by predict values of the variables behavioural uncertainty and information 
exchange. The reason to include these predict values is that environmental uncertainty and 
asset specificity are variables that may explain behavioural uncertainty as well as information 
exchange (Noordewier et al., 1990). In our sample, asset specificity significantly affects 
information exchange, which supports our decision to use predict values. We use two stage 
regression to obtain the predict values (Greene, 2005). In addition, farm characteristics, such 
as age, experience, property size, location, and quality standard adopted, are included as 
control variables in explaining performance. Producer performance is operationalised by 
product quality and three efficiency measures, namely yield, price, and profits. Therefore, 
producer performance is determined by the following equation: 
 
Performance 0 + 1 payment uncertainty+ 2 damage uncertainty+ 3 information 
exchange + 4 age of producer+ 5 experience of producer+ 6 size of property+ 7 location 
of property + 8 quality standard+e 
 
4.4.3  Measures 
 
Independent variables  
 
Buyer commitment refers to the supplier perception about the willingness of the buyer to 
maintain a positive exchange relationship (Parkhe, 1993) and to work towards continuous 
                                                 
19 Heteroscedasticity means that the variance of the residual is not equal at different levels of the independent 
variable. Homoscedasticity is one of the assumptions that should be met when drawing conclusions for a 
population on the basis of a sample. 
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improvement of the transaction performance (Geyskens et al., 1996). It is a measure of the 
intensity of the relationship between producer and buyer. Four items measured by means of a 
seven-point Likert scale – ranging from ‘not agree at all’ to ‘totally agree’ – are used to 
develop the ‘buyer commitment’ construct (see Table 4.6, Appendix 4.1). The reliability for 
this construct was (α = 0.85), and the construct was included as an individual variable in the 
model. 
 
Expectation of continuity indicates the degree to which the producer expects the relationship 
with the buyer to continue for the foreseeable future (Dwyer, 1987). Two items were used to 
measure this construct (see Table 4.6, Appendix 4.1), each one using a seven-point Likert 
scale. The reliability for this construct was (α = 0.67). The construct ‘expectation of 
continuity’ was included as an individual variable in the model. 
 
Information exchange is defined as a bilateral expectation that parties will proactively provide 
information useful to the partner, such as long-term forecasting, structural planning 
information, future product design, and production planning schedules (Noordewier et al., 
1990). In the present research, the construct ‘information exchange’ is based on four items 
(see Table 4.6, Appendix 4.1), each using a seven-point Likert scale. The reliability of this 
construct was (α = 0.85). 
 
Environmental uncertainty refers to the inability to predict changes in relevant factors 
surrounding the supplier-buyer exchange (Walker and Weber, 1984). Two items were initially 
included (see Table 4.6, Appendix 4.1): price uncertainty and demand uncertainty. However, 
because demand uncertainty presented a loading lower than 0.7, the two items were 
individually included in the model. A seven-point Likert scale was used for each of the items. 
 
Dependent variables  
 
Behavioural uncertainty is a performance evaluation problem (Rindfleish and Heide, 1997). 
In our study it refers to the difficulties the producer has in verifying whether the buyer will 
comply with the (price) agreement and whether the buyer will not damage the orchard of the 
producer (as the buyer is doing the actual harvesting). It was initially measured by the 
combination of two items: payment uncertainty and damage uncertainty. Because damage 
uncertainty had a loading lower than 0.7 (see Table 4.6, Appendix 4.1), the two items were 
individually included in the model. Again, a seven-point Likert scale was used. 
 
We used two performance indicators, product quality and efficiency, and we used both 
perception performance and actual performance. To measure perceived performance, we 
asked the producers to indicate what performance change they had experienced over the 
period 2004 - 2007. For efficiency we measured yield, price, and profit. The items were 
measured using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from ‘much lower’ to ‘much higher’, 
where much lower indicates that 2007 performance was much lower than 2004 performance. 
 
For actual performance, we measured yield, price, total sales, and product quality. The latter 
was calculated as the ratio of export product/total product in 2007. Yield increase was 
computed by taking the difference between the average avocado production per hectare in 
2005 and in 2007. Price was in pesos per ton of avocado, and sales was total avocado sales in 
pesos per year. 
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Control variables 
 
As control variables we included asset specificity as well as a number of farm characteristics. 
Asset specificity is the extent to which specialized investments in support of a transaction are 
made. It is based on the items developed by Dahlstrom et al. (1996). We employ this variable 
because we want to control for (1) the vulnerability of the producer because of transaction 
specific investments (and hence the need for buyer commitment and expectation of 
continuity) and (2) the type of exchange. According to TCE, exchanges differ in their need for 
safeguarding specific investments (Carson et al., 2006; Dyer, 1997; Parkhe, 1993). Thus, we 
control for asset specificity because any examination of the effects of buyer commitment and 
expectation of continuity must take into account exchange attributes that may influence these 
constructs. The construct for asset specificity was based on two items (human asset specificity 
and dedicated assets, see Table 4.6, Appendix 4.1). The items were measured using a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from ‘not agree at all’ to ‘totally agree’. 
 
We included a number of farm characteristics as control variables. Wollni and Zeller (2007) 
found that farm characteristics such as producer experience, property size, and product quality 
can explain producer performance in the context of market channel choice. Five farm 
characteristics were included: the age of the producer, the experience of the producer in 
producing avocado, the size of the producer’s property, the municipality in which the property 
is located, and the quality standard adopted by the producer. We modelled location and 
quality standard as dummy variables (1 for property located in Uruapan, 0 otherwise; 1 for 
private quality standard such as Global-GAP, US-GAP and organic, 0 for public quality 
standard). 
 
Table 4.2 presents a summary of the variables used in our study. The relationship 
characteristics have rather low mean scores, which may indicate that quite a number of 
avocado producers have low expectations about their relationship with buyers. Still, the 
standard deviation suggests that there are also a number of producers with positive 
experiences. Regarding farm characteristics, the producer’s property size presents a higher 
standard deviation than its mean. Sanchez (2007) and Stanford (1998) have emphasized that 
property size could affect producer performance. Producers with large property may be able 
to purchase inputs at a lower price, using them more intensively, thereby increasing product 
yield compared to producers with small property. In our research, size heterogeneity was 
taken into account by explicitly including producers with small, medium and large property. 
We expect a positive relationship between property size and producer performance. 
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Table 4.2 Summary of variables 
Variables Type of variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Relationship characteristics 
Buyer commitment * Ordinal 1.74 1.72
Expectation of continuity * Ordinal 1.45 1.46
Information exchange * Ordinal 2.50 2.14
Environmental uncertainty 
Price uncertainty Ordinal 5.03 2.02
Demand uncertainty Ordinal 2.93 1.72
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Behavioural uncertainty 
Payment Uncertainty Ordinal 3.02 2.12
Damage Uncertainty Ordinal 3.37 2.26
Performance measures 
Perception performance measures 
Yield Ordinal 5.09 1.54
Price Ordinal 5.45 1.41
Profit Ordinal 5.28 1.34
Product quality Ordinal 5.31 1.38
Actual performance measures 
Increasing yield (tons/hectare) Interval 1.26 2.26
Price (pesos/tons) Interval 11,420 3,640
Sales (pesos/year) Interval 1,526,592 3,187,164
Product quality (export/total product) Interval 0.39 0.35
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Asset specificity * Ordinal 4.51 1.90
Age of producer (years) Interval 49.56 14.78
Experience of producer (years) Interval 20.27 11.88
Size of property (hectares) Interval 12.70 18.92
Location of property  
(Uruapan=1, otherwise=0) Nominal 0.52 0.50
Quality standard (Organic, Global-GAP or 
US-Gap=1, otherwise=0) Nominal 0.23 0.42
* : The composition of these constructs can be found in the Appendix 4.1. 
Note: Likert scale ranging from 1 = not agree at all to 7 = totally agree for items of transaction 
characteristics and relationship characteristics and from 1 = much lower to 7 = much higher 
for performance measures. 
 
In terms of correlation between variables, none of them exhibit great overlap, the highest 
correlation among the exogenous variables being 0.45. Based on the low correlations among 
the measures, the possibility of criterion contamination can be more or less ruled out.   
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4.5 Results 
 
Table 4.3 shows the results for the expected association between several relationship 
characteristics and behavioural uncertainty (hypotheses 1 and 2), and for the expected 
association between environmental uncertainty and behavioural uncertainty (hypothesis 3). As 
indicated above, we measured two types of behavioural uncertainty: uncertainty about 
whether the buyer will comply with the agreed payment and whether the buyer will damage 
the orchard. Buyer commitment does reduce payment uncertainty; however, the result is not 
significant (thus hypothesis 1 is not supported). Expectation of continuity has a significant 
negative effect on payment uncertainty (thus, hypothesis 2 is supported). This implies that 
uncertainty about buyer payment will be lower in those relationships where the supplier has a 
high expectation of continued transactions with the buyer. Regarding the impact of 
environmental uncertainty, we found a positive effect of price uncertainty on payment 
uncertainty (supporting hypothesis 3). In addition, the control variable asset specificity is 
significantly and positively related to payment uncertainty. When we measure behavioural 
uncertainty as damage uncertainty, the variables buyer commitment and expectation of 
continuity are not significant, and hypotheses 1 and 2 are not supported. 
 
Table 4.3 Determinants of Behavioural Uncertainty (Robust regression) 
Dependent variable Payment uncertainty Damage uncertainty 
 adjusted R2 
 
0.1055 adjusted R2 
 
0.0063 
Independent Variables Coefficients Robust standard 
errors 
Coefficients Robust 
standard 
errors 
Buyer commitment -0.284 0.209 -0.175 0.241 
Expectation of continuity -0.458** 0.223 -0.336 0.257 
Price uncertainty 0.297** 0.104 -0.137 0.120 
Demand uncertainty 0.074 0.120 0.053 0.139 
Asset specificity 0.442* 0.244 0.212 0.282 
Constant 0.833 0.830 2.708 0.957 
** Significant at p < 0.05;        * Significant at p < 0.10  
 
Table 4.4 shows the determinants of producer performance, measured both as perceived and 
actual performance (the Table only presents the significant variables). When we look at actual 
performance measures, the results indicate that behavioural uncertainty, operationalised as 
payment uncertainty, negatively affects yield increase and product quality (thus, hypotheses 4 
and 5 about the association between behavioural uncertainty and performance are supported), 
but does not significantly affect price and sales. However, when we consider perceived 
performance measures, payment uncertainty does not influence any of the performance 
indicators. Mexican avocado producers who have more certainty about fulfilment of payment 
conditions have adopted private quality standards. Adoption of these quality standards has 
allowed not only reduction of the bargaining costs between parties, but also getting more 
products that fulfils the international standards (Sanchez, 2007). Damage uncertainty, the 
other behavioural uncertainty measure, does not significantly affect any of the performance 
variables. Damage uncertainty does not seem to be a serious problem in avocado transactions. 
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Hypotheses 6 and 7 stated an effect of information exchange on performance. As Table 4.4 
shows, information exchange has a significantly positive effect on the actual performance 
measures yield (thus partly supporting hypothesis 6) and product quality (supporting 
hypothesis 7), while it does not significantly affect the actual measures price and sales. 
Regarding perception performance measures, information exchange is significant in 
explaining price and product quality. 
 
We also looked at the impact on performance of several farm characteristics such as age and 
experience of the producer, property size, location, and quality standard adopted. The 
variables age of the producers, size of property, and quality standard turn out to be significant 
in affecting some performance indicators. Age is negatively related to actual price. Size of 
property significantly affects total sales and perception of yield increase, while the quality 
standard adopted significantly influences actual product quality, actual price, and actual total 
sales, as well as the perception measure of product quality. Particularly, the positive 
relationship between size of property and total sales shows that producers increasing their 
production area look for productive orchards, i.e., with mature trees, to respond to the 
increasing demand; otherwise, producers have to wait approximately 6 years to get the first 
avocado harvest (Sanchez, 2007). Table 4.5 provides a summary of the results for all 
hypotheses. 
 
Table 4.5 Results for the hypotheses 
 Coefficient 
is 
significant?
Expected 
sign of 
coefficient 
is correct? 
Hypothesis 
is 
supported 
or not? 
H1.  Buyer commitment is negatively related to 
behavioural uncertainty No - 
Not 
supported 
H2.  Expectation of continuity is negatively 
related to behavioural uncertainty about 
payment 
Yes Yes Supported 
H3.  Environmental uncertainty about price is 
positively related to behavioural uncertainty 
about payment 
Yes Yes Supported 
H4.  Behavioural uncertainty is negatively 
related to efficiency (measure as actual 
quality and yield) 
Yes Yes Supported 
H5.  Behavioural uncertainty is negatively 
related to product quality  Yes Yes Supported 
H6.  Information exchange for is positively 
related to efficiency (measure as actual 
quality and yield, or perception of quality 
and price) 
Yes Yes Supported 
H7.  Information exchange for is positively 
related to product quality  Yes Yes Supported 
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
We have examined the impact of relationship characteristics on performance in fresh produce 
supply chains. We have used data from the Mexican avocado industry to analyze the impact 
of buyer commitment, expectation of continuity, and information exchange on the economic 
and product quality performance of the supplier. We have used two types of analysis, based 
on two theoretical perspectives. Transaction Cost Economics was used to assess the effect of 
relationship characteristics on behavioural uncertainty (representing transaction costs) and 
thereby on supplier performance. Coordination theory was used to study the direct effect of 
information exchange on supplier performance. Our study shows that relationship 
characteristics influence performance through different paths. Whereas expectation of 
continuity affects payment uncertainty and thereby indirectly affects such performance 
measures as yield and product quality, information exchange directly affects the same 
performance indicators. In contrast, we found that buyer commitment does not significantly 
affect behavioural uncertainty. We will now discuss our findings in the context of the 
literature on inter-organizational relations. First we will focus on the effect of buyer 
commitment and expectation of continuity on behavioural uncertainty and (indirectly) on 
performance. Second, we will discuss the direct impact of information exchange on 
performance. 
 
In analyzing the path ‘relationship characteristics  behavioural uncertainty  performance’, 
we found, in line with Artz and Brush (2000) and Dyer (1997),  that seller expectation of 
continuity will significantly reduce uncertainty about buyer payment, thus reducing 
transaction costs. However, Carson et al. (2006) did not find a significant correlation between 
expectation of continuity and transaction costs caused by behavioural uncertainty. Regarding 
buyer commitment, we found that the impact of this relationship characteristic on behavioural 
uncertainty is not significant, which is similar to the results of Carson et al. (2006), who 
found that the history of the relationship does not significantly correlate with the risk of 
opportunism. Artz and Brush (2000), however, found that collaboration composed of the 
dimensions commitment and information exchange was significant in reducing negotiation 
costs. According to our results, we can affirm that expectation of future benefits is more 
important than current level of commitment to explain cooperative behaviour. 
 
As to the effect of environmental uncertainty on behavioural uncertainty, we found that price 
uncertainty is positively related to payment uncertainty. Andersen and Buvik (2001) have 
suggested that substantial environmental uncertainty increases the trading parties’ options to 
take advantage of asymmetric information and performance measurement problems. 
Analyzing inter-firm coordination in domestic versus international relationships, they found 
that behavioural uncertainty (measured as the difficulties in performance verifications) was 
modest in domestic relationships, while it was substantial in international relationships in 
which environmental uncertainty was significantly higher. For the Mexican avocado sector, 
Sanchez (2007) has argued that uncertainty about the price is an important determinant of 
whether the buyer will comply with the agreement. 
 
Linking behavioural uncertainty and performance, we found a negative association between 
payment uncertainty and yield and product quality. A possible explanation could be that 
producers that are uncertain about whether the buyer will comply with the price agreement are 
less likely to invest in productivity and quality enhancing inputs and activities. In addition, if 
producing higher quality means having fewer sales options, than the producer may end up in a 
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hold-up situation (Raynaud et al., 2005). Producers may not want to become dependent on 
one or a few buyers, thus refraining from transaction-specific quality enhancing investments.  
 
In summary, when avocado producers transact with buyers on the expectation of a continued 
relationship, they have reduced uncertainty about the behaviour of these buyers. Producers 
facing lower payment uncertainty spend less time on finding additional market information, 
on renegotiating agreements and on resolving conflicts. In addition, because of the 
expectation of a continued relationship, producers have made human capital investments in 
terms of knowing buyer requirements such as fulfilling particular product quality standards. 
Those producers show higher yield and product quality. 
 
With regard to information exchange, we found a significant and positive relation with the 
performance measures yield, price and product quality. Noordewier et al. (1990) found that 
information provided by buyers to suppliers significantly improves efficiency and allows 
planning current and future product deliveries, thereby improving the service of the supplier 
to the buyer, which is compensated by a higher price paid received by the supplier. 
 
Buyers providing information to producers have enabled Mexican avocado producers not only 
to plan current and future product deliveries, but also to adopt complex quality standards and 
to apply supply chain practices such as a cold chain (Ramos, 2007). Avocado producers 
receiving information from the buyers have increased the ratio of avocado export/total 
production, but have also achieved better coordination with the buyer in terms of fulfilment of 
product orders. 
 
4.7 Managerial implications and limitations 
 
From our study we can draw a number of management implications for Mexican avocado 
producers and buyers. First, increasing information exchange, in particular by buyers 
providing information to the producers on the quality and quantity of final demand, leads to 
higher performance. Thus, producers are advised to seek buyers that have a reputation of 
providing information to their suppliers. Second, establishing sustainable trading relationships 
between buyers and sellers will benefit both of them. Producers will benefit from secure sales, 
while packers will benefit not only from secure deliveries but also from producer commitment 
to comply with buyer demands. 
 
In our study we have limited ourselves to two relationship characteristics that may affect 
behavioural uncertainty, viz., commitment and expectation of continuity. Other relationship 
characteristics mentioned in the literature on efficient inter-organizational relations are trust 
and reputation. Further research may explicitly include those other relationship 
characteristics, and see how they complement or substitute for commitment and/or the 
expectation of a continued relationship. 
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APPENDIX 4.1 Constructs of variables 
 
Factor analysis is used to calculate the loadings for constructs information exchange, buyer 
commitment, expectation of continuity, asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty and 
environmental uncertainty. Under this method, the loadings indicate how much of variance in 
each independent item is accounted for by the latent construct (Lattin et al., 2003). Thus, to 
determine whether constructs such as asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty, 
environmental uncertainty, buyer commitment, expectation of continuity and information 
exchange can be used in the model, each construct is evaluated in terms of individual item 
reliability, internal consistency (composite reliability and cronbach’s alpha ‘α’) and 
discriminant validity (average variance extracted and interconstruct correlations) (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981). 
 
Individual item reliability was determined by examining the loadings of measures on their 
corresponding constructs (see Table 4.6). Except for constructs behavioural uncertainty and 
environmental uncertainty, the rest of constructs present loadings greater than or close to 0.7 
indicating a high degree of individual item reliability. 
 
Internal consistency was assessed using two measures: composite reliability and 
cronbach’alpha. Regarding composite reliability, an internal consistency of 0.7 or greater is 
reasonable for exploratory research. All the constructs exceed 0.70 (see Table 4.7) indicating 
a good internal consistency. In terms of cronbach’alpha, a minimum reliability of 0.7 is 
required. Except for the constructs behavioural uncertainty and environmental uncertainty, the 
rest of constructs present values ‘α’ closer to or higher than 0.7 (see Table 4.6) 
 
The discriminant validity was carried out in two ways. First, the square root of the variance 
extracted (the numbers on the diagonal in Table 4.7) should be greater than all construct 
correlations (the numbers on the off-diagonal in Table 4.7), as is the case. Second, the test 
involves assessing how each item is related to the latent constructs. Table 4.8 reports the item 
loadings and cross-loadings on the constructs. For all constructs, no item loaded higher on the 
other constructs than it did on its associated construct. Both criteria indicate that the 
discriminant validity of the constructs used in the model is satisfactory.  
 
Based on these three tests (individual item reliability, internal consistency, and discriminant 
validity) we can confidently rely on the constructs asset specificity17, buyer commitment, 
expectation of continuity, and information exchange. On the contrary, because the constructs 
behavioural and environmental uncertainties were not valid, we individually incorporated 
their items in the model. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 For asset specificity, we eliminated the item related to losing part of the physical investment when the 
producer switches to another buyer (Physical asset specificity). The new construct for asset specificity passed the 
tests for reliability, internal consistency, and discriminant validity.   
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Table 4.6 Constructs and items used in the model for the producer sample 
 Constructs Loadings 
Information exchange (= 0.85, eigenvalue= 2.58) 
Information exchange 
planning 
We receive information to help us plan according 
to his needs 
0.74 
Information exchange 
product requirements 
We are frequently informed of his product 
requirements 
0.87 
Information exchange 
forecasting 
We are provided with long-range forecasts of 
supply requirements 
0.68 
Information exchange 
preference and 
requirements 
We are informed in advance of impeding changes 
in preferences and requirements 
0.80 
Buyer commitment (= 0.85, eigenvalue= 1.53) 
Buyer commitment 
helping 
Our main buyer tries to help us when we incur 
problems 
0.70 
Buyer commitment 
sharing 
Our main buyer shares in the problems that arise 
in the course of dealing 
0.74 
Buyer commitment 
improving 
Our main buyer is committed to improvements 
that benefit our relationship 
0.68 
Buyer commitment 
assistance 
Our main buyer has supported us with technical 
assistance and inputs 
0.84 
Expectation of continuity (= 0.67, eigenvalue= 2.66) 
Expectation of continuity 
a long time 
We expect our relationship to continue a long time 0.85 
Expectation of continuity 
renewal  
Renewal of the relationship is virtually automatic 0.73 
Asset specificity (= 0.74, eigenvalue = 2.94) 
Human asset specificity We have made significant investments in training 
of workers and in equipment specific for our main 
buyer 
0.90 
Dedicated assets We have made significant investments in 
fulfilment of production requirements for our 
main buyer 
0.94 
Behavioural uncertainty (= 0.58, eigenvalue = 1.95) 
Payment uncertainty We are uncertain whether our buyer will stick to 
the payment agreement 
0.99 
Damage uncertainty We are uncertain whether our buyer will damage 
the orchard 
0.43 
Environmental uncertainty  (= 0.47, eigenvalue = 1.08) 
Price uncertainty 
 
The price for my product varies significantly over 
the seasons 
0.92 
Demand uncertainty There are always many buyers for my product 0.65 
 
 
 
 
Relationship characteristics and performance in fresh produce supply chains: the case 
of the Mexican avocado industry 
Supply chain practices, performance and organizational configuration in the  
Mexican avocado industry  77 
Table 4.7 Description of the Constructs [Mean (M), Standard Deviation (SD), Composite 
Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extracted and Intercorrelations of the Constructs] 
 Sample n = 122 
Constructs  M SD CR 1 2 3 
1. Asset Specificity 4.51 1.90 0.92 0.84   
2. Behavioural Uncertainty 3.08 1.93 0.72 -0.07 0.60  
3. Environmental Uncertainty 5.06 1.53 0.77 -0.13 0.31 0.63 
       
 
[Mean (M), Standard Deviation (SD), Composite Reliability (CR), Average Variance 
Extracted and Intercorrelations of the Constructs] 
 Sample n = 122 
Constructs  M SD CR 1 2 3 
1. Buyer commitment 1.74 1.72 0.90 0.69   
2. Expectation of continuity 1.45 1.46 0.91 0.47 0.74  
3. Information exchange 2.50 2.14 0.85 0.50 -0.23 0.71 
Note: The boldface numbers on the diagonal are the square root of the variance shared 
between the constructs and their measures (square root of Average Variance Extracted). 
Off-diagonal elements are correlations among constructs.  
 
Table 4.8 Construct to Measure Item, Loadings and Cross-Loadings 
Items Information exchange Commitment Continuity 
Information exchange planning 0.745 0.222 0.254 
Information exchange product 
requirements 0.873 0.117 0.211 
Information exchange forecasting 0.684 0.326 0.386 
Information exchange preference and 
requirements 0.804 0.226 0.149 
Buyer commitment helping 0.426 0.700 0.248 
Buyer commitment sharing 0.298 0.736 0.303 
Buyer commitment improving 0.235 0.681 0.563 
Buyer commitment assistance 0.076 0.837 -0.072 
Expectation of continuity a long time 0.200 0.079 0.847 
Expectation of continuity renewal  0.358 0.184 0.729 
 
Items Asset specificity Behavioural Uncertainty 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Asset specificity in terms of training 
of workers 0.900 -0.055 -0.065 
Asset specificity in terms of 
production requirements  0.937 -0.068 -0.161 
Payment uncertainty -0.067 0.990 0.313 
Damage uncertainty 0.082 0.437 0.004 
Price uncertainty -0.145 0.311 0.919 
Demand uncertainty -0.032 0.161 0.649 
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Interfirm coordination in the Mexican avocado 
industry: the packer – buyer relationship  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Since 1997, the Mexican avocado industry has shown increasing exports. To comply with 
international quality standards, supply chain management practices such as product 
standardization, supplier partnership and enhanced exchange information have been 
introduced, to improve quality and guarantee safe and reliable supply (Sanchez, 2007). 
Particularly, interfirm coordination (based on information exchange and expectation of future 
interaction) between packers and buyers has grown in relevance. Packers selling product in 
national and international markets face an uncertainty environment in which prices are 
determined on a daily basis and customer demand are rather volatile in terms of promotions, 
and changes in order procedures and in volume requirements (Ramos, 2007; Sanchez, 2007). 
Responding to these uncertainties differentiated levels of information exchange have been 
established between packers and buyers (Ramos, 2007). Whereas some packers have accessed 
to information about retail demand and promotions, and precise information that facilitate 
joint planning activities related to product requirements, distribution and transportation, others 
have supported their transactions based on information requirements such as product quantity 
and price. As result, these latter packers require to manage more safety inventory and increase 
the delivery costs to fulfil the orders or alternatively, because they do not commit to supply a 
specified quantity of product, they face more stock outs (Sanchez, 2007). Based on these 
differentiated levels of interfirm coordination we pose following research questions, what 
conditions determine the level of interfirm coordination between packers and buyers, and how 
interfirm coordination impacts performance of the packer.  
 
Interfirm coordination defined as coordinated adaptations that involve a move away from 
arm’s length market transactions and toward an extended, mutual adaptation between 
nominally interdependent parties (Williamson, 1991), has become a subject of considerable 
managerial interest. Typically viewed as a universally desirable win-win mechanism (Porter, 
1980), interfirm coordination has gained relevance in the analysis of hybrid forms of 
organization (Gulati et al., 2005; Noordewier et al., 1990; Palay, 1984). Whereas authors such 
as Gulati and Singh (1998), Noordewier et al. (1990) have argued that vertical coordination is 
an effective response to uncertainties in marketing environments, others such as Buvik and 
John (2000), assuming incentive conflicts, have concluded that higher levels of interfirm 
coordination increase the hazard posed to the seller’s exposed specific investments. The seller 
with a high level of transaction specific investments face safeguarding problems which under 
environmental uncertainty may conflict with the introduction of stronger interfirm ties with a 
buyer. According to this last standpoint we ask, if asset specificity generates dependence to 
the investing party, and therefore, vulnerable to exploitation ex post, why would one’s 
willingness to commit vary ex ante and to continue a relationship? 
 
Recently, Gulati et al. (2005), distinguishing between coordinated and cooperative responses 
to adaptation in situations of interdependency, have argued that contracting, common 
ownership, monitoring, and prospect of future interaction allow aligning interests, while 
information exchange is particularly accurate for aligning actions. Therefore, mechanisms that 
only align actions will not be sufficient to achieve full coordination (Gulati and Singh 1998).
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The objective of this chapter is to analyze what conditions impact the level of interfirm 
coordination between packers and buyers in the Mexican avocado industry, and whether a 
higher level of interfirm coordination improves packer performance. Otherwise, we would 
follow the traditional TCA analysis in which is predicted that under presence of hazard 
contractual problems, high asset specificity transactions are better organized hierarchically, 
and therefore, conclude that no higher levels of interfirm coordination between parties are 
expected (Buvik and John, 2000). 
 
The study is based on data gathered from 44 avocado packers commercializing their product 
by mean of traders or wholesalers, and therefore, no integrating trading activity. They 
commercialize their product in one of two markets, national or international market. We use 
two variables for measuring interfirm coordination: (1) duration of the arrangement between 
packer and buyer; and (2) information exchange, as an indicator of information provided by 
the buyer for organizing the flow of activities and resources to enable better alignment when 
unforeseen changing circumstances occur.  We expect following results. First, to confirm the 
level of information exchange is contingent on the magnitude of asset specificity under 
presence of environmental uncertainty. Second, duration of the arrangement is a significant 
variable to explain information exchange, and therefore, shows why packers continue in a 
contractual relationship with buyers although the former can face opportunism. Third, 
interfirm coordination is a significant variable to explain the packer performance. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, we describe the avocado industry in 
Mexico and the state of interfirm coordination between the packers and the buyers in Section 
5.2. Next, the conceptual framework and research hypotheses are presented in Section 5.3. 
We continue with the description of data, the methods used to estimate the model, the 
measurements used in the model, and the validity and reliability of measures used in Section 
5.4. After that the results are presented in Section 5.5. The chapter finishes with discussion 
and conclusions, limitations of the study and suggestions for further research in Section 5.6. 
 
5.2 Research domain: Interfirm coordination in the Mexican avocado 
industry 
 
5.2.1 The avocado industry 
 
Mexico is the word leader in production, consumption and export of fresh avocado (Sanchez, 
2007). Michoacan is the principal avocado production region in Mexico generating a 
harvested product value of more than US$ 700 million per year, and providing 42,000 
permanent and 31,000 temporal jobs (Ramos, 2007). Michoacan produces more than 800,000 
tons annually, on more than 75,800 hectares, by approximately 11,700 avocado producers 
(Sanchez, 2007). The five most important municipalities hosting 72% of cultivated area and 
66% of avocado producers are Tancitaro, Uruapan, Tacambaro, San Juan Nuevo, and Periban.  
 
A new configuration of the Mexican avocado industry has developed since 1997 when the 
non-tariff barriers that prohibited Mexican fresh avocado exports to the USA were 
eliminated21 and phytosanitary regulations were introduced (Ortiz, 2007; Sanchez, 2007: 67). 
In 2005, Mexican avocado producers exported 30% of avocado production, with the USA as 
                                                 
21 On February 5, 1997, the ban on Mexican avocado imports into the USA was lifted. To allow exports of 
Mexican avocado to the USA, the USDA requires verification of compliance to phytosanitary conditions, which 
is inspected by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS). In addition, a continuous program of 
pest control must be followed by Mexican producers (Sanchez, 2007: 49). 
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the main export market (with 16% of the total Mexican production). The other 70% of 
avocado production was sold domestically through small and medium sized retail stores (44% 
of total production) or supermarkets (26%).  
 
Unlike the production sector with its large number of farmers, the packaging sector is highly 
concentrated. In 2007, there were approximately 382 packers in the Mexican avocado 
industry (see Table 5.1). Only 62 packers participate in the export market, of which 26 are 
exporting to the USA (Sanchez, 2007). These 26 packers are characterized by large size 
packaging stations using quality systems such as good manufacturing practices and high 
levels of technology. Each of these packers sells more than 8,000 tons of avocados per year, 
and is supplied by an average of 50 producers. In total, these large size packers process 28% 
of the Mexican avocado production. The other 36 packers participating in the export market 
are medium size packaging stations generally applying lower levels of technology. They sell 
between 1,500 and 8,000 tons of avocados a year each and are supplied by a range of 20 to 50 
producers. In total, they handle 28% of the national product. Finally, 320 packers with small 
packaging stations use obsolete technology in sorting and packaging the product manually. 
They sell less than 1,500 tons a year each and are supplied by less than 20 producers. These 
packers process 44% of the national product (Sanchez, 2007). 
 
Table 5.1 Categories of packaging firms in the Mexican avocado industry 
Size of packer Number of 
packers 
Market destination  Share in total 
avocado handing 
 
Large size 
packer 
 
 
26 
 
The main market is USA. Also 
exporting to Japan, Europe, Canada 
 
28 
 
Middle size 
packer 
 
 
36 
 
The main markets are Central America 
and domestic supermarkets 
 
28 
 
Small size 
packer 
 
 
320 
 
The main markets are domestic middle 
and small size retailers, and wet 
markets (local markets) 
 
44 
Total 382   100% 
Source: Ramos (2007), Sanchez (2007) and authors’ survey. 
 
5.2.2 Interfirm coordination between the packers and the buyers 
 
Avocado packers and buyers have established different levels of interfirm coordination, 
depending on the final destination of the product (Sanchez, 2007). In domestic markets buyers 
provide information to packers about the product specifications and the price for a specific 
order. For foreign destinations, information exchange between supply chain partners is much 
richer. Buyers provide information about quantity and quality, promotion schedules, 
inventory levels, delivery schedules, and distribution planning. 
 
Packers sell to international traders who sell to foreign wholesalers and supermarkets or to 
domestic wholesalers and supermarkets. Out of the 26 largest packers, 19 are actually 
integrated packer-trading firms (Table 5.2). The main US distribution centres for Mexican 
avocado are located in Texas, California, and Chicago, where customers demand avocado’s 
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that fulfil high food safety and phytosanitary requirements and have a larger size than the 
product sold in the Mexican market. Fruits not meeting the minimum export quality standards 
are sold in the domestic market or go to the processing industry. 
 
Table 5.2 Vertical integration strategy of by Mexican avocado packers 
 Strategy 
Size of packer Number of 
packers 
Market destination  Integration of 
trading activity 
No integration of 
trading activity 
 
Large size 
packer 
 
 
 
26 
 
The main market is 
USA. Also 
exporting to Japan, 
Europe, Canada 
 
 
19 
 
 
7 
 
Middle size 
packer 
 
 
 
36 
 
The main markets 
are Central America 
and domestic 
supermarkets 
 
 
17 
 
 
19 
 
Small size 
packer 
 
 
 
320 
 
The main markets 
are domestic middle 
and small size 
retailers, and wet 
markets (local 
markets) 
 
 
0 
 
 
320 
Total 382  36 346 
Percentage 100%  9.4% 90.6% 
Source: Ramos (2007), Sanchez (2007) and authors’ survey. 
 
 
The medium size packers have followed two strategies. Seventeen packers have integrated 
with a trading company, selling their product to either wholesalers or supermarkets in 
Mexico. The other nineteen medium size packers sell their product to traders who sell to 
supermarkets mainly located in Central America. Finally, most of the small size packers sell 
their product to wholesalers who then sell to small and medium size retailers within Mexico. 
In sum, 90% of the packers (together handling 50% of the total Mexican avocado production) 
commercialize their product by means of traders or wholesalers. Our study focused on these 
90% of all packers. 
 
When selling product in the domestic market, less coordination in terms of knowledge sharing 
and information exchange is required compared to the international market. Still, packers 
sending product to domestic supermarkets put more effort in the working relationship with 
their buyers than packers sending product to small and medium sized retailers. In the latter 
case, packers do not use specialized personnel, while negotiations mainly focus on quantity 
and price. In contrast, selling product in the international market requires a tight working 
relationship between packer and buyer. Specialized personnel of the buyer evaluates prices, 
preferences, promotions and stocks determining demand and planning of future orders. 
 
The duration of the contractual relationship between packer and buyer and the duration of the 
arrangement varies from a one-time order to a multiple year relationship. A continuous 
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relationship enables the packers to obtain a good insight in the strength and weaknesses as 
well as the strategic preferences of the buyer. 
 
 
5.3 Conceptual framework 
 
5.3.1 Transaction Cost Analysis  
 
The conceptual framework is grounded in Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA). In  analyzing 
conditions that impact the level of interfirm coordination we follow Gulati et al. (2005), who 
have argued that efficient adaptation by transaction partners to changes in the transaction 
environment requires both a collaborative response, which is about realigning interests, and a 
coordinated response, which is about realigning activities. Thus, interfirm coordination can be 
considered as a solution to the dual problem of how to align interests in situations of incentive 
conflicts and how to align activities in situations where bounded rationality and information 
asymmetry may cause the parties to fail to recognize profound changes in the economic 
environment or to generate a coordinated response to such changes 
 
In an extensive review of the transactions cost literature, Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) 
identified three sources of transaction costs: safeguarding specific assets, adaptation of the 
transaction to changing conditions, and performance evaluation. The first source of 
transaction cost is crafting safeguards when a firm deploys specific assets which may be 
opportunistically exploited by the partner (this is the hold-up problem). The second is the 
coordination problem which arises when the transaction has to be adapted to a changing 
(economic) environment to remain efficient and the transaction partners have difficulty 
recognizing those changes and/or renegotiating an existing agreement (Camerer and Knez, 
1997; Foss, 2001). The third source of transaction costs is difficulties in performance 
evaluation that may arise when a firm has a hard time to (ex ante) find and screen a potential 
trading partner and (ex post) assess contract compliance by its partner. These three sources of 
transaction costs are key constructs in our study, but we explore a novel approach as to how 
these transaction attributes affect transaction and firm performance. We propose that the need 
for safeguarding specific assets and the difficulty in performance evaluation affect 
performance indirectly, that is, through interfirm coordination and adaptation. Thus, interfirm 
coordination is the central construct in our study, being affected by such transaction attributes 
as asset specificity and environmental uncertainty, and having effect on the performance in 
the transaction. 
 
5.3.2 Transaction attributes and interfirm coordination 
 
Interfirm coordination is conceptualized as coordinated adaptation or mutual adaptation 
between nominally independent firms (Williamson, 1991). Interfirm coordination problems 
are caused by interdependencies between collaborating firms. Such problems are mostly 
related to information asymmetries and are more serious in situations of environmental 
uncertainty which impose adaptation problems for decision-makers (Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Heide and John, 1992; John, 1984). More information exchange between collaborating firms 
is expected to enhance the predictability of the other party’s actions, and to increase the 
knowledge about how actions are interdependent (Gulati et al., 2005). In a seller-buyer 
relationship, information provided by the buyer, such as about final demand, promotions, 
changes in order procedures and forecasted volume requirements, increases the predictability 
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for the seller, facilitating its responsiveness. In our study, interfirm coordination is 
operationalised with two variables, information exchange and duration of the arrangement. 
 
Asset specificity refers to lack of redeployability of physical or human assets that support a 
specific transaction with a specific partner (Williamson, 1985). In a seller-buyer relationship, 
the seller firm adapts its skills, product design, production processes or logistics to the 
requirements of a specific buyer (Andersen and Buvik, 2001). In addition, specialized 
personnel are trained to develop particular business working relationship with the buyer 
(Palay, 1984). When transacting parties deploy substantial specific assets, which may invoke 
opportunism behaviour, hybrid governance or hierarchical governance (i.e., carrying out the 
transaction internally) will be more efficient than market governance (Williamson, 1991). 
Hybrid governance typically involved more extensive forms of information exchange. 
Whereas information exchange under market governance is mainly limited to price and 
quantity, under hybrid governance, information exchange is based on product specifications, 
planning demand and promotions activities (Noordewier et al., 1990). Information exchange 
enables better realignment of individual actions when circumstances change (Buvik and 
Grønhaug, 2000). 
 
Several studies have reported a positive association between asset specificity and information 
exchange (Anderson, 1985; Buvik and John, 2000; Noordewier et al., 1990). Substantial asset 
specificity creates dependencies that ask for safeguarding governance. Several authors have 
argued that higher levels of information exchange can provide those safeguards (Andersen 
and Buvik, 2001; Noordewier et al., 1990; Palay, 1984). Information exchange results in 
increased transparency and decreased complexity and uncertainty. In the present study, asset 
specificity refers to physical and human investments made by the packer tailored to the main 
buyer. For the association between asset specificity and information exchange, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H1: The level of asset specificity of packer investments in operation methods and skilled 
knowledge tailored to the buyer is positively associated to the amount of information 
provided by that buyer.  
 
The duration of the arrangement between seller and buyer is included as an element of 
interfirm coordination, as suggested by Andersen and Buvik (2001). Artz and Brush (2000), 
Gulati et al. (2005), and Hwang (2006) have argued that the duration of the arrangement can 
mitigate the opportunism in a dyadic relationship. Even when assets are highly specialized to 
an exchange, opportunistic behaviour is mitigated both by the experiences of past transactions 
and by the expectation that the relationship will continue (and continue to deliver benefits). 
Therefore, duration of the arrangement operates as a self-enforcing safeguard between parties. 
In addition, the present study also seeks to explore how asset specificity promotes the 
continuation of a contractual arrangement, even though Williamson (1985) has claimed that 
higher levels of asset specificity imply higher transaction costs which should be reduced by 
shifting from contracting towards hierarchical governance (or vertical integration).  
 
Asset specificity plays an important role in enhancing productivity and producing rents which 
in turn sustain the relationship (Hawkins et al., 2008; Hwang, 2006). Greater investment in 
specialized assets not only creates more dependency and therefore vulnerability to 
exploitation, it also leads to higher profits. In empirical studies, a high level of asset 
specificity has been found to be positively associated to duration of the arrangement (Buvik 
and Haugland, 2005; Dyer, 1997). The following hypothesis is proposed:  
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H2: The level of asset specificity of packer investments in operation methods and skilled 
knowledge tailored to the buyer is positively associated to the duration of the contractual 
arrangement between the packer and the buyer. 
 
Environmental uncertainty, which refers to unanticipated changes in the circumstances 
surrounding an exchange, influences negotiation and coordination costs. Williamson (1985) 
argues that environmental uncertainty has a profound effect on the transaction costs in a given 
exchange because unanticipated changes render it more difficult, if not impossible, to spell 
out all possible contingencies beforehand. As uncertainty increases, the limited cognitive 
capabilities of human agents put a strain on their ability to craft a priori agreements that take 
all relevant contingencies into account. At the same time, the need to adapt to changing 
circumstances becomes larger. Even when there is no or low asset specificity in the 
transaction, information exchange will increase with environmental uncertainty (Buvik and 
John, 2000). Sellers find it beneficial to engage in greater vertical coordination to cope with 
changing circumstances because it makes revision of current activity sets easier and quicker 
(Noordewier et al., 1990). Particularly, information exchange allows organizing the flow of 
activities and resources, and reduces the cost of documentation, product design changes, 
production planning, and quality control (Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000).   
 
A particular form of environmental uncertainty is demand uncertainty, which arises from 
forecasting errors, rapid changes in demand for specific product varieties, and irregular orders 
(Davis, 1993). Demand fluctuations cause instability throughout the supply chain. Firms 
operating under high demand uncertainty are likely to have a greater need for information 
exchange. Noordewier et al. (1990) found that under conditions of high environmental 
uncertainty increasing information exchange led to a reduction in acquisition costs and 
delivery delays in marketing standard products (i.e., with low asset specificity). In our study, 
we also expect a positive relationship between environmental (demand) uncertainty and 
information exchange for transactions with low asset specificity.  
 
H3: Under low levels of asset specificity, the association between environmental uncertainty 
and information exchange is positive. 
 
When both asset specificity and environmental uncertainty are high, the classical transaction 
costs economics prediction is that the transaction will be carried out within the boundaries of 
one firm (Williamson, 1985). However, vertical integration may not be a realistic option, due 
to differences in economies of scale and resource limitations. Seller-buyer relationships may 
continue using market governance, but will be adjusted in terms of information exchange. 
Buvik and John (2000) have found that sellers that have made buyer-specific investments may 
be reluctant in situations of environmental uncertainty to use buyer-provided information for 
planning their own activities, as they are afraid that the information provided by the buyer is 
biased towards the buyer’s interests. Thus, information exchange will not always increase in 
response to increasing environmental uncertainty, as it is contingent on the safeguarding 
problem. The following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H4: Under high levels of asset specificity, the association between environmental uncertainty 
and information exchange is negative. 
 
Duration of the arrangement concerns the extent to which the relationship or specific 
arrangement between the seller and buyer has been going on (Dwyer et al., 1987). Ongoing 
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relationships between sellers and buyers provide opportunities for better aligning of interests 
and better aligning of activities (Gulati et al., 2005; Mesquita and Brush, 2008).  
 
The presence of a long term relationship provides expectations about near future behaviour by 
the transaction partner (Heide and John, 1992). Partners to an ongoing contractual 
arrangements expect that future transactions will continue to deliver benefits (Artz and Brush, 
2000; Hawkins et al., 2008). An ongoing relationship is more likely to have a high level of 
information exchange compared to a short-term arrangement or a one-time transaction 
(Hawkins et al., 2008). Knowledge on the behaviour and reputation of the transaction partner, 
obtained through repetitive interactions, encourages cooperation (aligning of interests) and 
coordination (aligning of activities). In summary, experiences of past interactions support the 
willingness of the exchange partners to continue and even increase information exchange. The 
following hypothesis is posed: 
 
H5: Duration of the arrangement is positively related to information exchange. 
 
5.3.3 Interfirm coordination and performance 
 
Information exchange is important because it assists in resolving disputes and aligning 
perceptions and expectations (Gulati et al., 2005), and also because it facilitates efficient 
planning and scheduling of sales (Noordewier et al., 1990). Sellers and buyers 
communicating and sharing information reduce response time and improve cost savings 
through greater operational efficiencies (Carr and Pearson, 1999; Ogden et al., 2005). 
Noordewier et al. (1990) have indicated that increased information exchange can also result in 
a reduction of the possession and acquisition costs for inventories. In our study, performance 
indicators such as price, stock outs, and packer’s performance compared to its competitors are 
used. The following hypothesis is posed:  
 
H6: Information exchange is positively related to operational performance, sales, price and 
packer performance, and negatively related to stock outs. 
 
Baker et al. (2002) have indicated that repeated exchange deters the pursuit of short run gains 
that undermine the longevity of the relationship. Davis (1993) has indicated that increased 
timing in the supply chain occurs when opportunistic behaviour is reduced under duration of 
the arrangement. Buvik and Haugland (2005) has indicated that the prospects of future sales, 
volume commitments or high profit margins can mitigate transactional risks and provide a 
risk premium for the seller. When the parties are willing to adapt to environmental changes by 
adjusting the terms of their contract, the time and effort the seller spends negotiating detailed 
upfront contracts that cover a wide range of contingencies is reduced. In addition, long 
relationships also imply parties to have time to learn one another’s ways of doing business 
and develop multiple communication links or shared norms, values and beliefs (Gulati et al., 
2005). The following hypothesis is posed:  
 
H7: Duration of the arrangement is positively related to operational performance, sales, 
price and packer performance, and negatively related to stock outs. 
 
Figure 5.1 summarizes the previous discussion and provides the integrated conceptual model 
for this study. 
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   Figure 5.1 Conceptual framework 
 
5.4 Research design  
 
5.4.1 Data 
 
A survey was conducted among Mexican avocado packers in the period February to April 
2008 (see page 124, Appendix C), personally interviewing 44 packaging firms. From a total 
of 346 avocado packers with no integration of trading activity located in Michoacan State, 44 
were selected using two criteria: size of packaging house (small, middle or large size) and 
location of packaging house (from four municipalities: Periban, San Juan Nuevo, Tancitaro 
and Uruapan) (see Table 5.3).  
 
Regarding a population of 346 packers with no forward integration into trading, it was 
divided in strata based on size of the packaging house. Sanchez (2007) has emphasized the 
relevance of size of the packaging house in the Mexican avocado sector to create a 
representative sample. Thus, a sample of 44 packers was randomly surveyed from four 
municipalities: Periban, San Juan Nuevo, Tancitaro and Uruapan. From this sample of 44 
packers, 28 are small packers, 10 middle packers, and 6 large packers representing 9%, 53%, 
and 86% of the total packers contained in the respective stratum. The sample represents 13% 
of the total number of packers that are not forwardly integrated into trading (as was shown in 
Table 5.2). For our sample, the average workforce during the year is 99 employees in a large 
packaging company, 22 employees in a medium-sized packer, and 5 employees in a small 
packaging house. The average yearly turnover is 491 tons of avocado for the small packaging 
house, 3349 tons for the medium-sized packer, and 14,840 for the large packaging company. 
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Table 5.3 Sample characteristics 
Size of 
packaging 
house 
Number* and 
percentage** 
Location Average 
workforce per 
company 
Average 
turnover 
(tons/year) 
 
Large 
 
6 
 
86% 
Tancitaro=
San Juan= 
Periban= 
Uruapan= 
2 
1 
1 
2 
 
99 
 
14,840 
 
Medium 
 
10 
 
53% 
Tancitaro=
San Juan= 
Periban= 
Uruapan= 
0 
0 
5 
5 
 
22 
 
3,349 
 
Small 
 
28 
 
9% 
Tancitaro=
San Juan= 
Periban= 
Uruapan= 
1 
8 
3 
16 
 
5 
 
491 
 
Total 
 
44 
 
13% 
Tancitaro=
San Juan= 
Periban= 
Uruapan= 
3 
9 
9 
23 
 
19 
 
2,771 
Source: Elaborated with data obtained from our Mexican avocado packer survey 
Notes:  * Number of surveyed packaging houses in the stratum. 
** Percentage is calculated as total number of surveyed packaging houses in the stratum/ 
total number of packaging houses with no integration trading activity in the stratum. 
 
5.4.2 Methods 
 
Measures used in the survey were either newly developed or based on previous studies 
(Ganesan, 1994; Heide and John, 1992; Noordewier et al., 1990). A preliminary questionnaire  
(see page 117, Appendix A) was applied to three avocado packers (with different packaging 
station size) in the area of study to capture relevant dimensions for prospective measures of 
transaction characteristics (asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, and behavioural 
uncertainty), interfirm coordination (information exchange, and duration of the arrangement 
as an indirect measure of duration of the arrangement), and performance indicators (price, 
sales, stock outs, and relative packer performance). In addition, the respondents in the pre-test 
were asked to identify ambiguous or other problematic scale measures. Except duration of the 
arrangement and sales, the rest of the measures were operationalised using Likert scales from 
1 (not agree at all) to 7 (totally agree). The respondents were asked to select their main buyer 
and relate the answers to this specific firm. 
 
The measures chosen were subject to a purification process involving a series of reliability 
and validity assessments using SPSS (Field, 2005) and Visual Partial Least Squares (PLS) 
(Ringle et al., 2005)22. Exploratory factor analysis was carried out in SPSS to determine the 
best items for each latent variable (transaction characteristics and information exchange).  
 
After purifying the items for the constructs, a path analysis approach was chosen for empirical 
estimation. Rather than using the well-known LISREL, Wold’s (1982) method of PLS was 
                                                 
22 Visual PLS is free software for partial least squares analysis. Version 2.0 M3 was released on October 2, 2006. 
This software is available at http://www.smartpls.de. 
Inter-firm coordination in the Mexican avocado industry: the packer – buyer 
relationship 
Supply chain practices, performance and organizational configuration in the  
Mexican avocado industry  89 
employed23. Although PLS estimation has some shortcomings such as the bias and 
inconsistency of loadings and inner structural coefficients (Fornell and Cha, 1994), our 
decision was motivated by several considerations. First, the small sample size does not satisfy 
the assumptions for maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)24. Second, some theoretical 
problems such as inadmissible solutions (i.e., negative error) and factor indeterminacy (i.e., 
nonconvergence) have been identified with LISREL’s MLE (Fornell and Bookstein, 1982). 
PLS, however, avoids these two theoretical problems. Third, PLS estimation requires only 
that the basic assumptions of least squares estimation are satisfied. Fourth, PLS uses jackknife 
or bootstrap (Efron and Gong, 1983) in combination with the traditional measure of goodness-
of-fit (Bagozzi, 1981) to evaluate the model. Furthermore, in PLS models both formative and 
reflective indicators can be used simultaneously (Fornell and Bookstein, 1982). These 
advantages have encouraged the application of PLS in an increasing number of fields 
including marketing (Zinkhan et al., 1987), and more recently, strategic management 
(Birkinshaw, et al., 1995; Johansson and Yip, 1994). Following Chin (1998), bootstrapping 
with 500 resamplings was used to show the precision of the PLS estimates. 
 
5.4.3 Measurements 
 
Measures used in the present model are asset specificity, environmental uncertainty and 
behavioural uncertainty for transaction characteristics; information exchange and duration of 
the arrangement or duration of the arrangement for interfirm coordination; and price, sales, 
stock outs, and packer performance as performance indicators. Asset specificity, 
environmental uncertainty and information exchange are created using multiple items (see 
table 5.7, Appendix 5.1).  
 
Asset specificity refers to the physical and human investments made by the packer and 
tailored to a specific buyer. Based on Ganesan (1994), three items were used to measure asset 
specificity: to what extent does the packer loose part of his physical asset investments, human 
asset investments, and overall investments when he decides to stop trading with the main 
buyer. 
 
Environmental uncertainty refers to demand uncertainty faced by the packer in the packer-
buyer relationship. Based on Noordewier et al. (1990), two items were used to measure the 
level of environmental uncertainty: uncertainty about product demand and uncertainty about 
availability of buyers. 
 
Information exchange is conceptualized as information provided by the buyer for organizing 
the flow of activities and resources in the packer-buyer relationship. Based on Noordewier et 
al. (1990), four items were used to measure information exchange: supplying information 
about retail demand and promotions; information for planning packer activities; information 
for planning transport activities; and precise information for developing the packer activities. 
 
Duration of the arrangement is measured by means of the duration of the transaction 
arrangement. Duration has four choices: transacting during only one order (D1), during one 
season (D2), during one year (D3), and during several years (D4). 
 
                                                 
23 For a detailed discussion about the PLS model, see Chin and Newsted (1999). 
24 Anderson and Gerbing (1988: 415) noted that when using the Lisrel program ‘a sample size of 150 or more 
typically will be needed to obtain parameter estimates that have standard errors small enough to be of practical 
use’. 
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Four performance indicators were used, total sales, price, stock outs, and the relative 
performance. The latter is the performance of the packer compared to his main competitors. 
We use two categories of performance measures, actual performance such as sales, and 
perception performance such as price, stock outs, and relative performance. Each performance 
indicator was individually included in the analysis. 
 
5.4.4 Validity and Reliability of Measures and Constructs 
 
Factor analysis is used to calculate the loadings for constructs asset specificity, environmental 
uncertainty and information exchange. Under this method, the loadings indicate how much of 
variance in each independent item is accounted for by the latent construct (Lattin et al., 2003). 
Thus, before interpreting the model coefficients, we first check the reliability and validity of 
the measures. Following common practice (Fornell and Larcker, 1981), we examined the 
individual item reliability (factor loading), internal consistency (composite reliability and 
cronbach’s alpha “α”), and discriminant validity (average variance extracted and 
interconstruct correlations) for each construct. The individual item reliability is listed in table 
5.7, Appendix 5.1. The internal consistency is showed in tables 5.4 (composite reliability) and 
5.7 (cronbach’s alpha “α”), and discriminant validity is provided in table 5.5. 
 
The acceptability of the measurement model was assessed by first looking at the reliability of 
the individual items. Individual item reliability was determined by examining the loadings of 
measures on their corresponding constructs. In all cases, only individual factor loadings 
greater than 0.6 were retained. All loadings are greater than or close to 0.7 for packer sample, 
indicating a high degree of individual item reliability (see table 5.7, Appendix 5.1). 
 
Internal consistency was assessed using two measures: composite reliability and 
cronbach’alpha. Regarding composite reliability, an. internal consistency of 0.7 or greater is 
reasonable for exploratory research. Composite reliability for all constructs exceeds 0.8, 
indicating a good internal consistency. In terms of cronbach’alpha, a minimum reliability of 
0.7 is required. The constructs presented values “α” equal or higher than 0.7 confirming that 
each construct has a good internal consistency. 
 
The discriminant validity was carried out in two ways. First, the square root of the variance 
extracted (the numbers on the diagonal in Table 5.4) should be greater than all construct 
correlations (the numbers on the off-diagonal in Table 5.4), as is the case here. 
 
Second, the test involves assessing how each item is related to the latent constructs. Table 5.5 
reports the item loadings and cross-loadings on the constructs. No item loaded more highly on 
the other constructs than it did on its associated construct. Both criteria indicate that the 
discriminant validity of the constructs used in the model is satisfied. Therefore, we can 
confidently rely on the coefficients to interpret the relationships. 
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Table 5.4 Description of the Constructs [Mean (M), Standard Deviation (SD), Composite 
Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extracted, and Intercorrelations of the Measures] 
Measures M SD CR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
            
1.Asset 
Specificity 2.32 2.11 0.914 0.883        
2.Environmental 
Uncertainty 5.50 1.10 0.805 -0.237 0.822       
3.Environmental 
Uncertainty x 
Asset 
Specificity* -0.20 1.12 0.892 -0.292 0.014 0.762      
4. Information 
Exchange 4.50 2.11 0.926 0.225 0.469 -0.355 0.870     
5. Duration 2.06 0.97 1 0.582 0.108 -0.134 0.420 1    
6. Sales 36.00 66.72 1 0.422 -0.053 -0.299 0.329 0.256 1   
7. Price 4.77 1.22 1 0.023 0.084 0.154 0.091 0.097 0.318 1  
8. Stock outs 3.36 1.89 1 -0.421 0.069 0.013 -0.072 -0.374 
-
0.315 0.077 1 
9. Packer 
performance 4.59 1.26 1 0.108 0.262 -0.076 0.288 0.193 0.336 0.210 -0.189
Note. The boldface numbers on the diagonal are the square root of the variance shared 
between the constructs and their measures (square root of Average Variance Extracted). 
Off-diagonal elements are correlations among constructs. 
* Mean and standard deviation for moderating term are standardized measures. 
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Table 5.5 Construct to Measure Item Loadings and Cross-Loadings 
Items 
Asset 
specificity
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Environmental 
Uncertainty x  
Asset 
specificity 
Information 
Exchange 
Dedicated asset specificity to the 
buyer  0.863 -0.178 -0.308 0.265 
Human asset specificity 0.884 -0.203 -0.167 0.184 
Dedicated asset specificity 0.903 -0.256 -0.296 0.139 
Demand uncertainty -0.222 0.685 0.131 0.294 
Buyer uncertainty -0.183 0.750 -0.064 0.454 
Demand uncertainty x Dedicated 
asset specificity to the buyer -0.256 0.076 0.786 -0.243 
Demand uncertainty x Human 
asset specificity -0.266 -0.034 0.831 -0.340 
Demand uncertainty x Dedicated 
asset specificity -0.358 0.147 0.818 -0.278 
Buyer uncertainty x Dedicated 
asset specificity to the buyer  -0.196 0.076 0.650 -0.193 
Buyer uncertainty x Human asset 
specificity  -0.142 -0.075 0.714 -0.313 
Buyer uncertainty x Dedicated 
asset specificity -0.103 -0.090 0.760 -0.231 
Information exchange planning 
demand 0.182 0.415 -0.360 0.895 
Information exchange planning 
activities 0.238 0.403 -0.342 0.921 
Information Exchange planning 
transport activities 0.078 0.449 -0.147 0.863 
Information Exchange getting 
precise information 0.292 0.364 -0.392 0.796 
Duration* 0.581 0.109 -0.136 0.423 
Sales 0.422 -0.054 -0.298 0.325 
Price 0.023 0.083 0.154 0.091 
Stock outs -0.421 0.069 0.012 -0.072 
Performance 0.108 0.262 -0.075 0.289 
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Table 5.5 Continued. 
Items Duration Sales Price Stock outs Performance 
Dedicated asset specificity to the 
buyer 0.555 0.345 -0.101 -0.444 0.097 
Human asset specificity 0.508 0.422 0.117 -0.248 0.181 
Dedicated asset specificity 0.463 0.350 0.066 -0.415 -0.005 
Demand uncertainty -0.128 0.072 0.228 0.105 0.306 
Buyer uncertainty 0.232 -0.120 -0.033 0.027 0.162 
Demand uncertainty x Dedicated 
asset specificity to the buyer -0.220 -0.067 0.103 -0.159 -0.045 
Demand uncertainty x Human 
asset specificity -0.266 -0.243 0.049 0.070 -0.010 
Demand uncertainty x Dedicated 
asset specificity -0.378 -0.131 0.211 -0.003 -0.021 
Buyer uncertainty x Dedicated 
asset specificity to the buyer  0.057 -0.318 0.062 0.044 0.103 
Buyer uncertainty x Human asset 
specificity 0.075 -0.362 0.138 0.066 -0.169 
Buyer uncertainty x Dedicated 
asset specificity 0.207 -0.237 0.147 0.005 -0.167 
Information exchange planning 
demand 0.400 0.239 0.200 -0.091 0.326 
Information exchange planning 
activities 0.422 0.239 0.162 -0.052 0.279 
Information exchange planning 
transport activities 0.263 0.373 0.124 -0.080 0.216 
Information exchange getting 
precise information 0.378 0.293 -0.188 -0.025 0.175 
Duration* 1.000 0.256 0.097 -0.374 0.193 
Sales 0.256 1.000 0.318 -0.315 0.336 
Price 0.097 0.318 1.000 0.077 0.210 
Stock outs -0.374 -0.315 0.077 1.000 -0.189 
Performance 0.193 0.336 0.210 -0.189 1.000 
Note. The boldface numbers indicate the item loadings, and the others are the cross-loadings 
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5.5 Results 
 
The results are presented in Figure 5.2. Four out of the seven hypothesized relationships were 
significant at the 5% level, while the relationship between interfirm-coordination and 
performance (hypotheses 6 and 7) were only significant for some performance indicators. The 
results are indicated as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Results of the model 
 
 
The transaction characteristics (independent variables) used in the present model – i.e., asset 
specificity, environmental uncertainty, and the interaction term asset specificity-
environmental uncertainty – explain on average 36% of the total variance of interfirm 
coordination, indicating good prediction accuracy. 
 
Asset specificity alone, i.e. absent environmental uncertainty, is not significantly associated to 
information exchange between seller and buyer (path coefficient = 0.084). Thus, hypothesis 1 
is not supported. Higher investments of the packer in operation methods and skilled 
knowledge specifically for the transaction with the main buyer, does not necessarily lead to 
more information provided by the buyer.  
 
Regarding duration of the arrangement, the results reveal that asset specificity shows a 
significant positive association with duration of the arrangement, and therefore, hypothesis 2 
is supported (path coefficient = 0.581). A packer investing in operation methods and skilled 
knowledge specific for the transaction with the buyer wants to safeguard his investment, but 
also created more expectation of benefits based on a long-term relationship with his tailored 
buyer.  
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H7:0.144
H7:-0.419 
H5:0.283 
Path coefficient is significant at 5% level 
Path coefficient is significant at 10% level 
Path coefficient is not significant 
H7:0.070 
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The relationship between environmental uncertainty and information exchange is contingent 
on the level of asset specificity, as is shown in the following expression: (equation 3) 
 
Information exchange= 1 + 2 Asset specificity + 3 Environmental uncertainty 
+ 4  (Asset specificity)(Environmental uncertainty)  
(1) 
 
∂ Information exchange = 3 + 4 Asset specificity (2) ∂ Environmental uncertainty 
 
Substituting coefficients for 3  and 4 , we have, 
 
∂ Information exchange =0.462-0.304Asset specificity (3) ∂ Environmental uncertainty 
 
For a low level of asset specificity, environmental uncertainty presents a significant positive 
relationship with information exchange (path coefficient = 0.462 when AS=0), thus 
supporting hypothesis 3 (see Table 5.6 for the result of each hypothesis). When uncertainty 
about demand and about the availability of alternative buyers increases, the seller will require 
more and more precise information about retail demand and promotions, in order to support 
coordinated planning activities related to product requirements, distribution and 
transportation. 
 
For a high level of asset specificity, the interaction term asset specificity-environmental 
uncertainty has a significant negative relationship with information exchange (path coefficient 
= -0.304). Therefore, hypothesis 4 is supported. When substantial levels of both asset 
specificity and environmental uncertainty are present, the seller will be cautious use the 
information provided by the buyer because he fears that the buyer will use his information 
advantage to the disadvantage of the dependent seller.  
 
Duration of the arrangement has a significant positive relation with information exchange 
(coefficient=0.283), which leads us to except hypothesis 5. Longer duration of the 
arrangement fosters information exchange. 
 
Information exchange shows a significant positive association with the following performance 
indicators: seller’s sales (path coefficient = 0.263) and seller’s performance compared to his 
main competitors (path coefficient = 0.254). Therefore, hypothesis 6 is supported for these 
indicators. Information provided by buyers to the packers significantly improves efficiency 
and allows planning current and future product needs, thereby improving service offered by 
the packer to the buyer. 
 
Duration of the arrangement shows a significant negative association with seller’s stock outs 
(path coefficient = -0.419), which supports hypothesis 7 for this specific indicator. For the 
other performance indicators (sales, price, and relative performance) the effect of duration of 
the arrangement is not significant. 
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Table 5.6 Result for each hypothesis 
 Coefficient 
is 
significant?
Sign of 
coefficient 
as 
expected? 
Decision 
H1 The level of asset specificity of packer 
investments in operation methods and skilled 
knowledge tailored to the buyer is positively 
associated to the amount of information 
provided by that buyer. 
 
no - 
Not 
Supported 
H2 The level of asset specificity of packer 
investments in operation methods and skilled 
knowledge tailored to the buyer is positively 
associated to the duration of the contractual 
arrangement between the packer and the buyer. 
 
yes yes Supported 
H3 Under low levels of asset specificity, the 
association between environmental uncertainty 
and information exchange is positive. 
 
yes yes Supported 
H4 Under high levels of asset specificity, the 
association between environmental uncertainty 
and information exchange is negative. 
 
yes yes Supported 
H5 Duration of the arrangement is positively related 
to information exchange. 
 
yes yes Supported 
H6 Information exchange is positively related to 
operational performance, sales, price and packer 
performance, and negatively related to stock 
outs. 
 
yes yes * 
H7 Duration of the arrangement is positively related 
to operational performance, sales, price and 
packer performance, and negatively related to 
stock outs. 
 
yes yes ** 
*   Hypothesis 6 is supported for the performance indicators packer’s total sales and packer’s 
relative performance 
** Hypothesis 7 is supported for the performance indicator packer’s stock outs  
 
 
5.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Interfirm coordination plays an important role in aligning activities and interests when 
substantial environment uncertainty is present (Gulati et al., 2005). However, previous studies 
on the relationship between environmental uncertainty and interfirm coordination have found 
that information exchange is contingent on the magnitude of asset specificity (Buvik and 
Grønhaug, 2000; Buvik and John, 2000). Those results were confirmed by our study on 
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interfirm coordination between packers and buyers in the Mexican avocado supply chain. 
Individual analysis of the two interfirm coordination variables – information exchange and 
duration of the relationship – allowed a comprehensive understanding about their role in the 
exchange relationship and their influence on the packer’s performance.  
 
Information exchange is an important governance mechanism that facilitates aligning actions 
between sellers and buyers when substantial environment uncertainty is present (Gulati et al., 
2005; Noordewier et al., 1990). In our study, we found that the level of information exchange 
is contingent on the magnitude of asset specificity. Under a low level of asset specificity, 
environmental uncertainty resulted in a positive association with information exchange; 
however, under a high level of asset specificity, environmental uncertainty did not lead to 
more information exchange. The reason might be that as the specificity of the assets increases, 
the seller may not fully trust the information coming from the buyer fearing that the buyer 
may exploit the asymmetric dependency relationship. While increased information exchange 
facilitates adaptation between parties, it also opens up possibilities for a de facto redistribution 
of the gains from the transaction to the disadvantage of the more vulnerable partner (Buvik 
and John, 2000). 
 
Dyer (1997) and Noordewier et al. (1990) found that in turbulent environments information 
exchanges is crucial for efficient seller-buyer relationships because demand is changing 
rapidly, and buying firms want their suppliers to adapt to these changing conditions. Our 
study, however, showed that this positive relationship between environmental uncertainty and 
information exchange is only true in situations of low asset specificity. 
 
Our empirical results further indicate that a higher level of duration of the arrangement 
showed, on the one hand, a significant positive association with a higher level of information 
exchange, and the other hand, a significant positive association with a lower level of 
behavioural uncertainty. This is in line with Gulati et al. (2005) and Williamson (1991), who 
have emphasized the role that repeated interaction play in resolving motivation and 
coordination problems, allowing adaptation to changing environments. 
 
We also found that information exchange is positively related to the size of seller’s sales and 
to seller’s relative performance. This result is consistent with other empirical studies. 
Noordewier et al. (1990) found that in situations of high environmental uncertainty relational 
governance reduced the number of orders delivered late and under unacceptable conditions. 
Buvik and Grønhaug (2000) found that under conditions of high interfirm coordination 
purchasing volumes were increased. 
 
Our results indicate that the duration of the arrangement is negatively associated to seller 
stock outs. Repeated exchange provides the opportunity for the seller to align his production 
activities with the volume demand of the buyer. Despite high levels of uncertainty about final 
demand and about the availability of alternative buyers, sellers do not opportunistically use 
their inventories. This is in line with Baker et al. (2002), who found that under repeated 
exchange the expected pay-offs from a pattern of future transactions deters the pursuit of short 
run gains. 
 
Hawkins et al. (2008) and Hwang (2006) have mentioned that greater investment in 
specialized assets not only creates more party dependence, and therefore, vulnerable to 
exploitation, but it also creates more profits to the parties in a continued relationship. In 
addition, the distinction between governance mechanisms that allow aligning actions 
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(information exchange) and aligning interests (duration of the arrangement) was also 
important to understand interfirm coordination between the packers and buyers in the avocado 
sector in Mexico. Authors like Gulati et al. (2005) and Williamson (1991) have emphasized 
the role that these governance mechanisms play when adaptation problems are present. 
Particularly, information exchange was of significant importance to deal with adaptation 
problems. Duration of the arrangement was relevant to explain information exchange and 
behavioural uncertainty. Finally, the two interfirm coordination mechanisms influenced 
different performance indicators. Information exchange was positively related to seller’s sales 
and seller’s performance, and duration of the arrangement was negatively associated to stock 
outs. 
 
5.6.1 Relevance to practice 
 
Based on the present study, attempts to improve adaptation through interfirm coordination in 
the Mexican avocado sector may paradoxically result in increased haggling and other ex post 
transaction costs. Increased interfirm coordination represents a safeguard for the packer in the 
sense that the buyer can be expected to provide appropriate information that facilitates packer 
operations. Avocado packers receiving substantial buyer information about customer 
preferences, promotions, stock flows, have improved their performance compared to other 
packers because demand planning and related activities such as distribution and transportation 
have allowed to guarantee product quality and to reduce stock outs. However, as our study 
showed, more interfirm coordination simultaneously increases the hazards to the packer’s 
specific investments. The packers that have invested in human capital and information 
systems tailored to the buyer have created a higher dependency in the packer-buyer 
relationship. 
 
Expectation of continued business between packers and buyers is another interesting element 
to consider for firms in a seller-buyer relationship. Our study has shown that duration of the 
arrangement supports aligning of interests between sellers and buyers. Avocado packers 
providing products complying to private quality standards, not only have safeguarded their 
specific investments, but also have obtained additional information, thus improving their 
performance.  
 
Although the empirical results of this study support the research hypotheses, the outcome of 
this research should be evaluated with full awareness of its limitations. First, the sample size 
is relatively small. From a total of 382 avocado packers, the present study considered only 44 
packers. Future research could consider a larger packer sample distinguishing between the 
national and international markets in which the packers operate. Second, as duration of the 
arrangement was measured only by duration of the arrangement, it is desirable to elaborate 
multi-item measures of duration of the arrangement including elements such as expectation of 
future pay-offs continuity, and commitment. 
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APPENDIX 5.1 
 
Table 5.7 Measures and Items used in the models for the packer sample  
Sample n = 44   
 Measure  Loadings
Asset specificity (= 0.86, eigenvalue = 2.69) 
Dedicated asset specificity to 
the buyer 
 
We lose part of our investment when we 
switch to another buyer 
 0.86 
Dedicated asset specificity If we decide to stop trading with the main 
buyer, we lose a lot of knowledge regarding 
the buyer’s operation method 
 0.88 
Human asset specificity If we decide to stop trading with the main 
buyer, we lose a lot of investments we have 
made 
 0.90 
    
Environmental Uncertainty  (= 0.70, eigenvalue = 2.17) 
Demand uncertainty 
The demand for avocados varies 
significantly 
 0.68 
Buyer uncertainty 
The availability of buyers varies 
significantly 
 0.75 
    
Environmental uncertainty x Asset specificity (= 0.78) 
Demand uncertainty x Dedicated asset specificity to the buyer  0.79 
Demand uncertainty x Human asset specificity  0.83 
Demand uncertainty x Dedicated asset specificity  0.82 
Buyer uncertainty x Dedicated asset specificity to the buyer  0.65 
Buyer uncertainty x Human asset specificity  0.71 
Buyer uncertainty x Dedicated asset specificity  0.76 
    
Information Exchange (= 0.89, eigenvalue = 3.80) 
Information exchange planning 
demand 
Our main buyer supplies us with information 
about retail demand and promotions 
 0.89 
Information exchange planning 
activities 
Our main buyer supplies us with information 
to plan our activities 
 0.92 
Information exchange planning 
transport activities 
Our main buyer supplies us with information 
to help us to plan transport activities 
 0.86 
Information exchange getting 
precise information 
Our main buyer supports us with precise 
information 
 0.79 
    
Duration Duration of the arrangement with the main 
buyer (single item) 
 1.00 
    
Sales Packer sales (single item)  1.00 
    
Price Price for packer product (single item)  1.00 
    
Stock outs Stock outs of packer product (single item)  1.00 
    
Relative performance Packer performance compared to his 
competitors (single item) 
 1.00 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
In this final chapter, we discuss the main findings of the research presented in this thesis. In 
Section 6.1 we provide answers to the research questions. The most important managerial 
implications are discussed in Section 6.2. Contributions to the theoretical literature are 
presented in Section 6.3. Finally, we discuss limitations of this study and the implications for 
future research in Section 6.4 
 
The main research question to be answered in this thesis is:  
 
What is the impact of supply chain practices on performance in the Mexican avocado 
industry, and how do organizational solutions align with these supply chain practices? 
 
For our empirical research we have built a database of avocado producers and packers 
characterized by having different property size and business size respectively, and 
participating in either the domestic market or the international market. The database included 
information about 122 avocado producers and 44 packers located in Michoacan, the most 
important avocado production area in Mexico. Before applying the survey, an exploratory 
case study was carried out, gathering data through interviews and from documents. 
Particularly, interviews with 13 different supply chain actors were conducted to improve the 
validity and reliability of the questionnaire items. This preliminary study proved to be 
important to gather qualitative but detailed insights regarding the relationships in the supply 
chain, particularly between producers and packers, and between packers and traders. 
 
6.1 Answers to research questions 
 
6.1.1 Supply Chain Management in the Mexican avocado industry: the role of the packer 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the relevant supply chain practices (SCPs) introduced in the Mexican 
avocado industry, to answer the following research question: 
 
RQ1: What are the technical and organizational solutions that packers in the Mexican 
avocado industry have introduced in dealing with the main supply chain challenges? 
 
Based on an exploratory case study, we found that three SCPs have been introduced in the 
Mexican avocado industry to deal with the main supply chain challenges. The practices 
product standardization, supplier partnership and information exchange have been a solution 
to obtain reliable supply, enhance product quality, and improve planning of packing and 
distribution processes. 
 
Product standardization has been obtained by entering into multilateral partnerships, while 
reliable supply and higher quality has been obtained by entering into bilateral contractual 
relationships.  
 
Producers and packers in the state of Michoacan have established the Avocado Producers and 
Export Packers Association of Michoacan (APEAM), the most important association in the 
Mexican avocado industry. The member companies have congruent interests in maintaining a 
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reliable supply for the US market and therefore have joint interests in supporting the public 
certification program. 
 
In bilateral partnerships, producers and packers not only collaborate to obtain a reliable 
supply, but also to enhance quality. Two types of bilateral partnerships have been identified. 
First, packers have established contractual relationships with producers of specialty products 
that comply with US and European standards on food safety, good agricultural practice and 
organic produce standards. Thus, given the higher uncertainty (or higher information 
requirements) and the asset specificity in these specialty product supply chains, the packers 
have chosen for a contractual relationship to assure the supply of high quality produce. 
Second, some producers are financially participating in a packaging house. We found that 
under this type of partnership the packing house puts much effort in providing technical 
assistance to its owners-suppliers in order for them to comply with current and future product 
and process quality requirements such as US-GAP and Global-GAP. 
 
Regarding downstream information exchange to improve coordination, packers have followed 
two strategies. On the one hand, transnational packers have integrated with trading 
companies. These trading companies have direct access to foreign customers and thereby 
obtain information on retail demand, product quality and required quantity, available stocks, 
etc. On the other hand, some of the national packers have created an intensive relationship 
with their buyers to get information about retail demand and promotions, and precise 
information that facilitates joint planning activities. 
 
We conclude that both product standardization and coordination have been used in the 
Mexican avocado industry to guarantee export quality. Whereas product standardization has 
been adopted by producers to obtain reliable supply and improve quality, information 
exchange as part of coordination has been used by packers to improve the management of 
demand. Partnership between producers and packers and between packers and buyers has 
played a relevant role to facilitate adoption of these practices. 
 
6.1.2 Contractual arrangements and food quality standards in the Mexican avocado industry 
 
Chapter 3 addresses the governance structure choices for different quality standards that are 
adopted by Mexican avocado producers, to answer the following research question: 
 
RQ2: What types of contractual arrangements do producers use to adopt particular quality 
standards in the Mexican avocado industry? 
 
The findings in the present study indicate that the type of contractual arrangement is 
important in the adoption of a specific type of quality standard. Safeguarding specific assets is 
found as primary driver of governance structure choice and Mexican avocado producers have 
followed two strategies. First, regarding relational contractual arrangements, information 
exchange and expectation of continuity are used to safeguarding asset specificity. As a result, 
high quality standards such as Organic, US-GAP or Global-GAP standards are adopted. 
Second, under simple contractual arrangements, a high support of the institutional 
environment (e.g. a public-private partnership of local producers and federal authorities) 
reduces the need for safeguarding specific investments. The reason is that the public-private 
partnerships of local producers and federal authorities provide information, inputs, and 
technical assistance to producers. In addition, simple contractual arrangements, associated 
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with a low level of asset specificity and a high level of price uncertainty, are related to 
adoption of public quality standards. 
 
6.1.3 Relationship characteristics and performance in the Mexican avocado industry 
 
In Chapter 4, we examine the impact of relationship characteristics on performance in 
business transactions. Distinguishing between relationship characteristics that have a direct 
influence on coordination and thereby affecting performance, and those characteristics that 
affect transaction costs associated to behavioural uncertainty and thereby indirectly affect 
performance, the following research question is posed:  
 
RQ3: How do the characteristics of the producer-packer relationship affect producer 
performance? 
 
Our study showed that relationship characteristics influence performance through different 
paths. Whereas expectation of continuity affects payment uncertainty and thereby indirectly 
affects performance measures such as yield and product quality, information exchange 
directly affects the same performance measures as well as the relative measures of price and 
product quality increases. In contrast, we found that buyer commitment does not significantly 
affect behavioural uncertainty. 
 
When we compare the influence of the relationship characteristics that have an impact on 
performance through reduction of behavioural uncertainty, we can affirm that expectation of 
future benefits is more important than commitment to explain the cooperative behaviour of 
Mexican avocado producers and buyers. 
 
6.1.4 Inter-firm coordination in the Mexican avocado industry: the packer – buyer 
relationship 
 
Chapter 5 studies the influence of transaction characteristics on inter-firm coordination. We 
measure inter-firm coordination using two variables, information exchange and duration of 
the arrangement with the buyer. The following research question is posed: 
 
RQ4: What are the conditions that determine inter-firm coordination between packers and 
buyers? 
 
Our empirical results indicate that inter-firm coordination based on information exchange and 
continuity of the arrangement is an important governance mechanism to facilitate the 
alignment of actions and the safeguarding of specific assets between sellers and buyers when 
substantial environmental uncertainty is present. 
 
We found that the level of information exchange is contingent on the level of asset specificity. 
However, we also obtained that the level of information exchange is positively associated 
with the duration of the arrangement. Thus, the duration of the arrangement turns out to be a 
relevant variable in enhancing information exchange. 
 
We also found that the duration of the arrangement is explained by the level of asset 
specificity. In other words, the presence of specialized assets not only creates more 
interdependence between the partners, and therefore, vulnerability to exploitation, it also 
provides strong incentives to the partners to continue the relationship. 
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In addition, we found that inter-firm coordination has a significant positive impact on 
performance. Whereas a high level of duration of the arrangement reduces the seller stock 
outs, information exchange improves seller’s performance compared to competitors. 
 
In summary, individual analysis of the two inter-firm coordination variables allowed a 
comprehensive understanding about their role in the exchange relationship and their influence 
on the packer’s performance. 
 
6.1.5 Summary of testing the hypotheses 
 
Appendix D provides an overview of the outcomes of the empirical tests of the hypotheses of 
the studies presented in Chapters 3 to 5. The study in Chapter 2 had an explorative character, 
and no hypotheses were used. 
 
6.2 Managerial implications 
 
Combining the findings of the four studies enables us to draw overall conclusions and to 
provide an answer to the central research question: 
 
RQ: What is the impact of supply chain practices on performance in the Mexican avocado 
industry, and how do organizational arrangements of producers and packers align with these 
supply chain practices? 
 
By answering this question, we achieve the main objective of explaining the relationship 
between supply chain practices and inter-organizational arrangements, as well as explaining 
how particular combinations of supply chain practices and inter-organizational arrangements 
result in higher performance in the Mexican avocado industry. 
 
6.2.1 Adopting SCPs such as product standardization, information exchange, and supplier 
partnership allows dealing with agrifood supply chain challenges. 
 
Exporting to the US market has led to specific supply chain challenges for the Mexican 
avocado industry. From the perspective of the packers, three challenges stand out: creating 
reliable avocado supply, enhancing product quality, and improving coordination between 
supply and demand. The findings indicate that despite the substantial efforts needed to 
successfully introduce product standardization and intensive information exchange, SCPs 
have clearly contributed to solving the supply chain challenges previously mentioned. Packers 
that wish to obtain reliable supply should enter into bilateral and/or multilateral partnerships. 
We found that multilateral partnerships between producers and packers, such as the APEAM, 
have institutionalized joint interest in maintaining reliable supply. In addition, bilateral 
partnerships consisting of producer-packer contractual arrangements or of producers 
financially participating in a packaging house have allowed obtaining higher product quality. 
These types of bilateral partnership have facilitated that producers adopt high quality 
standards (such as US-GAP, Global-GAP and Organic). Finally, packers entering into either 
bilateral partnerships or vertical integration with trading companies have implemented joint 
planning activities and obtained improved efficiency leading to higher product quality. 
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6.2.2 It is important for producers to choose an appropriate contractual arrangement to 
ensure adoption of a particular quality standard. 
 
Quality standards can provide credible quality guarantees, thereby increasing benefits and 
improving competitiveness. In order to obtain the benefits, adopting quality standards implies 
complex interactions to decompose production and distribution tasks and to manage 
interdependent activities among chain partners, as well as safeguarding specific investments. 
Until 1997, only private quality standards were present in the Mexican avocado industry. 
After that year, an increasing number of producers has adopted public quality standards. Our 
results showed that producers that adopt private quality standards (such as US-GAP, Global-
GAP or Organic standard) that encompass a high level of asset specificity should select 
contractual arrangements based on relational features such as a long duration of the 
arrangement and intensive information exchange. These contractual arrangements safeguard 
specific investments and allow producers to get sufficient information from buyers for 
planning of their own activities. Regarding adoption of public quality standards (particularly 
phytosanitary standards), these present a low level of asset specificity, and producers use 
simple or market contractual arrangements. The presence of a public-private organization that 
provides information, inputs and technical assistance to producers, reduces the need for 
safeguarding specific investments thus allowing the use of simple contractual arrangements.  
 
6.2.3 It is important for producers to opt for appropriate features in their business 
relationship with buyers.  
 
Mexican avocado producers have recognized that a consolidated supplier-buyer relationship 
can help them to comply with quality requirements, adopt appropriate business practices, and 
meet the qualitative and quantitative demands of buyers. Characteristics of a supplier-buyer 
relationship such as the long term duration of the arrangement and intensive exchange of 
information play an important role in improving performance in the agrifood sector 
 
Producers improve their performance when their relationship with the buyer is characterized 
by a high expectation of continued business interaction and a substantial exchange of 
information. An ongoing relationship decreases uncertainty about whether the buyer will 
honour the contract. As a result, these producers have obtained a higher product yield and 
product quality. In addition, high levels of information provided by the buyers about the 
quality and quantity their customers demand has resulted in avocado producers improving 
their performance in terms of yield, product quality and price. However, when the market is 
characterized by high price uncertainty, producers face the risk that buyers renege on the 
contract. Under volatile prices, buyers more often start renegotiation prices and quantities. 
When producers have a continued relationship with a buyer, the risk of buyer opportunism is 
reduced. The role of buyer commitment is ambiguous. In our case study we learned that buyer 
commitment is a strong signal for producers to engage in quality enhancing activities. 
However, in our quantitative study we did not find significant support for the hypotheses that 
higher buyer commitment leads to higher producer performance. 
 
6.2.4 Packers seeking performance improvements should not only consider aligning 
activities but also aligning interests with their buyers. 
 
In the Mexican avocado industry, information exchange and the expectation of future 
interaction between packers and buyers has become increasingly important. Packers selling 
products to domestic and international markets face an uncertain environment in which prices 
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are determined on a daily basis and customer demand is volatile due to retail promotions and 
changes in order procedures and volume requirements. We found that packers that try to 
improve adaptation through inter-firm coordination may paradoxically face higher ex-post 
transaction costs. Avocado packers receiving substantial buyer information about customer 
preferences, promotions, and product flows, have improved their performance compared to 
other packers, because demand planning and related activities in distribution and 
transportation have allowed to guarantee product quality and to reduce stock outs. However, 
as our study showed, more interfirm coordination increases the risk for the packer’s specific 
investments. Packers that have invested in human capital and information systems tailored to 
their buyers have created a higher dependency in the packer-buyer relationship. To deal with 
this dependency and the accompanying transaction costs, packers should create a continued 
business relationship with their buyers. This relationship allows packers to combine 
safeguarding specific investments and obtaining additional information that is used for 
performance improvement. In addition, a high level of interfirm coordination creates benefits 
for both the packer and the buyer. Whereas the packer improves its performance in terms of 
sales, the buyer faces less stock outs caused by packer unfulfilment. 
 
6.3 Theoretical contributions 
 
This thesis is among the first to study the relationship between particular supply chain 
practices and inter-organizational arrangements, and how particular combinations of supply 
chain practices and inter-organizational arrangements result in higher performance in the 
Mexican avocado industry.  
 
First, this thesis combined a number of theoretical approaches to develop and test theoretical 
arguments for the combination of particular contractual arrangements and specific supply 
chain practices. Specifically, we use TCE to study the interaction among transaction 
characteristics (asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty, and environmental uncertainty) and 
governance structure when supply chain practices are adopted. Supply chain practices (SCPs) 
are referred to in the SCM literature as organizational and technical tools to increase 
efficiency and competitiveness. SCPs are used to study the interface between supply chain 
actors. Organization theory is utilized as a complementary theory to TCE to understand the 
role that relationship characteristics such as expectation of continuity, commitment and 
information exchange can play to reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour and obtain more 
efficient coordination between buyer and seller activities and thereby enhance performance. 
Thus, whereas TCE and Organization theory have their own focus, assumptions, and 
framework for studying supplier-buyer relationships, SCPs are included in the analysis to 
explain the impact of these practices on performance. 
 
Second, the present study has contributed to understanding what conditions determine the 
level of interfirm coordination. Previous studies on the relationship between environmental 
uncertainty and interfirm coordination (Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000; Buvik and John, 2000) 
found that information exchange is contingent on the magnitude of asset specificity in the 
presence of environmental uncertainty. Despite the relevance of this conclusion, these studies 
lack an explanation of how relationship characteristics or informal governance mechanisms 
safeguard transaction specific assets and promote information exchange. In other words, if 
asset specificity is only considered as a risk because it generates dependency and vulnerability 
to ex-post exploitation, why would a firm be willing to invest? The present study allowed 
explaining the important role that relationship characteristics like expectation of continuity 
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play in aligning interests and promoting information exchange as well as aligning activities in 
the packer-buyer relationship. 
 
Third, by distinguishing between relationship characteristics that have a direct effect on 
coordination and thereby on performance, and those characteristics that affect transaction 
costs resulting from behavioural uncertainty, the present study has contributed to 
understanding the differences in the key mechanisms in TCE and Organization theory to 
explain performance. Particularly, analysis regarding inter-firm coordination should include 
the distinction between information exchange and relationship characteristics that affect 
transaction costs to really understand the impact on performance. 
 
6.4 Limitations and future research 
 
The findings of this study should be evaluated in light of the following limitations. Directions 
for further research are also given. 
 
First, although the sample of producers used in Chapters 3 and 4, and the sample of packers 
used in Chapter 5 were large enough to evaluate the different hypotheses and get significant 
results, we faced limitations in terms of the representativeness are the data. The samples of 
producers and packers included respondents from different farm and firm sizes and from the 
different production areas in Mexico. Thus, the variation in the samples was relatively large 
compared to the sizes of the sample (122 for the producers and 44 for the packers). In other to 
increase the external validity of the findings, we should have selected a larger number of 
respondents. 
 
Second, our sample only contained cross sectional data. Therefore, our results only provide a 
‘snapshot’ of the situation in the Mexican avocado industry. In order to get an idea of the 
dynamics of the relationships, and to go beyond statistical inferences about causality, a 
longitudinal study design would be needed. 
 
Third, our empirical analyses have focused on adoption of quality standards, supplier 
partnership, coordination and performance. No distinction regarding national and 
international marketing channels has been made. A larger sample representing these two 
marketing channels would give more insight in the potential differences in the supply chain 
relationships in these two channels. 
 
Four, in explaining the relationship between coordination and performance (Chapter 4 we 
focused our analysis on those packers that have not formally integrated their packaging 
activities with trading activities. Although our exploratory case study showed that forward 
integration between packers and trading companies is present in a limited number of cases in 
the Mexican avocado industry, future analysis could go deeper into this integration to analyze 
what factors are most important for successful forward integration. In addition future research 
should consider analysing of the relationship between traders and national and international 
retailers. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Case study protocol. Questionnaire for producers, packers, 
traders and representatives of the Mexican government 
participating in the Mexican avocado sector.  
 
Respondent information 
1. What is your position in the company / organization? 
2. How long have you been working in this company? 
3. How long have you been working in this position? 
 
Industry and market characteristics 
4. What different market channels can be identified in the avocado sector in Michoacan? 
5. How many producers participate in each market channel?  
6. How many packers and export packers participate in each market channel? 
7. How many traders participate in each market channel? 
8. How many associated and non-associated producers and packers participate in each 
market channel? 
9. How much product is marketed in the different channels? (international and national 
market: supermarket and middle and small retailers) 
 
Transactional problems 
10. Are there problems about product quality? 
11. Are there problems about stable product supply? 
12. Are there problems about planning production and fulfilment of the buyer’s order?   
 
Supply Chain Practices 
13. What are the activities and investments taken by the producers in order to improve 
product quality?  
14. What are the activities and investments taken by the packers in order to achieve a stable 
product supply with the required quality? 
15. What are the activities and investments taken by the packers with the producers in order to 
develop a supplier-partnership relation? 
16. What are the activities implemented by the packers with the trader in order to synchronize 
the production? (planning production, stock capacity, processing activities, and estimation 
of sales forecasting) 
17. What percentage of the producers complies with phytosanitary and product quality 
activities? 
18. What percentage of the packers develops a supplier-partnership relation with producers? 
19. What percentage of the packers receives information from traders in order to synchronize 
the production? 
 
Governance structure 
20. What are the different arrangements between producer and packer? (spot market, short 
arrangement, large arrangement, verbal arrangement and ownership) 
21. What are the different arrangements between packer and trader? (spot market, short term 
contract, large term contract, verbal arrangement and ownership) 
22. Is a certain arrangement preferred? and why? 
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23. What are the conditions included in these arrangements?  
24. Is a certain arrangement preferred by associated and non-associated producers and 
packers? 
 
Association 
25. How many associations exist in the avocado sector in Mexico? 
26. Who are the types of members in each association? 
27. What are the functions in each association?  
28. What are the members’ obligations and rights?  
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Appendix B. Questionnaire for avocado producers 
 
Section A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Sex Age Education level Avocado 
production 
experience 
Number of 
household 
members 
Size Property 
Own land Rent 
1= male 
2= female 
years 1= primary school 
2= secondary school  
3= higher education 
4= other 
Years Persons Hectares Hectares 
 
 
      
 
1. Residence Place (municipality) __________________________________________________ 
2. How much avocado did you harvest during 2007?       (average ton per hectare) 
3. How much do you expect to harvest in 2010?           (average ton per hectare) 
 
4. Please, indicate whether you are registered and/or certified producer of avocados: 
a.     Not registered  
b.     Registered  
c.     Registered and certified  
 
5. Since when have you have been registered? _____________(years)  
6. In addition to producing avocados, do you have other sources of income?  Yes/No?  
If your answer is ‘No’ continue with question 6. 
    Other farming activities. If so, which activities?        
    Non-farming sources of income? If so, what sources?       
Please indicate the ratio between different sources of income: 
Avocado   %; Other farming    %; Non-farming         %. 
 
Section B. PERFORMANCE 
 
7. What were your sales per hectare, in 2007?  _____________   (pesos) 
8. What was your average price of the product, in 2007?  ___________________ 
9. What was your ratio of high quality product/total product, in 2007? ___________________ 
  
10. What was your total avocado production in 2005? _______________ (tons) 
11. What was your total avocado production in 2007? _______________ (tons) 
12. What total production do you expect for 2009? _______________ (tons) 
 
What is your performance compared to three years ago? Much lower                  Much higher
13. product yield 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
14. product quality 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
15. product price 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
16. profits 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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Section C. MARKET STRUCTURE 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements: 
   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
17. For my last harvest, there were many potential buyers  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
18. For my current harvest, there are many potential buyers  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Section D. RELATIONSHIP WITH BUYERS 
 
19. Who is your main buyer? 
a.    a collector 
b.    a non-certified packer 
c.    a certified packer  
d.    do not know 
 
20. How long time have you been selling your product to this main buyer?           ________ (years) 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements in the relationship with your 
main buyer,  
 
Buyer commitment    not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
21. he tries to help us when we incur problems 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
22. he shares in the problems that arise in the course of dealing  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
23. he is committed to improvements that benefit our relationship 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
24. he has supported us with technical assistance and inputs 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Expectation of continuity   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
25. we expect our relationship to continue a long time  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
26. renewal of the relationship is virtually automatic 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Information exchange   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
27. we receive information to help us plan according to his needs 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
28. we are frequently informed of his product requirements 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
29. we are provided with long-range forecasts of supply requirements  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
30. we are informed in advance of impeding changes in preferences and 
requirements 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Section E. UNCERTAINTY AND INVESTMENTS 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements in the relationship with your 
main buyer, 
 
Behavioural uncertainty   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
31. we are uncertain whether our buyer will stick to the payment 
agreement 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
32. we are uncertain whether our buyer will damage the orchard  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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Environmental uncertainty   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
33. the price for my product varies significantly over the seasons 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
34. there are always many buyers for my product  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
35. the amount of subsidies for inputs changes frequently 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
36. the harvested volume per hectare varies significantly 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Asset specificity 
In order to fulfil the quality requirements of our main buyer: not agree                          totally 
   at all                              agree
37. we lose part of our investment when we switch to another buyer  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
38. we have made significant investments in training of workers and in 
equipment specific for our main buyer 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
39. we have made significant investments in fulfilment of production 
requirements for our main buyer 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Section F. CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT 
 
40. Please, indicates what type of arrangement is commonly used by you in selling your product, and select the 
duration of this arrangement: 
 
41. Please, mark with ‘X’, what terms are indicated in the arrangement:  
Terms Mark with ‘x’ 
Pre-agreed price  
Specific production practices  
Specific harvesting practice  
Certification  
Pre-agreed volume  
Inputs provided by the buyer  
Credit provided by the buyer  
Technical assistance provided the buyer  
Clauses that define penalties if deadlines, services or products are not met, or product 
quality is not fulfilled 
 
Other? Please indicate what other:   
 
Do you participate as an owner in a packaging house?    Yes / No? 
If your answer is ‘No’ continue with question 48. 
  
40a. Type of arrangement 
 
    Written arrangement 
    Verbal arrangement 
40b. Duration 
    one cut  
    one harvest (several cuts) 
    one season 
    several seasons 
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Why did you decide to invest in a packaging activity?   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree 
42. It allows me to obtain a higher price 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
43. It allows me to target other markets 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
44. It allows me to better align production and packaging activities 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
45. It allows me to receive better market information  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
46. It generates additional income 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
47. Other? Please indicate: _________________________________  
 
48. Are you member of an association? 
 (If you are not a member of an association, please, continue with question 50). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49. Please, mark with ‘X’, whether the association performs these functions:  
Functions Mark with ‘x’ 
To regulate product sales   
To provide access to export markets  
To provide information about prices  
To solve disputes with buyers  
To offer technical assistance  
Other? Please indicate what other:   
 
 
Have there been major changes in the arrangement between you and your main buyer over the last three years?  
 
50. Changes in the type of the agreement? If so, what changes? _______________________________ 
 
51. Changes in the terms of the agreement? If so, what changes? ______________________________ 
 
52. Changes in ownership of packaging house? If so, what changes? ___________________________ 
 
 
 
Section G. SUPPLY CHAIN PRACTICES 
 
Have you applied new practices in the last three years?  
 
53. new product standards yes/no 
54. new methods to exchange information with your buyers yes/no 
55. new partnerships with your buyers yes/no 
56. new harvesting methods yes/no 
57. others? Please indicate what others:  
 
  
Yes, APEAM ________ 
Other association ________ 
No                               ________ 
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58. Which quality standard do you apply? 
(If your answer is None, please, continue with question 63) 
 
     None 
     phytosanitary 
     organic 
     US-GAP 
       Global-GAP 
     Other, please indicate ……………. 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements: 
 
In order to implement the highest quality standard,   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
59. we had to obtain more information about specific quality requirements 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
60. we had to obtain more inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, water, etc. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
61. we had to obtain more technical assistance 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
62. we had to obtain more credit in order to invest in inputs 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
63.  Where did you obtain the additional information / inputs / resources:  
 
Information about the specific quality requirements 
     buyer 
     government 
   
 
inputs  
     buyer 
     government 
 
 
technical assistance  
     buyer 
     government 
 
 
credit  
     buyer 
     government 
 
 
Section H. CHANNEL CHOICE 
 
64. What is the main market destination for your product? 
 
     Export market 
     Domestic supermarket 
     Middle and small domestic retailer 
     Do not know 
 
65. Has the main market destination changed during the last three years? Yes / No 
If yes, what has been the change? _______________________________________________ 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements: 
 
We continue to sell in this channel, because,   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
66. In this channel we are paid the highest price for the product 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
67. In this channel we have more certainty of demand 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
68. In this channel we have more growth opportunities 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
69. No alternative is available 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
70. We have invested in a packaging house in this channel 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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Appendix C. Questionnaire for avocado packers 
 
Section A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Municipality of residence   __________________________________________________ 
 
Sex Age Position in the business 
1= male 
2= female 
Years 1= Owner 
2= Manager 
 
 
  
 
Years that company 
is involved in 
avocado business 
Number of people 
employed in the 
company (2007) 
Total sales 
in 2007 
Capacity 
of the company 
Years Persons Pesos Tons 
 
 
   
 
2. Do you also pack other products?     Yes / No 
       If your answer is yes, please indicate what other products: ………………………….. 
       ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3. In your total turnover, how important is avocado compared to the other products: 
       Avocado …………%;  Other products ……………….% 
4. Do you outsource some of your packaging to other packaging houses? Yes / No 
        If your answer is yes, please, indicate what percentage of your total turnover is outsourced ____%  
5. What are the main functions of our company? 
 Only packaging  
 Packaging and Trading 
 
PART I: UPSTREAM PART OF THE CHAIN 
 
Section A. PERFORMANCE 
 
Has there been a change in the performance of your main suppliers over the last tree years with respect to: 
 
 Much lower                  Much higher
6. Defected product  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
7. High quality products as part of total products  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
8. Product price 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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Section B. MARKET STRUCTURE 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements: 
   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree 
9. Last year, we had many suppliers  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
10. This year, we have many potential suppliers  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Section C. RELATIONSHIP WITH SUPPLIERS 
 
11. Who are your main suppliers? 
 
 Collectors 
 Non-certified producers 
 Certified producers  
 Do not know 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements in the relationship with your 
main supplier, 
 
Commitment    not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
12. we try to help them when they have problems in their production 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
13. we are committed to improvements that benefit our relationship  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
14. we have supported them with technical assistance and inputs for a 
long time 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Expectation of continuity   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
15. we expect our relationship to continue a long time  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
16. renewal of the relationship is virtually automatic 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Information exchange 
 
  not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree 
17. we frequently inform them of our product requirements 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
18. we supply them with long-range forecasts of demand  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
19. we inform in advance of expected changes in preferences and 
requirements 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Section D. UNCERTAINTY AND INVESTMENTS 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements in the relationship with your 
main supplier, 
 
Behavioural uncertainty   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
20. we are uncertain whether the suppliers will comply with phytosanitary 
requirements 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
21. we are uncertain whether the suppliers will comply with other quality 
requirements 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Environmental uncertainty   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
22. the quality of the available product varies significantly  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
23. the quantity of the available product varies significantly 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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Transaction specific investment   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
24. we lose part of our investment when we switch to other suppliers  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
25. we have invested in equipment that is special for our main buyers  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
26. if we switch to other suppliers much of our investment has to be made 
again 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
27. if we switch to other suppliers, it would take a lot of time to learn to 
work effectively with these new suppliers 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Section E. CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT 
 
28. Please, indicate what type of arrangement you commonly use in buying avocado, and select the duration of 
this arrangement: 
 
Type of arrangement 
 
 Written agreement 
 Verbal agreement 
Duration 
 
 one cut 
 one harvest (several cuts) 
 one season 
 several seasons 
 
29. Please, mark with ‘X’, what terms are included in the agreement:  
Terms Mark with ‘x’ 
Pre-agreed price  
Specific production practices  
Specific harvesting practices  
Pre-agreed volume  
Input provision to supplier  
Credit provision to supplier  
Technical assistance to supplier  
Clauses that define penalties if deadlines, services or products are not met, or product 
quality is not fulfilled  
Other. Please indicate ……………  
 
30. Do you own orchards yourself?       Yes / No. 
(If your answer is No continue with question 35). 
 
Why did you decide to own orchards?   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree 
31.  It is difficult to obtain product of the right quality 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
32.  It increases our sources of income 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
33.  It is difficult to obtain sufficient volume of product 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
34.  Other reason; please indicate …………..  
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35. Are you member of some association? (If you are not association’s member, please, continue with question 
37). 
 
 
 
 
 
36. Please, mark with ‘X’, whether the association performs these functions:  
Functions Mark with ‘x’ 
To regulate product sales  
To provide access to export market  
To provide information about prices  
To collectively bargain with suppliers and customers     
To solve disputes with suppliers  
Other function; please indicate: ……………………….  
 
Have there been major changes in the agreement between you and your main suppliers over the last three years?  
 
37. Changes in the type of the agreement?  
        If yes, what changes? ………………………………………………………………..  
 
Yes / No 
38. Changes in the terms of the agreement?  
        If yes, what changes?  ……………………………………………………………….. 
 
Yes / No 
 
Section F. SUPPLY CHAIN PRACTICES 
 
39. Which quality standard do you request from your main suppliers? 
(If your answer is None, please, continue with question 44). 
 
 None 
 Phytosanitary 
 Organic  
  US-GAP 
 Global-GAP  
 
In order to help our main suppliers to apply our quality standard, we have provided them with:  
   not at all                          very much
40. information about specific quality requirements 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
41. inputs like fertilizers, pesticides 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
42. technical assistance 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
43. credit  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Changes in Supply Chain Practices 
 
44. Have you applied new practices in the last three years? 
 new product standards 
 new methods to exchange information with your main suppliers 
 new partnership with your main suppliers 
 new harvesting methods for your main suppliers 
 others; please indicate …………………………………………… 
Yes, APEAM               ________ 
Other association ________ 
No                               ________ 
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PART II: DOWNSTREAM PART OF THE CHAIN 
 
Section A. PERFORMANCE 
 
What has been the change in your performance over the last three years, with respect to 
 
  Much lower                  Much higher
45. volume of product sold in the market 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
46. prices for my product  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
47. stock out of product 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
48. What is your expectation as to your turnover in 2010? 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
49. What is your performance compared to your main competitors 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Section B. MARKET STRUCTURE 
 
50. How many buyers did you have in the last season? ___________ 
51. How many buyers do you have in the current season?  ___________ 
 
 
Section C. CHANNEL CHOICE 
 
52. What is the main market destination for your product? 
 Export market 
     - USA         ………….% 
     - Europe     …………..% 
     - Others      …………..% 
 Domestic supermarkets 
 Domestic middle and small retailers 
 Do not know 
 
53. Has your main market destination changed in the last four years?  Yes / No 
If yes, what has been the change?  …………………………………………………………. 
 
Please, indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements: 
 
We continue in this channel, because: 
 
  not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree 
54. In this channel we receive the highest price for my product 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
55. In this channel we have more certainty of demand 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
56. In this channel we have more growth opportunities 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
57. No alternatives available 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Section D. RELATIONSHIP WITH BUYERS 
 
58. Who is your main buyer? 
 International retailer 
 International Wholesaler 
 International trader 
 Domestic retailer 
 Domestic wholesaler  
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Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements in the relationship with our main 
buyer, 
 
Information exchange 
 
  not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree 
59. he supplies us with information about retail demand and promotions   1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
60. he supplies us with information to help us to plan our activities 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
61. he supplies us with information to help us to plan transport activities 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
62. he supports us with precise information  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Section E. UNCERTAINTY AND INVESTMENTS 
Please indicate to what extent you agree/disagree with the following statements in the relationship with your 
main buyer, 
 
Behavioural uncertainty   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
63. I am uncertain whether the buyer will comply with our agreement 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
64. I am uncertain whether the buyer will provide information that I need 
to plan my activities 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Environmental uncertainty   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
65. The demand for avocados varies significantly 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
66. The availability of buyers varies significantly  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Asset specificity   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree
67. we lose part of our investment when we switch to another buyer 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
68. If we decide to stop trading with this buyer, we lose a lot of 
knowledge regarding the buyer’s method of operation 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
69. If we decide to stop trading with this buyer, we lose a lot of the 
investments we have made 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
70. What type of arrangement do you mostly use in selling your product, and what is the duration of this 
arrangement? 
 
70a. Type of arrangement 
 
 Written agreement 
 Verbal agreement 
70b. Duration 
 
 one order 
 one season 
 one year 
 several years 
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71. Please, mark with ‘X’, what terms are part of the agreement:  
Terms Mark with ‘x’ 
Pre-agreed price  
Specifications on avocado production processes  
Certification  
Pre-agreed volume  
Pre-agreed delivery time and delivery place  
Clauses that define penalties if deadlines, services or products are not met, or 
product quality is not fulfilled 
 
Others, please indicate ……………  
 
72. Combining packaging and trading (commercialisation) of avocados may generate a number of advantages. 
Do you agree on the following advantages of an integrated packaging/trading company?  
   not agree                             totally 
     at all                                 agree 
A reduction in price variability 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Better coordination of supply and demand 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Obtaining a higher price 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 Better coordination of packaging and trading activities 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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Appendix D. Proposed hypotheses with the empirical results 
 
 
 
Hypotheses 
Upstream model 
(Relationship 
producer-buyer) 
Downstream 
model 
(Relationship 
packer-buyer) 
Impact of Transactional characteristics and relationship 
characteristics 
  
 H1a: Asset specificity → relational governance Supported  
 H1b: Behavioural uncertainty → market governance Not supported  
 H1c: Environmental uncertainty → market 
governance 
Supported  
 H1d: Institutional environment → market 
governance 
Supported  
 H1e: Expectation of continuity → relational 
governance 
Supported  
 H1f: Buyer commitment → relational governance Not supported  
 H1g: Information exchange → relational 
governance 
Supported  
 H1h: Relational governance → private quality 
standards. 
Supported  
Impact of Transactional characteristics and relationship 
characteristics 
  
 H2a: Asset Specificity → information exchange  Not supported 
 H2b: Asset Specificity → expectation of continuity  Supported 
 H2c: Environmental uncertainty → information 
exchange 
 Supported 
 H2d: Asset specificity x environmental uncertainty 
→ information exchange 
 Supported 
 H2e: Expectation of continuity → information 
exchange 
 Supported 
 H2f: Information exchange → operational 
performance 
 Supported 
 H2g: Expectation of continuity → operational 
performance 
 Supported 
Impact of Transactional characteristics and relationship 
characteristics 
  
 H3a: Buyer commitment → behavioural uncertainty Not supported  
 H3b: Expectation of continuity → behavioural 
uncertainty 
Supported  
 H3c: Environmental uncertainty → behavioural 
uncertainty 
Supported  
 H3d: Behavioural uncertainty → efficiency Supported  
 H3e: Behavioural uncertainty → product quality Supported  
 H3f: Information exchange → efficiency Supported  
 H3g: Information exchange → product quality Supported  
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Summary 
 
Recent changes in agrifood supply chains, such as the need for quality improvement and 
control, enhanced information exchange, and increased customer responsiveness, have made 
the introduction of Supply Chain Practices (SCPs) essential. Adopting practices such as 
product standardization, supplier partnerships and IT driven information exchange have 
resulted in higher supply chain efficiency and economic performance (Fearne et al., 2006; 
Van der Vorst et al., 2007). Producers, traders and processors are able to obtain better control 
over production and distribution processes, improve and assure quality, obtain more reliable 
supply, and rationalize logistic processes in the supply chain (Van der Vorst et al., 2007). 
 
While most research on the introduction of SCPs has focused on the potential benefits, up to 
now little research is conducted on the conditions under which these benefits are obtained. 
Humphrey (2006) has mentioned the complexity associated to adoption of SCPs; Raynaud et 
al. (2005) have called attention for the specificity of the assets involved and the uncertainty of 
the context in which the transactions take place; Van der Vorst et al. (2007), amongst others, 
have emphasized the importance of trust among the supply chain organizations when SCPs 
are adopted. These studies only begin to inform us on the institutional and organizational 
conditions that favour the application of new SCPs. To further the scientific knowledge on the 
contingencies affecting the adoption of SCPs in agrifood supply chains, particularly in fresh 
produce chains, this thesis has studied the introduction of SCPs in the avocado industry in 
Mexico. 
 
Mexican avocado producers have the opportunity to enhance exports to the USA. This new 
export opportunity and the concomitant introduction of strict phytosanitary requirements have 
led to a number of specific supply chain challenges for the Mexican avocado industry, such as 
the need to enhance product quality, create reliable supply, and improve coordination between 
supply chain actors (Ramos, 2007; Sanchez, 2007). In addition, as avocado is a seasonal 
product, the industry is faced with specific supply chain challenges such as large variation in 
the demand for transportation, storage and packaging facilities, making logistic planning more 
complicated (Sanchez, 2007). Within this context, we investigated which SCPs have been 
adopted to respond to the specific supply chain challenges, what type of contractual 
arrangements have been used to facilitate the adoption of SCPs, and what features of the 
relationships between supply chain actors enable a better performance.  
 
The overall objective of this thesis is to explain the relationship between supply chain 
practices and inter-organizational arrangements, and to explain how particular combinations 
of supply chain practices and inter-organizational arrangements result in better performance 
in the Mexican avocado industry. In achieving the main objective, four specific objectives 
have been elaborated: 
 
1 To describe the technical and organizational solutions that avocado packers have 
introduced in dealing with the main supply chain challenges.  
2 To analyse what types of contractual arrangements avocado producers have been using in 
adopting particular quality standards. 
3 To analyse how characteristics of the producer-packer relationship affect producer 
performance. 
4 To analyse the conditions that affect the level of inter-firm coordination between packers 
and buyers. 
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To achieve these objectives we have collected data from producers and buyers in the Mexican 
avocado industry on three key constructs: inter-organizational relationships, supply chain 
practices, and performance. By analysing the interaction among these constructs we seek to 
contribute to both a theoretical and practical understanding of the organizational practices that 
enhance quality performance in a supply chain context. 
 
The present thesis uses three theoretical approaches to conduct the analyses on supply chain 
practices and inter-organizational relationships: Supply Chain Management, Transaction Cost 
Economics, and Organization Theory. Supply Chain Management (SCM) is a rapidly 
evolving area of interest that has usually been applied in studying the interface between 
processors and its suppliers or retailers and its suppliers (Van der Vorst et al., 2007). SCPs 
have been referred to in the SCM literature as organizational and technical tools for increasing 
efficiency and competitiveness (Van der Vorst et al., 2007; Taylor and Fearne, 2009). These 
practices not only stand for the integration of various processes running across functions and 
organizations, they also imply that transactions are grouped and managed from a chain 
perspective. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) has become the predominant theoretical framework for 
explaining inter-organizational relationships (Geyskens et al., 2006). TCE focuses on the 
efficiency of transactions. Transaction costs will be low when there is a good match between 
the attributes of a transaction and the governance structure in which the transaction is 
embedded. Failure to align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance 
structures, which differ in their costs and competences, results in competitive disadvantage 
(Williamson, 1991). Thus, parties in a dyadic relationship are motivated to craft efficient 
organizational forms to achieve lower transaction costs and thus better performance 
(Williamson, 1985). While TCE indicates which (formal) governance mechanisms may 
reduce the transaction costs that result from uncertainty and asset specificity, this approach 
has at least two limitations. First, it ignores the impact of an ongoing relationship on the 
building of cooperative behaviour, which can reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour that 
is so central to TCE (Nooteboom, 2004). Second, because of its assumption of conflicting 
interests between transaction partners, it ignores the possibility of transaction costs even when 
interests are fully aligned (Gulati et al., 2005). Such transaction costs (or better: coordination 
costs) are related to the cognitive limitations of human beings in gathering and processing all 
relevant information concerning the transaction. Recently, several authors have emphasized 
that particular relationship characteristics allow more efficient coordination between buyer 
and seller activities and thereby enhance performance (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Mesquita and 
Brush, 2008; Paulraj et al., 2008). 
 
In addition to SCM and TCE, studies in the field organization theory have emphasized the 
importance of particular relational characteristics in dyadic relationships to reduce the 
propensity of opportunistic behaviour as well as to improve coordination. Organization theory 
posits that forms of organizational interactions are based on the gradual development of 
relationship features such as trust (Barney and Hansen, 1994), reputation (Kreps and Wilson, 
1982), expectation of continuity (Dwyer et al., 1987), and commitment (Noordewier et al., 
1990). These characteristics have the effect of reducing the chance of behavioural 
opportunism (Artz and Brush, 2000; Brouthers et al., 2007; Dyer, 1996 and 1997; Heide and 
John, 1992). In addition, these characteristics improve information exchange and thereby lead 
to more efficient coordination among the transaction partners (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Mesquita 
and Brush, 2008; Paulraj et al., 2008). 
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The objectives presented above will be achieved using a theoretical framework that integrates 
the three theoretical approaches. Each of these theoretical approaches offers its own focus, 
assumptions and framework for studying the adoption of SCPs in supplier-buyer 
relationships. Together they provide complementary explanations for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of particular supplier-buyer relationships. SCM will allow us to determine the 
reasons behind strategic choices and the impact of these choices on performance. Insofar as 
the practices are organizational solutions, they fit in the TCE model, which predicts that a 
different organizational structure will be chosen when transaction costs change. Including 
relationship characteristics in the analysis will allow explaining performance not only on the 
basis of transaction attributes but also on the basis of the characteristics of the relationship. 
 
In the following we will briefly describe the main research topics of the thesis and their main 
results and conclusions. 
 
Supply chain challenges and supply chain practices 
 
Analysis of agrifood supply chains originating from developing countries has focused on 
aspects such as quality and safety of products and reliability of supply (Humphrey, 2006; 
Ruben et al., 2007). Consistent product quality and compliance with complex food safety and 
phytosanitary standards are required when exporting to high demanding markets. Particular 
supply chain practices, such as product standardization, supplier partnership and information 
exchange can be used to enhance quality, guarantee safety, and improve coordination between 
supply and demand (Van der Vorst et al., 2007). 
 
Chapter 2 aims to describe and analyse the technical and organizational solutions that packers 
in the Mexican avocado industry have introduced in dealing with the main supply chain 
challenges. The focus in this chapter is on the role that the packer plays in introducing supply 
chain practices. Although the packer performs a central role in the supply chain, few 
academic studies have focused on this particular chain actor. The main research strategy used 
for this chapter has been the case study. By studying documents and interviewing 13 
representatives of the Mexican avocado industry as well as of state agencies dealing with the 
avocado industry, a rich picture has appeared of the supply chain challenges and the supply 
chain practices introduced to deal with these challenges. 
 
We found that product standardization is the main solution for obtaining reliable supply, and 
that it is mainly organised by packers entering into multilateral partnerships. By establishing 
the Avocado Producers and Export Packers Association of Michoacan (APEAM), packers 
have assured a reliable supply of avocado for the US market. In addition, APEAM has been 
an important private institution supporting the public certification programme. 
 
By establishing two different types of bilateral partnerships, packers have not only obtained 
reliable supply, but have also been able to induce producers to enhance quality. In the first 
type of bilateral partnerships, packers maintain a relationship with producers of specialty 
products, such as avocado that complies with US and European standards on food safety and 
good agricultural practice, and with organic produce standards. The second type of bilateral 
partnerships consists of producers financially participating in packaging houses. Under this 
type of partnership, we found that, whereas producers have adopted high quality standards 
such as US-GAP and Global-GAP, the packaging houses have put much effort in providing 
technical advice to its owners-suppliers in order to support them in complying with current 
and future product and process requirements. 
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Regarding improving coordination downstream in the supply chain, packers have followed 
two different strategies. On the one hand, packers have integrated with trading companies. 
These trading companies have direct contact with foreign customers and thereby have direct 
access to information on retail demand, product quality and quantity required, and available 
stocks. On the other hand, some of the exporting packers have created an intensive contractual 
relationship with their buyers to get better information on retail demand and promotions, and 
other information that facilitates joint planning activities. 
 
We conclude in Chapter 2 that the supply practices product standardization and information 
exchange have been introduced by packers in the Mexican avocado sector. Whereas product 
standardization has been adopted to obtain reliable supply and improve quality, coordination 
has been used by packers to improve the management of demand. Partnerships between 
producers and packers and between packers and buyers have been important organisational 
solutions in dealing with the supply chain challenges of obtaining uniform product quality and 
improving reliability of supply. 
 
Contractual arrangements and food quality standards 
 
Quality is now a key variable in marketing strategies in food chains. Quality improvement 
often requires transaction-specific investments and tight coordination among transactors 
(Ménard and Valceschini, 2005). Difficult-to-measure quality attributes imply asymmetric 
information between buyers and suppliers of food products, while consumer and governments 
request more information on all processes in the supply chain. A key development in food 
chains is the shift from market governance towards more contractual and hierarchical 
governance. Despite the high relevance of the interaction between food quality standards and 
particular governance structures, few studies have sought to analyses the causality between 
these variables (Ménard and Valceschini, 2005; Raynaud et al., 2005). 
 
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the types of contractual arrangements that avocado 
producers have been using in adopting particular quality standards in the Mexican avocado 
industry. To get detailed information on quality standards and contractual arrangements, we 
set up a survey among 122 avocado producers of the state of Michoacan in the period 
February-April 2008. A bivariate probit model was used for the analysis, i.e., two separate 
binary dependent variables were introduced in the model. First, the type of arrangement is 
explained by the transaction characteristics, institutional environment, and relationship 
characteristics. Second, the model estimates the relationship between the type of arrangement 
and the household characteristics as independent variables and type of quality standard as the 
dependent variable. 
 
We found that these independent variables show a good model fit for the dependent variables. 
Regarding the first dependent variable – type of arrangement – we found that asset specificity 
positively influences the adoption of relational arrangements. However, when moderated by 
the institutional environment, we found that a supporting institutional environment causes a 
lower need for safeguarding specific investments and simple arrangements are more 
prevalent. Price uncertainty is an important transaction characteristic. A low level of price 
uncertainty leads to more relational arrangements (compared to spot market arrangements). In 
addition, relational characteristics such as information exchange and expectation of continuity 
significantly explain the adoption of relational arrangements. For the second dependent 
variable – quality standard – we found that relational arrangements, a high price, and a large 
property size have a significantly positive impact on the adoption of private quality standards. 
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Summarizing, the findings presented in Chapter 3 indicate that the type of contractual 
arrangement is important for the adoption of a specific type of quality standard and 
safeguarding specific assets is confirmed as a primary driver of governance structure choice. 
In addition, information exchange and expectation of continuity are important relational 
characteristics explaining relational contractual arrangements. Adopting this type of 
arrangement has been an important prerequisite to adopt high quality standards such as 
Organic, US-GAP or Global-GAP in the Mexican avocado industry. 
 
Relationship characteristics and performance 
 
Relationship characteristics have been found to be important governance mechanisms for 
reducing the propensity of opportunistic behaviour (Barney and Hansen, 1994; Dwyer et al., 
1987; Noordewier et al., 1990). Recently, Mesquita and Brush (2008) have brought further 
depth into the discussion by disentangling which relationship characteristics function as 
safeguards for specific investments and which can be considered coordination devices. They 
found that the function of relationship characteristics varies with the moderating effects of 
complexity and asset specificity. Untangling safeguarding and coordination effects of inter-
firm relationship characteristics in the context of unstable buyer-supplier relationships allows 
a more detailed explanation of the efficiency impact of particular inter-organizational 
relationship characteristics (Mesquita and Brush, 2008).  
 
Chapter 4 seeks to analyse how characteristics of the producer-packer relationship affect 
producer performance. The analysis is based on the same survey among 122 avocado 
producers mentioned above. Our study showed that relationship characteristics influence 
performance through different paths. Whereas expectation of continuity affects payment 
uncertainty and thereby indirectly affects performance measures as yield and product quality, 
information exchange directly affects these performance measures, as well as the perception 
of price and product quality. In contrast, we found that buyer commitment did not 
significantly affect behavioural uncertainty for the producers. 
 
Based on our findings, Chapter 4 confirms that expectation of future benefits is more 
important than the current level of commitment in explaining the cooperative behaviour 
between Mexican avocado producers and packers. To sum up, relational characteristics such 
as expectation of continuity only has an impact on performance through reducing the 
propensity of opportunistic behaviour, while information exchange explains performance 
based on better efficiency and planning of current and future product needs between partners. 
 
Inter-firm coordination between packers and buyers 
 
Inter-firm coordination has become a subject of considerable managerial interest. Typically 
viewed as a universally desirable win-win mechanism (Porter, 1980), inter-firm coordination 
has gained relevance in the analysis of hybrid forms of organization (Gulati et al., 2005; 
Noordewier et al., 1990). Several studies have found that vertical coordination is an effective 
response to the uncertainties of changing market environments (Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Palay, 1984). Other studies, however, have argued that higher levels of inter-firm 
coordination increase the hazard posed to the sellers’ specific investments (Buvik and John, 
2000). Suppliers with substantial transaction-specific investments face safeguarding 
problems, which, under conditions of environmental uncertainty, may conflict with the 
introduction of stronger ties with buyers. Recently, Gulati et al. (2005) have suggested that 
Summary 
138  Supply chain practices, performance and organizational configuration in the 
        Mexican avocado industry 
the analysis of inter-firm coordination requires evaluation of aligning actions as well as 
interests between parties. 
 
While the Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the transactions between producers and packers, Chapter 
5 studies the interaction between packers and their customers. The chapter aims to present an 
analysis of the conditions that affect the level of inter-firm coordination between packers and 
their buyers. The analysis is based a survey among 44 packers in the Mexican avocado 
industry. The data were collected in the period February – April 2008. 
 
Our empirical results indicate that inter-firm coordination based on information exchange and 
expectation of continuity is an important governance mechanism to facilitate aligning actions 
and safeguard specific assets between sellers and buyers when substantial environmental 
uncertainty is present. We found that the level of information exchange is contingent on the 
magnitude of asset specificity. However, we also learned that a high level of information 
exchange is associated with a high level of continuity expectation. Thus, expectation of 
continuity is a relevant variable enhancing and enhanced by intensive information exchange. 
 
Regarding expectation of continuity, we found that this is explained by asset specificity. In 
other words, presence of specialized assets not only creates more dependency among 
transactors, and therefore, vulnerability to exploitation, it also supports parties to continue the 
relationship. In addition, we found that inter-firm coordination has a significant positive 
impact on performance. Whereas a high expectation of continuity reduced sellers’ stock outs, 
information exchange improved sellers’ sales and performance. In summary, individual 
analysis of the two inter-firm coordination variables allowed a comprehensive understanding 
about their role in the exchange relationship and their influence on packers’ performance. 
 
Managerial implications 
 
First, adopting SCPs such as product standardization, information exchange, and supplier 
partnerships allows dealing with several agrifood supply chain challenges. Multilateral 
partnership between producers and packers (e.g. in APEAM) has organised joint interest in 
maintaining a reliable supply. Partnerships based on a contractual producer-packer 
relationship or producers financially participating in a packaging house have allowed 
adopting quality improving practices by avocado producers. Finally, packers entering into 
bilateral partnerships or integrating with trading companies have facilitated joint planning and 
improved efficiency regarding fulfilment of product quality and quantity. 
 
Second, producers require appropriate contractual arrangements to ensure reliable supply 
and/or enhance quality. Producers adopting private quality standards (US-GAP, Global-GAP 
or Organic standard) with a high level of asset specificity should select relational 
arrangements based on expectation of continuity and information exchange. Producers 
adopting public quality standards (e.g. phytosanitary standards) with a low level of asset 
specificity should use simple (market) contractual arrangements in which price is the main 
coordination device. Between these two levels of quality standards, producers investing assets 
in a specific producer-packer relationship may obtain support about information, inputs, and 
technical assistance from a public-private partnership of local producers and federal 
authorities. Thus, the higher the support of public-private institutions for adopting quality 
standards, the less relational arrangements are required. 
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Third, producers should opt for the appropriate features in a business relationship to guarantee 
benefits. Producers should support their producer-buyer relationships in terms of expectation 
of continued business interaction and information exchange to improve their performance. 
The producer expectation of a continuous relationship with a packer decreases producer 
uncertainty associated to whether the buyer will honour the contractual arrangement, and 
thereby supporting actions to improve product yield and product quality. Transparent 
information about the quality and quantity demanded by buyers will lead to Mexican avocado 
producers improving their performance in terms of yield, product quality and price. 
 
Finally, packers that aim at improving coordination and performance should not only consider 
aligning activities in the supply chain, but also aligning interests with their own buyers. Under 
a high level of asset specificity, avocado packers that receive substantial buyer information 
about final customer preferences, promotions, stock flows, can improve their performance, 
because demand planning and related activities such as distribution and transportation will 
allow to assure product quality and to reduce stock outs. However, more inter-firm 
coordination simultaneously increases the hazards to the packer’s specific investments. 
Therefore, packers should put effort in building a continued business relationship with their 
buyers in order to safeguard their specific investments. 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
Recente veranderingen in agri-food supply chains, zoals de noodzaak tot kwaliteits-
verbetering, verbeterde informatie-uitwisseling en meer klantgerichtheid, maken de 
introductie van Supply Chain Practices (SCPs) noodzakelijk. Het toepassen van product-
standaardisering, partnerschappen tussen leveranciers and afnemers en IT-gedreven 
informatie-uitwisseling resulteren in hogere efficiëntie van de supply chain en betere 
economische prestaties (Fearne et al., 2006; Van der Vorst et al., 2007). Ook geven SCPs de 
producenten, handelaren en verwerkers beter controle over het productie- en distributieproces, 
verbeterde en gegarandeerde kwaliteit, de garantie van een constant aanbod en de 
mogelijkheid het logistiek proces te rationaliseren (Van der Vorst et al., 2007). 
 
Terwijl het merendeel van het onderzoek naar de introductie van SCPs zich richt op de 
potentiële voordelen, is er maar weinig onderzoek gedaan over de omstandigheden waaronder 
deze voordelen kunnen worden behaald. Humphrey (2006) noemt de complexiteit die 
samenhangt met de toepassing van SCPs. Raynaud et al. (2005) vragen aandacht voor 
enerzijds de transactiespecificiteit van de noodzakelijke investeringen en anderzijds de 
veranderingen in de context waarbinnen transacties worden uitgevoerd. Van der Vorst et al. 
(2007) benadrukken het belang van vertrouwen binnen supply chains wanneer SCPs worden 
toegepast. Deze studies zijn slechts de eerste stappen in een breder onderzoeksprogramma 
naar de institutionele en organisatorische omstandigheden die de toepassing van SCPs 
beïnvloeden. Dit proefschrift over de introductie van SCPs in de avocadosector in Mexico 
draagt bij aan het vergroten van de wetenschappelijke kennis over de condities die de effect 
hebben op de toepassing van SCPs in agri-food supply chains, met name in ketens van verse 
groente en fruit. 
 
Mexicaanse avocadoproducenten hebben sinds enkele jaren de mogelijkheid te exporteren 
naar de Verenigde Staten. Deze nieuwe exportmogelijkheid evenals de introductie van de 
strikte fytosanitaire eisen hebben geleid tot een aantal specifieke uitdagingen voor de 
avocadosector in Mexico. Deze uitdagingen betreffen vooral de noodzaak tot 
kwaliteitsverbetering, tot het garanderen van een constant aanbod, en tot een verbeterde 
coördinatie tussen de bedrijven in de keten (Ramos, 2007; Sanchez, 2007). Bovendien kampt 
de avocadosector, gezien het seizoensmatige karakter, met een grote variatie in de vraag naar 
transport-, opslag- en verpakkingsfaciliteiten wat leidt tot complexiteit in de logistieke 
planning (Sanchez, 2007). Dit proefschrift onderzoekt welke SCPs worden toegepast om deze 
specifieke uitdagingen te lijf te gaan, welk type contractuele overeenkomsten daarbij worden 
gehanteerd en welke karakteristieken van de relaties tussen de bedrijven in de supply chain tot 
een betere prestatie hebben bijgedragen. 
 
De hoofddoelstelling van dit proefschrift is inzicht te verschaffen in de relatie tussen SCPs en 
organisatorische configuratie in de Mexicaanse avocadosector, en duidelijk te maken hoe 
bepaalde combinaties van SCPs met inter-organisatorische arrangementen tot betere prestaties 
leiden. Om deze hoofddoelstelling te bereiken, worden voor dit proefschrift vier specifieke 
doelen geformuleerd: 
 
1. Het beschrijven van de technische en organisatorische oplossingen die verpakkers van 
avocado’s hebben geïntroduceerd om de belangrijkste uitdagingen in de avocadoketen 
het hoofd te bieden. 
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2. Het analyseren van de verschillende soorten contractuele overeenkomsten die 
producenten van avocado’s hanteren bij de introductie van kwaliteitsstandaarden. 
3. Het analyseren van de invloed van de relaties tussen producenten en verpakkers op de 
prestaties van de producenten. 
4. Het analyseren van de condities die de mate van coördinatie tussen verpakkers en hun 
klanten in de avocado supply chain bepalen.  
 
Om deze doelstellingen te behalen is data verzameld en geanalyseerd over de volgende drie 
aspecten van de Mexicaanse avocadosector: inter-organisatorische relaties, SCPs en prestaties 
van producenten. Door de samenhang tussen deze drie aspecten te analyseren wordt een 
bijdrage geleverd aan het verbeteren van het inzicht in zowel de theorie als de praktijk van de 
samenhang tussen organisatorische configuratie en kwaliteitsverbetering in een supply chain 
context. 
 
Dit proefschrift gebruikt drie theoretische benaderingen om de samenhang tussen SCPs en de 
inter-organisatorische relaties te bestuderen: Supply Chain Management (SCM), Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) en organisatiekunde. SCM is een snel groeiend onderzoeksterrein dat 
veelvuldig wordt toegepast om de relaties tussen verwerkers en hun toeleveranciers of tussen 
retailers en hun toeleveranciers te analyseren (Van der Vorst et al., 2007). Binnen de SCM-
literatuur worden SCPs beschouwd als organisatorische en technische methoden om 
efficiëntie en concurrentiekracht te vergroten (Taylor and Fearne, 2009). Deze methoden 
staan niet alleen voor de integratie van processen die zich over functionele en 
organisatorische grenzen heen uitstrekken, ze benadrukken ook dat transacties worden 
gemanaged vanuit een ketenperspectief. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) vormt het voornaamste theoretisch kader om inter-
organisatorische relaties te duiden (Geyskens et al., 2006). TCE is gericht op de vraag hoe 
transacties zo efficiënt mogelijk kunnen worden uitgevoerd. Transactiekosten kunnen laag 
worden gehouden middels een goede afstemming tussen de transactie (met zijn specifieke 
kenmerken) en de beheerstructuur (met zijn specifieke karakteristieken) waarbinnen de 
transactie wordt uitgevoerd. Een onvoldoende afstemming tussen transactie en beheer-
structuur leidt tot een concurrentienadeel voor de betrokken ondernemingen (Williamson, 
1991). Partijen in een dyadische relatie (bijvoorbeeld een aan- en verkooprelatie) zijn 
gemotiveerd om een organisatorische configuratie te kiezen die tot de laagste transactiekosten 
leidt (Williamson, 1985). Terwijl TCE inzicht geeft in welke beheerstructuren transactie-
kosten kunnen reduceren, heeft deze benadering twee beperkingen. Ten eerste negeert TCE de 
invloed van bestaande relatie op het aangaan van een samenwerkingsverband. Het sociale 
kapitaal dat in een bestaande relatie is opgebouwd kan het risico van opportunistisch gedrag 
aanzienlijk verkleinen (Nooteboom, 2004). Ten tweede gaat TCE uit van tegengestelde 
belangen tussen de transactiepartners, en heeft daarmee geen aandacht voor de mogelijkheid 
van positieve transactiekosten zelfs bij overeenkomstige belangen (Gulati et al., 2005). Zulke 
transactiekosten (beter gezegd: coördinatiekosten) komen voort uit de cognitieve beperkingen 
van mensen om alle benodigde en relevante informatie voor een transactie te kunnen 
verzamelen en verwerken. Verschillende schrijvers hebben benadrukt dat specifieke 
relatiekenmerken een efficiënte coördinatie tussen de activiteiten van de verkoper en die van 
de klant positief kunnen beïnvloeden en daardoor het gezamenlijk resultaat vergroten (Dyer 
and Chu, 2003; Mesquita and Brush, 2008; Paulraj et al., 2008). 
 
Naast SCM en TCE kan ook organisatiekunde bijdragen aan het verhelderen van de 
samenhang tussen organisatie en prestatie in ketens. Binnen de organisatietheorie wordt al 
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langer benadrukt dat specifieke karakteristieken van dyadische relaties de neiging tot 
opportunistisch gedrag kunnen te verminderen. Organisatietheorie stelt dat de keuze voor de 
organisatorische configuratie die wordt gebruikt om onderlinge transacties uit te voeren 
gebaseerd is op de geleidelijke ontwikkeling van relatiekarakteristieken als vertrouwen 
(Barney and Hansen, 1994), reputatie (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), continuïteitsverwachting 
(Dwyer et al., 1987) en betrokkenheid (Noordewier et al., 1990). Deze karakteristieken leiden 
tot een lagere kans op opportunistisch gedrag (Artz and Brush, 2000; Brouthers et al., 2007; 
Dyer, 1996 and 1997; Heide and John, 1992). Daarnaast verbeteren ze de informatie-
uitwisseling wat bijdraagt aan een efficiënte coördinatie tussen de transactiepartners. 
 
Hieronder geven we een korte beschrijving van de belangrijkste onderwerpen van dit 
proefschrift en de voornaamste bevindingen en conclusies. 
 
Problemen en oplossingen in de supply chain 
 
Analyse van agri-food supply chains die beginnen in ontwikkelingslanden richt zich vaak op 
aspecten als kwaliteit en veiligheid van producten en betrouwbaarheid van het aanbod 
(Humphrey, 2006; Ruben et al., 2007). Consistente productkwaliteit en het naleven van strikte 
voedselveiligheidseisen en fytosanitaire standaarden zijn nodig bij export naar markten met 
hoge eisen. Specifieke SCPs als productstandaardisering, partnerschappen tussen leveranciers 
en afnemers, en informatie-uitwisseling kunnen gebruikt worden om kwaliteit te verhogen, 
voedselveiligheid te garanderen en de coördinatie tussen vraag en aanbod te verbeteren (Van 
der Vorst et al., 2007). 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een beschrijving en analyse van de technische en organisatorische 
oplossingen die verpakkers in de Mexicaanse avocadosector hebben geïntroduceerd om de 
belangrijkste problemen in de supply chain op te lossen. De focus van dit hoofdstuk ligt op de 
rol die verpakkers hebben in het introduceren van SCPs. Ondanks de centrale rol die de 
verpakkers binnen het supply chain van verse groente en fruit vervullen is nog weinig 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek gedaan naar deze rol. De voornaamste onderzoeksstrategie die 
gebruikt is in dit hoofdstuk is de case study. Op basis van documenten en interviews met 13 
vertegenwoordigers van bedrijven en organisaties in de Mexicaanse avocadosector (inclusief 
overheidsorganisaties), zijn de problemen en de oplossingen (in de vorm van SCPs) van de 
avocadoketen geïnventariseerd. 
 
Het onderzoek wijst uit dat productstandaardisering de beste methode is om een constant 
aanbod te verkrijgen en dat deze SCP wordt georganiseerd door verpakkers die een 
multilateraal partnerschap zijn aangegaan met producenten. Met het opzetten van de Avocado 
Producenten en Export Verpakkers Vereniging van Michoacán (APEAM) hebben verpakkers 
de garantie verkregen van een constant aanbod van avocado’s met voldoende kwaliteit voor 
export naar de VS. Bovendien heeft APEAM een belangrijke rol gespeeld bij het opzetten en 
uitvoeren van het overheidscertificeringsprogramma betreffende fytosanitaire eisen. 
 
Met behulp van twee verschillende soorten bilaterale partnerschappen hebben verpakkers zich 
niet alleen verzekerd van een constant aanbod maar zijn ze ook in staat geweest om 
producenten aan te zetten tot kwaliteitsverbetering. Het eerste type bilateraal partnerschap 
betreft verpakkers die een contractuele relatie zijn aangegaan met producenten van 
speciaalproducten, zoals avocado’s die aan de Amerikaanse of Europese eisen van 
voedselveiligheid, goede landbouwpraktijk, en standaarden voor biologische producten 
voldoen. Het tweede type bilateraal partnerschap bestaat uit producenten die financieel 
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participeren in een verpakkingsbedrijf. Bij deze vorm van samenwerking leveren de 
verpakkers technisch advies aan de producenten-eigenaren opdat die aan hoge 
kwaliteitsstandaarden (zoals biologisch, US-GAP en Global GAP) kunnen voldoen. 
 
Verpakkers volgen twee strategieën betreffende het verbeteren van de coördinatie in het 
stroomafwaartse deel van de keten. Sommige verpakkers zijn geïntegreerd met handels-
bedrijven. Deze handelsbedrijven staan in directe verbinding met de buitenlandse afnemers en 
hebben direct toegang tot informatie over de ontwikkeling van de vraag, de gewenste 
productkwaliteit, de benodigde hoeveelheid en aanwezige voorraad. Andere verpakkers 
hebben een intensieve contractuele relatie opgebouwd met hun klanten om betere informatie 
te verkrijgen over de vraag van retailers en hun aanbiedingen, om tot betere planning en 
capaciteitsbenutting te komen. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 heeft duidelijk gemaakt dat productstandaardisering en informatie-uitwisseling 
zijn geïntroduceerd door de verpakkers in de Mexicaanse avocadosector. Terwijl product-
standaardisering wordt gebruikt om een constant aanbod en een verbeterde kwaliteit te 
verkrijgen, wordt informatie-uitwisseling vooral gebruikt om beter inzicht te krijgen in de 
vraag naar avocado’s. Partnerschappen tussen producenten en verpakkers maar ook die tussen 
verpakkers en hun klanten zijn belangrijke organisatorische oplossingen voor de problemen in 
de supply chains, zoals een gebrek aan uniforme productkwaliteit en een wisselend 
productaanbod. 
 
Contractuele arrangementen en standaarden voor voedselkwaliteit 
 
Kwaliteit is tegenwoordig een sleutelvariabele in marketingstrategieën binnen voedselketens. 
Kwaliteitsverbetering vereist vaak investeringen in transactiespecifieke activa en in strakke 
coördinatie tussen transactiepartners (Ménard et al., 2005). Moeilijk meetbare kwaliteits-
kenmerken impliceren een asymmetrische informatie tussen klanten en leveranciers, terwijl 
afnemers en overheden meer informatie eisen betreffende alle processen in het supply chain. 
Een evidente ontwikkeling binnen voedselketens is de verschuiving van spotmarkten naar 
meer contractuele en hiërarchische beheerstructuren. Ondanks de relevantie van de 
samenhang tussen voedselkwaliteit en beheerstructuur hebben slechts weinigen deze relatie 
onderzocht (Ménard et al., 2005; Raynaud et al., 2005). 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 worden de verschillende vormen van contractuele arrangementen geanalyseerd 
die avocadoproducenten gebruiken om aan specifieke kwaliteitsstandaarden te voldoen. Om 
gedetailleerde informatie over kwaliteitsstandaarden en contractuele arrangementen te 
verkrijgen is in de periode van februari tot april 2008 informatie verzameld van 122 
avocadoproducenten in de deelstaat Michoacán. Voor de analyse van de gegevens is een 
bivariaat probitmodel gebruikt. Dit betekent dat twee afzonderlijke binaire afhankelijke 
variabelen binnen één model zijn onderzocht. Ten eerste is de vorm van het arrangement 
verklaard aan de hand van transactiekarakteristieken, de institutionele omgeving en de 
kenmerken van de relatie tussen koper en verkoper. Ten tweede is de relatie geschat tussen 
het arrangement en een aantal kenmerken van de producent (als onafhankelijke variabele) en 
het type kwaliteitsstandaard (als afhankelijke variabele).  
 
De onafhankelijke variabelen geven een goede ‘model fit’ voor de afhankelijke variabelen. 
Voor de eerste afhankelijke variabele – type arrangement – hebben we gevonden dat 
specifieke investeringen een positieve invloed hebben op het aangaan van een relationeel 
arrangement. Het bleek echter dat een ondersteunende institutionele omgeving ervoor zorgt 
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dat er minder waarborgen voor de specifieke investeringen nodig zijn, waardoor eenvoudigere 
arrangementen kunnen worden aangegaan. Een laag niveau van prijsonzekerheid stimuleert 
de keuze voor een relationeel arrangement (in vergelijking tot een spotmarkt arrangement). 
Daarbij zijn relationele eigenschappen als informatie-uitwisseling en de verwachting van een 
voortgaande relatie significant in het verklaren van de toepassing van een relationeel 
arrangement. Voor de tweede afhankelijke variabele – kwaliteitsstandaard – vonden we dat 
een relationeel arrangement, een hoge prijs, en een grote boerderij een significant positief 
effect hebben op de adoptie van private kwaliteitsstandaarden. 
 
We kunnen concluderen dat de vorm van het contractuele arrangement belangrijk is voor de 
adoptie van specifieke kwaliteitsstandaarden en dat het waarborgen van specifieke activa de 
voornaamste drijfveer is bij de keuze van beheerstructuur. Daarnaast is gebleken dat 
informatie-uitwisseling en continuïteitsverwachting verklaringen bieden voor de keuze van 
een relationeel arrangement. Het toepassen van een dergelijk contractueel arrangement heeft 
in belangrijke mate bijgedragen aan het kunnen voldoen aan hogere kwaliteitsstandaarden, 
zoals biologisch, US-GAP en Global-GAP, door Mexicaanse avocadoproducenten.  
 
Kenmerken van de relatie en prestatie 
 
Kenmerken van een relatie tussen twee transactiepartners kunnen een belangrijke effect 
hebben op de neiging tot opportunistisch gedrag van een of beide partners (Barney and 
Hansen, 1994; Dwyer et al., 1987; Noordewier et al., 1990). Recentelijk hebben Mesquita and 
Brush (2008) ontrafelt welke kenmerken van de relatie vooral functioneren als waarborg voor 
transactiespecifieke investeringen en welke vooral bijdragen tot coördinatie van de transactie. 
Zij hebben geconcludeerd dat de functie van relatiekenmerken mede afhankelijk is van de 
mate van complexiteit van en specifieke investeringen in de transactie. Door onderscheid te 
maken tussen de waarborgfunctie en coördinatiefuntie, in de context van een onstabiele 
koper-verkoperrelatie, kunnen we een betere verklaring verkrijgen van het effect van 
specifieke relatiekenmerken op de efficiëntie van de transactie (Mesquita and Brush, 2008). 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert hoe bepaalde karakteristieken van de producent-verpakkerrelatie de 
prestatie van de producent beïnvloedt. De analyse is gebaseerd op de eerdergenoemde data 
van 122 avocadoproducenten. Ons onderzoek toont aan dat relatiekarakteristieken op 
verschillende manieren prestatie beïnvloeden. Terwijl continuïteitsverwachting een directe 
invloed heeft op betalingsonzekerheid en daarmee indirect op opbrengst en productkwaliteit, 
heeft informatie-uitwisseling een direct effect op prestatie. Daarentegen bleek dat 
betrokkenheid van de klant bij de (transactie met) de producent geen significant effect heeft 
op de onzekerheid voor de producenten. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 stelt vast dat voor het verklaren van samenwerkingsgedrag tussen Mexicaanse 
avocadoproducenten en verpakkers de verwachting van toekomstige voordelen belangrijker is 
dan het huidig niveau van betrokkenheid. Het relatiekenmerk continuïteitsverwachting heeft 
invloed op prestatie door middel van het reduceren van de neiging tot opportunistisch gedrag, 
terwijl het kenmerk informatie-uitwisseling prestatie verklaart op basis van hogere efficiëntie 
en betere planning van huidige en toekomstige productstromen tussen partners. 
 
Inter-organisatorische coördinatie tussen verpakkers en hun klanten 
 
Inter-organisatorische coördinatie is een belangrijk onderwerp binnen de bedrijfskunde. 
Terwijl het oorspronkelijk werd gezien als een universeel win-win mechanisme (Porter, 
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1980), wordt inter-organisatorische coördinatie recent meer gebruikt bij het analyseren van 
hybride organisatievormen (Gulati et al., 2005; Noordewier et al., 1990). Vershillende studies 
hebben aangetoond dat verticale coördinatie een effectieve reactie is op de onzekerheden in 
dynamische markten (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Palay, 1984). Echter, andere studies beweren 
dat een hoge mate van inter-organisatorische coördinatie een risico oplevert voor de 
transactiespecifieke investeringen van verkopers (Buvik and John, 2000). Leveranciers met 
substantiële transactiespecifieke investeringen ervaren waarborgingsproblemen die, onder 
dynamische omgevingsfactoren, de introductie van sterkere banden met klanten kunnen 
belemmeren. Recentelijk hebben Gulati et al. (2005) voorgesteld dat de analyse van inter-
organisatorische coördinatie naast de klassieke aandacht voor de afstemming van belangen 
tussen transactiepartners ook aandacht moet hebben voor de afstemming van de activiteiten 
van die partners. 
 
Terwijl hoofdstuk 3 en 4 handelen over transacties tussen producenten en verpakkers, 
analyseert hoofdstuk 5 de interactie tussen verpakkers en hun afnemers. Het hoofdstuk 
presenteert een analyse van de omstandigheden die de mate van inter-organisatorische 
coördinatie tussen verpakkers en inkopers bepalen. Deze analyse is gebaseerd op een 
onderzoek onder 44 verpakkers in de Mexicaanse avocadosector. De data is verzameld in de 
periode van februari tot april 2008. 
 
Onze empirische resultaten tonen aan dat inter-organisatorische coördinatie die gebaseerd is 
op informatie-uitwisseling en continuïteitsverwachting een belangrijk beheersmechanisme is 
om activiteiten van transactiepartners op één lijn te krijgen en de specifieke investeringen te 
waarborgen. We concluderen dat het niveau van informatie-uitwisseling bepaald wordt door 
de omvang van de transactiespecifieke investeringen. Tevens hebben we gevonden dat een 
hoge mate van informatie-uitwisseling geassocieerd wordt met een hoog niveau van 
continuïteitsverwachting. Continuïteitsverwachting heeft invloed op informatie-uitwisseling, 
maar informatie-uitwisseling heeft ook een positief effect op continuïteitsverwachting.  
 
Continuïteitsverwachting wordt verklaard door transactiespecifieke investeringen. In andere 
woorden, de aanwezigheid van transactiespecifieke investeringen creëert niet alleen meer 
afhankelijkheid tussen de transactiepartners en daardoor kwetsbaarheid voor uitbuiting, het 
stimuleert ook tot voortzetting van die relatie. Daarnaast heeft inter-organisatorische 
coördinatie een significant positief effect op prestatie. Terwijl een hoge continuïteits-
verwachting de stock-out bij verpakkers heeft verkleind, heeft informatie-uitwisseling de 
prestatie van verpakkers direct verhoogd. Onze afzonderlijke analyse van de twee variabelen 
van inter-organisatorische coördinatie maken het mogelijk een meer gedetailleerd inzicht te 
verkrijgen van hun effect op de transactierelatie en (daarmee) op de prestatie van verpakkers. 
 
Management implicaties 
 
Ten eerste, het toepassen van SCPs zoals productstandaardisering, informatie-uitwisseling en 
partnerschappen tussen leveranciers en afnemers, bieden een oplossing voor verschillende 
uitdagingen in de agri-food supply chain. Producenten en verpakkers die participeren in 
multilaterale partnerschappen (bijvoorbeeld APEAM) hebben een gezamenlijk belang bij het 
organiseren van een constant aanbod. Partnerschappen die gebaseerd zijn op een contractuele 
producent-verpakkerrelatie of producenten die financieel participeren in een verpakkings-
bedrijf bevorderen de adoptie van kwaliteitsverhogende methoden door avocadoproducenten. 
Ten slotte, verpakkers die een bilateraal partnerschap aangaan of integreren met handels-
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maatschappijen hebben gezamenlijke planning ingevoerd en zijn beter in staat gebleken om 
product van de juiste kwaliteit en kwantiteit te leveren. 
 
Ten tweede, producenten dienen geschikte contractuele overeenkomsten te kiezen om een 
constant aanbod en/of een verbeterde kwaliteit te kunnen garanderen. Producenten die private 
standaarden toepassen (zoals biologisch, US-GAP of Global GAP), met een hoog gehalte aan 
transactiespecifieke investeringen, zouden relationele overeenkomsten moeten selecteren op 
basis van continuïteitsverwachting en informatie-uitwisseling. Producenten die enkel publieke 
kwaliteitsstandaarden (bijvoorbeeld fytosanitaire standaarden) hebben nauwelijks 
transactiespecifieke investeringen en kunnen volstaan met eenvoudige contractuele 
overeenkomsten waarin de prijs het voornaamste coördinatiemechanisme is. Daarnaast 
kunnen producenten investeren in partnerschappen met verpakkers. Deze partnerschappen 
hebben onder andere tot doel technische ondersteuning te organiseren voor producenten, 
opdat die de kwaliteit van hun producten kunnen verhogen. Hoe meer ondersteuning van 
publieke en private instellingen, hoe minder relationele contracten nodig zijn. 
 
Ten derde, producenten zouden moeten kiezen voor transactierelaties met specifieke 
karakteristieken. Producenten kunnen hun prestatie verbeteren als ze kiezen voor een 
transactierelatie met een hoge continuïteitsverwachting en een uitgebreide informatie-
uitwisseling. Naarmate de producent hogere verwachtingen heeft betreffende de continuïteit 
van zijn relatie met de verpakker, ervaart hij minder onzekerheid over het gedrag van die 
verpakker. Meer transparantie over de kwaliteit en kwantiteit die gevraagd wordt door 
stroomafwaartse klanten (zoals retailers) zal ertoe leiden dat Mexicaanse avocadoproducenten 
hun prestatie inzake opbrengst, kwaliteit en prijs verbeteren. 
 
Ten slotte, verpakkers die streven naar een verbeterde coördinatie en prestatie zouden zich 
niet alleen moeten richten op het afstemmen van de activiteiten in de keten, maar ook op het 
afstemmen van hun belangen met die van hun afnemers. Avocadoverpakkers die informatie 
van hun klanten krijgen over uiteindelijke vraag van de (buitenlandse) retail, over 
consumentvoorkeuren, over retailaanbiedingen, en over productstromen, kunnen hun prestatie 
verbeteren omdat het de mogelijkheid beidt tot vraaggestuurde planning en verbetering van 
distributie-actitiviteiten. Omdat een hogere mate van inter-organisatorische coördinatie leidt 
tot een groter risico inzake de bescherming van transactiespecifieke investeringen zouden 
verpakkers moeten investeren in langdurige relaties met hun klanten. 
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